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Abstract 
 What led the post-1978 Chinese Leninist elites to allocate state-owned economic capital 
in radically different ways, ranging from centrally planned import-substitution to market-
building efforts to attract foreign investment? In the railway sector, the Ministry of Railways 
maintained its authority to operate the entire industry till 2013; in the shipbuilding sector, the 
minister of shipbuilding industry pursued a program of vertical integration for export-
oriented industrialization since 1978; and in the automobile sector, the central government 
moved from designing coherent industrial upgrading policies at national level to the control 
of foreign direct investment for domestic market-building in 1986. This thesis discloses a 
neo-Bourdieusian state theory to explain this empirical puzzle by establishing existential 
insecurity (both as structurally induced material forces—the collective efforts to deal with 
credible threats backed by capabilities to perform symbolic and physical violence and 
subjective experiences of state actors—the fear of enemy) as a cause of variations in state 
strategy of industrialization. The divided socialist elites competed inside the meta-field of 
party-state—the Central Committee of the Party for a specific form of symbolic capital: the 
statecraft of socialist modernization. This involved exhibiting an alleged expertise for 
articulating the most effective strategy of industrialization, and a capacity to balance national 
defense and improvement of living standards. Moreover, military merits—the abilities to 
prepare, fight, and win battles—formed in revolutionary warfare was central to socialist 
statecraft which resulted in a military logic of industrialization in the geopolitical space of the 
global Cold War. Between 1964 and 1978, this military logic of practice critically affected the 
developmental trajectories of these three industrial sectors which then gave rise to state 
capital differentiation in the post-1978 reform. Competitions among the divided socialist 
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elites decisively shaped the ongoing production of industrial policy. Policy formation was 
also influenced by geopolitical changes, responses by the firm managers, and the dominant 
actor’s final authority in appointing and dismissing policymakers. The effects of these 
additional mechanisms were typically mediated by the two general mechanisms: (1) 
(dis)alignment of policy preferences between constituents in the central committee members 




The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: 
capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural 
capital or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital. It is this concentration as such 
constitute the state as the holder of a sort of metal-capital granting power over other species 
of capital and over their holders.  
– Bourdieu 1999, 57 (emphasis in original) 
The Puzzle 
 Few organizations in the People’s Republic touched more people than the Ministry of 
Railways. Whenever an ordinary citizen wanted to reunify with her family or take a business 
trip to another city by train throughout the sixty-four years of the ministry’s existence, her 
travel was operated by the civil servants of the Ministry of Railways. This ministry was not 
only responsible for the construction of national railway networks, the development and 
maintenance of locomotives, and the management of railway traffic; it even had its own 
hospital, school, police force, prosecutor office, and court system. In post-1978 China, this 
“state within a state” sounds like a gigantic relic from the Stalinist big push industrialization. 
Yet, unlike other ministerial organizations that also took over control of production, 
accumulation of economic capital, and management of industrial sectors under central 
planning, the Ministry of Railways was not dissolved until 2013. Put it differently, this 
market-oriented industrial reform was “delayed” for more than three decades after the 
dissolution of similar agencies: The Sixth Ministry of Machine Building (or simply the 
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry) and the Chief Directorate of Automobile Industry were 
respectively reconfigured into the Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and 
Chinese State Automobile Corporation (CSAC) in 1982.  
 Since 1982, the socioeconomic afterlives of these three industrial giants differed to an 
even greater extent: the CSSC, organized as a “pyramidal business group” in 1982, exists in 
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2020 as the largest shipbuilding conglomerate across the globe1: Today, the CCSC is 
“account for half of new orders and repair contracts from Chinese shipowners, along with the 
bulk of China’s naval shipyard activity” (the Maritime Executive 2019). Currently, the CSSC 
employs 347 thousand personnel, and it holds assets value of approximately 126 billion U.S. 
dollars2 (CSSC 2020). In contrast, the CSAC’s natural monopoly was stripped by the central 
government in 1985; more importantly, at the same time, its most valuable and competitive 
subordinate companies were restructured as separate state-owned enterprises controlled by 
the central government. In addition, its remaining administrative functions for industrial 
regulation were transferred to a newly established industrial association in 1987. In 2007, the 
CSAC went bankrupt. When the Ministry of Railways s was “finally” dissolved in 2013, its 
administrative functions were then transferred to the Ministry of Transport, and its economic 
roles were succeeded by the China Railway3at the same time. 
 How did the central government decide to introduce differentiated industrial policies for 
reforming these three state sectors with such radical differences in the designs, paths, and 
speeds? And what explains the state’s contrasting manners in arranging state-owned 
economic capital’s allocation, accumulation, and managerial forms in these three industries? I 
argue that the ways that the ministerial subfield elites connected to different constituencies 
(i.e., the political actors of the meta-field of the party-state: the members of the Central 
Committee of the Party) during the Third Front (ca. 1964-80)—the militarized big push 
 
1 It was split into two sperate entities in 1998 to boost competition, the hierarchical arrangements of corporate 
structure remained unchanged and in 2019 a re-merger was completed. 
2 The numbers are calculated from the CSSC’s official website, it states that it holds 840 billion RMB.  
3 Its full name for now is China State Railway Group Company, Ltd (CR). 
11 
industrialization program—critically affected their ability to transform economic 
performance into symbolic capital. This variation in extent and type of political-symbolic 
capital is what allowed these subfield actors to set the terms of their own restructuring of the 
ministerial subfields, or that left them at the mercy of reform initiatives issued by the 
dominant actors inside the main overarching field of power. 
 The empirical purpose of explaining why these three powerful ministries experienced 
radically different outcomes in the historic processes of economic reform is to develop an 
explanation of the mode of operation of all industrial state-owned enterprises in post-1978 
China. In addition to this substantive contribution, my project also illustrates the explanatory 
payoff of the neo-Bourdieusian field-theoretic analysis: without specifying the political-
symbolic leverages of the ministerial subfield actors we cannot properly understand the 
political origins of industrial policy in the non-liberal democratic states; without specifying 
the definition of the field- and competition-specific symbolic capital governing conflicts 
within the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) we cannot explain how 
the divided socialist elites created and recreated the national system of industrial economy, 
and without analyzing those conflicts internal to the socialist state we cannot properly situate 
the encasing effects of existential insecurity of the global Cold War on the trajectory of 
national industrialization. 
Misplaced Concreteness: Previous Explanations 
 By conducting this field-theoretic analysis, I intend to make several theoretical 
contributions as well. The formation and transformation of the national system of political 
economy in China can be conceived as a part of the larger history of state-led 
industrialization (Kohli 2004; Aiginger and Rodrik 2020; Hirata 2020). While the theorists of 
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comparative political economy have made great strides in explaining the effects of different 
types of incentive structures (Acemoglu et al. 2020; Jiang 2018; Chen 2018) within state 
bureaucracy on various outcomes, prior studies have not theorized why different types of 
incentive structures emerge in the first place. The literature on war, conversely, has 
predominantly sought to explain the occurrence, dynamics, and resolution of conflict (for 
example, Copeland 2015; Toft and Zhukov 2015; Zhukov 2017), while the existential 
insecurity (i.e., the collective efforts to deal with credible threats backed by capabilities to 
perform symbolic and physical violence motivated by the subjective experiences of state 
actors—the fear of enemy) created by perceived threats to political survival as a producer of 
political outcomes other than state formation (Tilly 1985; Kiser and Baer 2005) and political 
order (Huntington and Fukuyama 2006; Slater and Smith 2016) has been neglected.          
 This thesis brings together these disjoint literatures and establishes existential insecurity 
as a cause of policy formation. Before these three industries were differently restructured in 
the post-1978 reform, they had been constructed under a military logic of industrialization 
(Zedong [1964a] 2014; Zhengcao [1964a] 2014; Military Administration Committee of the 
First Ministry of Machine Building [1969] 2014; State Council and Central Military 
Commission [1970] 2014). Between 1964 and 1971, Chinese generals under Mao replaced 
the purged statesmen to design and implement this state strategy of industrialization (Li 
2007) to secure the survival of the socialist state in the bipolar space of the global Cold War 
via massive military buildup (Naughton 1991). Building on the “founding struggle” paradigm 
(see Levitsky and Way 2012; Slater and Smith 2016), my point to discuss the roles of the 
military in the politics of industrialization is to illustrate the symbolic importance of military 
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merits (see Finer and Stanley 2002) in socialist statecraft. The fear of (imagined) enemies 
(Evrigenis 2008) incentivized the divided elites’ collective action for thwarting perceived 
dangers.   
 In brief, I argue existential insecurity formed in revolutionary warfare can result in the 
militarization of the socialist state. This militarized state strategy of industrialization for 
combat capabilities development was the priority of the central government (Naughton, 
1991). This power structure in which generals replaced statesmen for designing state-led 
industrialization was the outcome of Chinese party elites’ collective encounter with organized 
mass death in revolutionary war and counterrevolutionary state-sanctioned mass murder 
before they took national power in 1949. Moreover, their existential insecurity was reinforced 
by geopolitical changes of the global Cold War (Li and Xia 2018). Geopolitical changes of 
the global Cold War and the collective encounter with mass death both contributed to the 
militarization of the socialist state in China (for the historical accounts of militarization in 
socialist China, see Naughton 1988; Lewis and Xue 1991; Zedong and Qiuli [1965] 2014; 
Meyskens 2015; Meyskens 2020; Hou 2018). Conversely, because the Soviet civilian party 
elites had much less operational experience and stayed in major cities rather than fought side-
by-side with the former Tsarist officers of the Red Army to defeat the counterrevolutionary 
“Whites”, the bureaucratization of the Soviet state was less militarized (Zhou 2019). 
Moreover, the Soviet armed forces relied on army-to-army strategies for national defense 
(Glantz 2013). These military strategies required a professional state bureaucracy 
(Sokolovsky and Garthoff 1963; Priestland 2010) in which party elites lacked the military 
expertise to exercise command-and-control authority for conducting combined arms 
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operation (for a detailed account of Soviet military-party conflict, see Nichols 1993). As a 
result, geopolitical changes reinforced this separate pattern of party-army dynamics.     
 This militarization is one key aspect of Chinese state socialism that departs from Marx 
and Engels' envision of socialism (Engels 1877; Joas and Knöbl 2013). When Deng Xiaoping 
was rehabilitated in 1975, his first orders ([1975] 2014, 282; [1981] 2014, 284) were to 
replace the militarized strategy of industrial development with an emphasis on production of 
consumptive goods. In this sense, the beginning of post-1978 economic reform cannot be 
properly addressed without paying attention to the rise and fall of military merits in socialist 
statecraft.     
 This thesis also refines the literature on state-led industrialization (for example, Kohli 
1994; Kohli 2004; Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 2015) which has tended to lump together 
competing policy-planning agencies of all kinds as an autonomous apparatus that determines 
effective policymaking, invoking problematic conceptualizations to the relative autonomy of 
administrative subfields. In addition, the Weberian theorists of bureaucratic autonomy (for 
example, see Evans 1995) tended to conceptualize relative autonomy as a binary category: 
the policy planning agencies’ autonomy in respect to constituents’ political agendas and 
suburbanites’ action-orientations is constructed as a twofold concept. First, bureaucrats at the 
top positions of policy-planning agencies are characterized as “depoliticalized” actors who 
can craft long term developmental strategy without intervention from above. Second, 
professionalized “policy implementers” in the administrative subfields (i.e., the 
administrative subordinates) are depicted as robotic actors who cannot defy or challenge their 
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institutional bosses (i.e., the leaders of planning agencies ). If one of the two conditions fails 
to occur, then autonomy does not exist.    
 This “Weberian” theorization based on capitalist states in Continental Europe (Dunlavy 
1994), North America (Carpenter 2001), and East Asia (for example, Carpenter 2001 and 
Kohli 2004) fails to capture the socio-political realities of early socialist states which 
systematically recruited peasant boys, revolutionary soldiers, and urban workers into the 
poorly bureaucratized, patron-client based, and ideologically rifted state apparatuses: the 
literature on the formation of socialist states has pointed out this flaw but lacks a theoretical 
explanation to the encasing effects of bureaucratization on the socialist political economy (for 
excellent studies of the bureaucratization of socialist states, see Easter 1996; U 2007; Walder 
1986; Kligman and Verdery 2011; Hou 2018; Andreas 2019).  
 Moreover, the literature on the politics of policymaking within non-democratic states 
exaggerated the administrative control of the dominant actors (for example, Lü and Landry 
2014). According to the foundational texts of the politics of economic development in post-
1978 China, the ministers and provincial officials who make economic policies are 
characterized as autonomous actors whose decisions can only be challenged by bargaining 
between them (Shirk 1993; Mertha 2009) and contingent interventions from their institutional 
boss (Baum 1994)—the dominant actor and position in the meta-field. While such a 
dichotomous conceptualization offers clear measurement advantages, “policy kingdom” 
problematically defines the irrelevance of power struggles in the meta-field as the conceptual 
benchmark and neglects ways in which dominant state actors exert political power by 
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creating and recreating incentive structures for bureaucrats in the policy planning and 
implementation subfields (for example, Bendix 1973; Hintze et al. 1975; Gorski 2013). 
 In this thesis, I propose to reexamine these theoretical assumptions of ministerial 
autonomy in respect to political constituents’ action-orientations and bureaucratic 
subordinates’ policy preferences. The presence of competition in the meta-field is not 
necessarily a cause of fragmentation (Lieberthal 1992); rather, it may indicate the emergence 
of the attempts at restructuring the incentives within the state-structured institutional order 
(for example, see Johnson 1982, 74-5; Kandil 2016). Political competition in the meta-field 
also frequently involves policy preferences of one faction (i.e., a vertical alliance between 
administrative bureaucrats and political constituents) outcompeting the ones of another, rather 
than the promotion of the dominated actors (i.e., the subordinate bureaucrats who design and 
implement the policies) who achieved the best performance in the views of the outcompeted 
elites. In other words, theorists cannot assume the presence of competition always increases 
the likelihood of the formation of persistent incentive schemes. In the political context of 
non-democratic party-states, the rationalization of bureaucracies is conditioned by the power 
struggles within the party-state fields (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 
1998; Eyal 2003; Zhang 2020).     
 Most relevant to this study is Yeling Tan’ recent attempt to specify the variations in state 
strategies (2020). Tan defines a state strategy as “a set of policy instruments, rooted in a 
particular mode of state–market relations, that is adopted to further a state’s economic 
objectives” (2020, 2121). This thesis’s definition of state strategy builds on Tan’s one because 
it makes the task of delineating the historic processes of state capital differentiation 
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analytically manageable. However, my definition differs from Tan’s one in a crucial way: her 
theory does not include an explanation of why and how these political agendas of exceeding 
and distinctive durability emerge in the first place.  
 According to Tan’s machine-learning-based text analysis, three competing state strategies 
existed in post-1978 China. First, “the regulatory strategy involves an arms-length 
relationship between state and business, where the role of the state is to facilitate the 
functioning of market mechanisms and address market failures” (Tan, 2020, 2122). In this 
case, “regulatory policies therefore involve a redeployment (rather than reduction) of state 
activity toward market-enhancing measures to strengthen price signals and establish a level 
playing field for competition” (Tan 2020, 2122). Second, “the developmental strategy in its 
‘classic’ sense is associated with a depoliticized bureaucracy that mixes intervention with 
market mechanisms to drive a nation’s industrialization (Tan 2020, 2123). Third, “the 
directive strategy refers to policies drawn from methods used in the Mao-era planned 
economy and which derive from command and control governance approaches used by the 
Soviet Union” (Tan 2020, 2123). Her theory-generating exercise shows how multiple agendas 
of industrialization can coexist in the Leninist state; but her theory does not provide an 
explanation to how and why these state strategies of exceeding and distinctive durability 
emerged in the first place. In this sense, the aim of this thesis is to explain the historical 
origins of these state strategies inside the post-1978 CCP party-state.   
 In so doing, central to my neo-Bourdieusian state theory is the proposal to study state 
capital in terms of practices of policymaking as modus operandi rather than in terms of 
policies as opus operatum (see Bourdieu 1977, 79). As I will explicate in chapter 1, state 
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strategies are subjected to the political competition in the meta-field of power; and state 
strategies are weaponized by political actors to obtain and hold power. In this sense, the state 
strategy— a set of policy instruments that is adopted by the members the meta-field of 
power—is weaponized by state actors for advancing industrial development (as the universal 
interests) and holding political power (as the particular interests). 
 Henceforth, building on the literature on state strategies of economic development 
(Katzenstein 1981; Prasad 2006; Hsueh 2016; Ang 2016; Tan 2020), this thesis represents an 
initial effort to correct these polarized and problematic imaginations of state competition. By 
development I refer to the socioeconomic “transformation of agrarian societies into industrial 
ones” (Kohli 2020, 7). The divided Chinese Leninist state elites in the post-Mao era 
embraced market economy not because they intentionally betrayed socialist theodicy formed 
in the founding struggles, but because they consciously competed for the power of defining 
the most effective state strategy of economic and industrial development. In the late Mao era 
(ca. 1964-76), the Chinese mass-mobilizing party elites within the central government 
defined the rapid construction of decentralized military buildup as the only priority of 
industrial policy (Naughton, 1991), and the Chinese socialist state was more militarized than 
other socialist states for defending national sovereignty (Meyskens 2015; Meyskens 2020), 
and these structures in which mass-mobilizing elites carried out waves of purges to their 
colleagues who prioritized consumption investment and central planning proved fragile.      
An Overview of the Thesis 
 In what follows, I offer a state theory of two general mechanisms that mediate existential 
insecurity and changes in industrial policies. First, existential insecurity conditions the 
possibilities of political alignment in the meta-field. Existential insecurity is the collective 
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efforts to deal with credible threats motivated by the subjective experience of organized mass 
death—the fear of enemies (see Evrigenis 2008). My definition is expansive but intentionally 
so. I conceptually separate existential insecurity from “war” because existential insecurity 
includes: (1) the military-industrial bureaucracy’s autonomous yet insecure operational 
experience of fighting armed conflicts and (2) the military-industrial measures taken by the 
state actors for thwarting perceived dangers during peacetime. I find it useful to conceptualize 
insecurity in wider rather than narrower terms because I seek a concept that can travel cross 
space and time, even though I fully expect that insecurities will play out in informatively 
different ways in different events of social transformations. Second, the political 
(dis)alignment of policy preferences between constituents in the meta-field, as the external 
force on administrative subfields, decisively shapes the degree of relative autonomy enjoyed 
by subfield policymakers. The relative autonomy of ministerial bureaucrats is subjected to the 
political competition in the meta-field: the struggles over the agenda-setting power of 
defining the “best” means to fulfill the universal intertest—national strivings in the bipolar 
universe of the global Cold War. 
 In chapter 1, an overview of the argument is provided. In chapter 2, a comparative 
historical analysis of the two socialist revolutions in Russia and China elaborates the effects 
revolutionary military merits have on the post-revolutionary states’ strategies of 
industrialization. The basic method I employ to establish a linkage between the lived 
experience of organized mass death and the procedural context of state formation is to use the 
Millian method of difference to compare these two socialist revolutions for establishing 
Leninist elites’ existential insecurity formed in regional insurgencies as a cause of the 
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militarization of the Chinese socialist state. In chapter3, I analyze the becoming of the Third 
Front as a historical turning point in which state competitions resulted in the military logic of 
Mao’s last big push industrialization. In chapter 4, a comparative historical analysis of state 
capital differentiation in the railways, automobile, and shipbuilding sectors elaborates the 
institutional mechanisms through which the competitive dynamics of policymaking can result 
in radical differences in paths, designs, and speeds of industrial reforms of state sectors. This 
theory-generating exercise shows how state competitions within the Central Committee of the 
CCP can give rise to durable, although not unchangeable, socioeconomic orders.  
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Chapter1 The Games of Old Bolsheviks 
The Argument 
 An effective theory of state capital must begin by explaining how state capital functioned 
to the mode of operation of the national system of political economy (see Hsueh 2016; Lee 
2017). In this thesis, stateness in state capital refers to the capacities of state actors (backed 
by material and symbolic forces) to accumulate, manage and control economic capital. 
Economic capital here refers to the means of economic existence (Tilly 1992; Easter 2012, 1). 
It can be physical assets, cash, and credit. While the general mechanisms I posit is novel, the 
institution I see underpinning state-structured socioeconomic order should be familiar—the 
meta-field of socialist states—the Central Committee of the Party. And, in a political culture 
where elites in the Central Committee share the collective intention to build an industrialized 
national economy but disagree and compete with each other about the methods, these 
competitive dynamics inside the meta-field of the Leninist state (i.e., the Central Committee), 
I argue, decisively shape the transformation of the mode of operation of national economy in 
post-1978 China in which state-owned enterprises—the institutions of controlling, creating, 
and accumulating economic capital owned by the state (Lee 2017)—have been designed to 
perform differentiated and active roles in different industrial sectors for developing a state-
regulated market economy. 
  In the actually existing socialist project, the Central Committee of the Party holds the 
final authority of making claims of economic capital. For materializing the Leninist party-
state’s claims of economic capital, the state-owned enterprises are tasked to build a socialist 
economy at national scale. “SOEs in Maoist China, like their counterparts in other socialist 
regimes, were embedded into the state bureaucracy as the core parts of the socialist planned 
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economy” (Hirata 2020, 876). However, the conflicts over the design and implementation of 
state strategies are at the center of ceaseless power struggles (for cases other than Soviet-type 
socialist states, see Kandil 2016, 2–4) inside the top echelons of state bureaucracies. In short, 
the dynamics of the power struggles in the Leninist meta-field can be defined in the following 
terms: the collective intention to build an industrialized national economy was shared by 
socialist state elites who disagreed and competed with each other about the methods. The 
symbolic parameters, structured by the formal institutions of the party-state, compromise the 
procedural contexts of power struggle and political articulation4. 
Militarization and State Strategies of Industrialization: From Revolutionary Warfare to Post-
Revolutionary Political Competition 
 My central analytical ambition is agenda correcting and, potentially, agenda setting. In 
doing so, two threads of argument entwine each other in this thesis. First, a neo-Bourdieusian 
state theory offers sustained mediation on the historic processes between the development of 
state elites’ understandings of state strategies of industrialization as formed and transformed 
in political competition and the changes of economic institutions created and recreated by 
their action5. More, it lays out in detail the competitive dynamics through which these historic 
processes operate.  
 Its particular claim is that existential insecurity—that is, the collective efforts to deal 
with credible threats to the post-revolutionary state motivated by the fear of enemies in the 
geopolitical space of the global Cold War across time—plays a central role in these 
 
4 This survey serves as a guide to explain macro-structural changes’ encasing effects on shaping the explicit and 
implicit rules of political competition which in turn conditions the possibilities of strategic choices in the state 
field. 
5 This argument is also inspired by Machiavelli’s theory of state.   
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competitive dynamics of the formation of state strategy of industrialization. The field of 
power in socialist China was permeated with this air of fear. Consequently, during the pivotal 
era of the global Cold War, the Chinese socialist statesmen regarded military merits forged in 
their collective experience of revolutionary warfare—the abilities to prepare, fight, and win 
battles as the centerpiece of socialist statecraft. This military merit transformed into the 
habitus of the state actors (Bourdieu 1977, 78-9): this is reflected in the languages (including 
speeches, letters, and instructions), practices (including decision-making processes), and 
structures (including party-army dynamics) within the field of power (for example, see Mao 
[1964a] 2014; Mao and Yu [1965] 2014; Zhou 2019; Hou 2018). Yet they disagreed on the 
means to accomplish national prosperity in this bipolar universe of nuclear standoffs that they 
agreed to be dangerous and hostile. Thus, I argue for a focus on processes of power struggles 
as an analytical angle from which the decisions of policy change can be comprehended. The 
power struggles in the meta-field critically affected the formation of incentive schemes and of 
institutional adaptiveness (Tsai 2006) in the post-1978 reform.  
 Second, a historical strand of argument offers a reinterpretation of the formation of the 
post-1978 national system of political economy in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by 
analyzing it as the renewed “attempt to perform a revolutionary self-fulfilling prophecy” 
(Glaeser 2011, xv). This perspective enables an empirical account of the eventful 
socioeconomic transformation from Maoist socialism to the post-1978 state-regulated market 
economy, which focuses on the party-state elites’ collective efforts to resolve the catastrophes 
unleashed by Mao’s grand strategy of decentralized military buildup (i.e., the Third Front 
construction). In this sense, we can gain a fuller understanding of the critical roles played by 
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fantasies, fears, and hopes in (re)stabilizing the economic and political systems (Beckert 
2016, 114) in the PRC by analyzing the Third Front as a specific transformative event 
(Abbott 1992; Sewell 1996; Steinmetz 2005) in which socialist elites’ collective fears of 
enemies induced nonlinear social changes. The comparative survey of these three centralized 
agencies of railways, automobile, and shipbuilding industries and their different forms and 
levels of involvement in the Third Front is intended to help us to identify the formation of 
differentiated state capital in post-1978 China as the political outcome of competition within 
the meta-field of the party-state—the Central Committee of the CCP.  
Table 1.1: A Two-Dimensional Typology of the Differentiated State Strategy of 
Industrialization in Post-1978 Manufacturing Sectors at National Level 
  Industrial Upgrading  










A Unified State 
Bureaucracy at National 








controlled by the central 
government enjoy a natural 
monopoly and other 
institutional privileges in terms 
of finance and administrative 
rank; limited inter-firm 
competition in the same sector) 
Shipbuilding Industry 
(central government controls 
the path of industrial upgrading 
through infant industry 
protection policies; and 
bureaucratic coordination 
between firms in allocating 
their shares of the domestic 
market) 
Market Competition 
between Firms with 
limited coordination at 
national scale: The 
Central Government 
designs Industrial 
Policy via Control of 
Inflow of Foreign 
Investment and Access 
to Global market 
Automobile Industry  
(central government controls 
foreign direct investment 
through the rules of access to 
the domestic market; for 
example, foreign firms must 
set joint ventures with Chinese 
state-owned enterprises which 
have a majority share)   
Textile Industry 
(no state-owned enterprise 
directly controlled by the 
central government; they are 
either privatized or transferred 
to local authorities for regional 
development) 
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 For answering why and how these agencies would then be able to (or fail to) transform 
themselves in the years of post-1978 reform, industrial policy needs to be understood as a 
field- and competition-specific symbolic capital in the state (Bourdieu 2014; Bourdieu 2018; 
Steinmetz 2008; Zhang 2020). In this sense, I offer a new state theory of socioeconomic 
transformation in contrast to the currently prevalent variants of economic and political 
systems variants (for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Solnick 1999; 
Dimitrov 2013). The point is not to say these are altogether invalid. Rather, I argue that 
properly addressing the symbolic dimensions of stateness enables comparative theorists to 
develop an analytical angle from which the competitive dynamics of institutional changes 
(Kandil 2016) can be comprehended. 
Between Cause and Effect: Political Competition in the Making of State Strategies 
 To explain the links between existential insecurity and variations in industrial policies at 
sectoral level which then gave rise to the differentiated state capital in post-1978 China, I 
emphasize two competitive dynamics of institutions: (1) the political articulations (Jessop 
1982, 155; De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal 2009; Mudge 2018) of policy preferences between the 
divided elites in the meta-field and (2) the patterns of connections between ministers and 
constituents in the meta-field. By focusing on these two dimensions of the power struggle, I 
show that cultural schemas, as William Sewell Jr. has pointed out (1996), is an intrinsic part 
of the transformative events in which party elites’ action created and recreated economic 
institutions.  
 Central to this neo-Bourdieusian state theory is the proposal to study state capital in 
terms of acts of policymaking as modus operandi rather than in terms of policies as opus 
operatum. Henceforth, two sets of hypotheses are tested in this thesis. These hypotheses seek 
26 
to explain variations in both (1) strategic goals of industrialization, which refer to the ends of 
industrial development defined by the Central Committee, and (2) types of post-1978 
industrial policies, which capture radical differences in state’s manners of controlling, 
accumulating, and managing economic capital.  
 First, civilian party elites’ direct exposure to organized violence in the founding struggles 
increases the likelihood of militarization of post-revolutionary party-state. In this case, we 
can expect an “infused pattern of post-revolutionary party-army dynamics” (Zhou 2019, 197) 
in which generals hold decision-making power over policies that are irrelevant to the conduct 
of combat operations. Conversely, civilian party elites’ limited exposure to organized 
violence in the founding struggles decreases the likelihood of militarization. In this case, we 
can expect “a separate pattern of post-revolutionary party-army dynamics” (Zhou 2019, 197) 
in which generals focus on military activities and professional technocrats hold decision-
making power over industrial policies. The party elites’ involvement in the founding struggles 
can be measured by identifying their positions during the revolutionary warfare (i.e., if they 
joined the armed forces as uniformed, active-duty officers or political commissars, then they 
should have more exposure to organized violence; if they stayed in cities and did not join the 
armed forces, they should have limited exposure to mass death through war).  
 Second, a coherent articulation of policy preferences based on the agreement of the 
necessity of military-industrial preparations in the meta-field (i.e., the collective strategy of 
political survival of dominant actors) increases the likelihood of high-powered incentives of a 
unified industrialization strategy at national level. Conversely, the disalignment of policy 
preferences between actors in the meta-field—increases the likelihood of differentiated 
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industrialization strategies at sectoral level. More generally, my conceptual emphasis on 
militarization (see Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2019) – a term I derive from classic texts of state 
theory (for example, Hintze et al. 1975; Finer and Stanley 2002) – highlights the encasing 
effects of existential insecurity on the institutional foundations of national economy. I 
measure policy preferences and policy outcomes by analyzing central committee members’ 
speeches, briefing, governmental reports, meeting records, and decrees.  
Table 1.2: The Predicted Effects of State Competition 
    Economic 





(Central government formally 
controls the state-owned 
enterprises) 
Decentralization  
(Central government no longer 
controls the state-owned 
enterprises) 
Alignment of Policy 
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Centralized agency for import-
substitution industrialization—
central planning  
(Meta-field actors holds 
agenda setting power: they set 
the reform initiatives) 
Example: Ministry of Railways  
Decentralized agency for market 
competition—state-owned 
enterprises are controlled by 
local authorities.  
(Meta-field actors holds agenda 
setting power: they set the 
reform initiatives)  
Example: automobile industry   
Disalignment of 
Policy Preferences in 
the meta-field: 
competing agendas 
of industrialization   
Centralized agency for export-
oriented industrialization— 
developmental state in the 
“classic sense”  
(If the subfield actors 
successfully exhibit their 
alleged expertise of advancing 
socialist industrialization, they 
can set their own terms of 
industrial reform.) 
Example: Sixth Ministry of 
Machine Building (i.e., 
shipbuilding industry) 
Decentralized agency for 
domestic market building—
regulatory policy  
(If the subfield actors 
successfully exhibit their alleged 
expertise of advancing socialist 
industrialization, they can set 
their own terms of industrial 
reform.) 
Example: textile industry  
The Logic of Inquiry 
 These deliberations about the importance of comparing different historical processes that 
are distinct in space and time for the building of state theory lead straight into considerations 
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about method. The primary logic of inquiry of this thesis is counterfactual. By “mentally 
altering” the historical processes (De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal 2009, 201) in which each camp 
of the divided state actors (i.e., the mass mobilizers, the consumption investors, and the 
central planners) articulated a distinctive state strategy of industrialization, I show that 
without existential insecurity formed in revolutionary struggles, the bureaucratic structures of 
competitive policymaking in each case would fail to occur; and without power struggles 
inside the top echelons of post-revolutioanry states, the strategic goals of socialist 
industrialization in each case would be altered. 
 By analyzing the competitive dynamics of policymaking during the transformative 
event—the Third Front (ca.1964-80), I show that the specific logic of each state strategy was 
context dependent rather than structurally overdetermined. By posing such historical 
counterfactuals, I am doing more than juxtaposing historical narratives (De Leon, Desai, and 
Tuğal 2009, 201) of political competitions. In particular, the within-case sequence of each 
historical case offers me multiple “data points” with which to evaluate the explanatory power 
of my state theory. Consequently, my comparative-historical analysis offers the three theory-
generating tools identified by Rueschemeyer: “conceptual equivalencies across political, 
social, and cultural boundaries”, the “identification of universal or quite general problems 
that occur in varied historical contexts”, and “the development of highly focused theoretical 
frameworks” (2003, 328). 
 Embracing the time-tested principle of historical sociological research that comparative-
historical analysis should be capable of telling the “large” processes and that of factors on the 
ground (Hintze et al. 1975; Weber, Roth, and Wittich 1978 Tilly 1992; Mudge 2018), I 
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account for changes in state capital via an analysis of both large-scale institutional 
transformations and the trajectories, positions, and self-accounts of state actors who articulate 
state strategy of industrialization. In short, my counterfactual analysis involves the study of 
historical change centered on the formation, geopolitical contexts, and orientations of 
socialist statecraft. For operationalize this analytical task, I focus on generationally 
comparable socialist elites who occupied structurally similar locations in their respective 
universes and who become well-recognized decision-makers on matters of military strategy, 
industrialization, and economic management.   
 This analytical focus on constituents arises from a theoretical perspective (Mudge 2018) 
that takes the actually existing socialist projects as internally contested fields of power (Eyal, 
Szelényi, and Townsley 1998; Eyal 2003; Zhang 2020) in which political actors do much 
more than seek revenues, policies, and offices. Key to the actually existing socialist project is 
a triple orientation: first, toward industrialization, education, socialization, and truth claiming; 
second, toward agitation, mobilization, and indoctrination; and third, toward political 
articulation, power-seeking and state security. Each orientation, in its own way, expressed the 
political claim that Marx-Leninism’s higher insight into social reality can guide the 
construction of a better society. In this sense, the socialist party-states seek to neutralize 
themselves by shaping how the rank-and-file understand the world and their place in it 
(Gramsci, Buttigieg, and Callari 2011). In this effort, the constituents within the Central 
Committee plays a special role. For the present purpose, the distinguishing mark is in their 
action-orientation: they strive to formulate the socialist statecraft by which the state elites 
characterize the world, define programmatic priorities, and instruct the rank-and-file to 
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actualize the revolutionary self-fulfilling prophecy. In so doing, they compete for the power 
of defining the “best” state strategy of industrialization.  
 This approach preempts overly strong assumptions about the priority of any particular 
unit of analysis—oligarchic organizations (for example, Michels et al. 1968), polarities of 
international politics (for example, Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), nation-states (for 
example, Hall and Soskice 2001), and so forth. This analysis that traces the institutional 
locations and trajectories of Leninist policymakers make no assumptions, for instance, that 
their experiences, trajectories, and action-orientations are overdetermined by the power 
structure of international politics (Mearsheimer 2001). At the same time, by centering this 
analysis on similarly situated political actors across time periods and political spaces, my 
approach retains the advantages of a comparative perspective.        
 To measures changes in state strategies, I mostly rely on policy documents (for example, 
Chen, Xu, and Song 2014) to identify policy preferences, political articulation, and 
institutional outcomes. I also rely on party-commissioned historians’ writings based on 
archival sources (for example, Chen 2003) and published autobiographies written by 
historical actors (for example, Chen 1996). Below, I group my cases together into a two-part 
discussion: first, I specify the order-producing attributes of existential insecurity formed in 
revolutionary struggles and the variations in insecurity’s effects on post-revolutionary state 
formation through a comparative-historical analysis of two socialist revolutions in Russia and 
China and elaborate my state theory, and trace the sources of state capital differentiation at 
sectoral level in socialist China, and the competitive dynamics of policy formation in the 
becoming of state capital differentiation in railways, automobile, and shipbuilding industries. 
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Figure 1.1: A Basic Outline of the Relational Structure of Fields, Subfields, and Social Spaces 
 
The Structure of Arguments 
 In the core chapters of this thesis, both the principles of analysis and the neo-
Bourdieusian state theory are employed in the analysis of state capital. My approach is to 
start with the theory but supplement it with ideas anticipated by the logic of inquiry.  
 In chapter 2, the link between existential insecurity and post-revolutionary statecraft are 
elaborated through a theory-building exercise based on the Millian method of difference for 
illustrating the encasing effects militarization has on the state strategy of industrialization. By 
comparing the Russian revolution (ca. 1917-22) and the Chinese revolution (ca.1911-49) as 
the two most similar cases of socialist revolution, I establish existential insecurity formed in 
regional insurgencies in post-imperial China as the cause of the militarization (i.e., the 
military holds decision-making power over policies that are unrelated to the conduct of 
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combat operations.) of the Chinese party-state. In the Chinese context, the 
counterrevolutionary warlords emerged from the fragmented post-imperial military field had 
so antagonized their junior officers, soldiers, and peasant boys that these radicalized actors 
joined the Party’s regional insurgencies led by Marxist intellectuals (i.e., the civilian party 
leaders) to end counterrevolutionary elites’ political order. The military merits (as the solution 
to insecurity) formed in these founding struggles between the mass-mobilizing CCP and elite-
protecting counterrevolutionary warlords (ca. 1927-49) critically affected the post-
revolutionary state elites’ socialist statecraft.  
 In chapter3, I analyze the becoming of the Third Front as a historical turning point in 
which state competitions resulted in the military logic of Mao’s last big push 
industrialization. In particular, Mao’s political articulation of the absolute necessity of rapid 
industrialization for defense led to a unified industrialization strategy of massive military 
buildup which became the priority of the central government between 1964 and 1976. 
Statesmen who opposed Mao’s policy preferences were marginalized, purged, and replaced 
by generals to carry out Mao’s grand strategy of preparing nuclear total war. The culmination 
of this militarization of the Chinese socialist state resulted in the Third Front construction—a 
unified military logic of industrialization in which the state strategy of military buildup 
decisively reshaped the national system of political economy. 
 In chapter 4, the theoretical arguments of state capital differentiation are elaborated 
through a comparative-historical analysis of the divergent developmental trajectories of 
railways, automobile, and shipbuilding sectors in socialist China. The developmental 
trajectories of these three sectors exemplify three distinctive patterns of industrial upgrading 
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strategy that cover all state-owned enterprises in manufacturing sectors in post-1978 China. 
The differentiated patterns of involvement in the Third Front critically affected the post-1978 
industrial policies of these three sectors. One the one hand, the restructured Sixth Ministry of 
Machine Building (i.e., the CSSC), as a state-owned industrial conglomerate, vertically 
integrated the shipbuilding industry for export-oriented industrialization. On the other hand, 
the Ministry of Railways continued to exist as a state bureaucracy for implementing import-
substitution industrialization at national level; its successor agency—China Railways 
continued this mode of operation till today. In stark contrast to these two centralized agencies, 
the China State Automobile Company was dissolved by the central government for boosting 
market competition in 1986. As one part of the central government’s strategy of market-
building at national level, domestic market of automobiles was opened to foreign direct 
investment; and provincial state authorities became the primary actors for regulating, 
accumulating, and controlling state-run economic capital.    
The Analysis to Come 
I delineate why and how the power dynamics inside the meta-field structures the 
variations in the institutional configurations of state capital across industrial sectors. In brief, 
the historic process of capital differentiation is conditioned by the power struggles over the 
collective strategy to accumulate, manage, and redistribute state-owned economic capital 
inside the Central Committee of the CCP. For explaining the political origins of differentiated 
state capital in post-1978 China, we need to consider policy formation in the ministerial 
subfields as the political consequence of power struggles inside the meta-field. An industrial 
policy, as a culturally constructed instrument (Dobbin, 1994) for regulating economic 
capital’s accumulation, management, and circulation, often results from political competition 
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between actors in the state field. For holding power, state actors seek symbolic capital 
specific to the field and competition as their capacities to influence political consequences 
(Bourdieu 2014; Bourdieu 2018; Steinmetz 2008). In practice, they compete for the agenda-
setting power by presenting their specific goals as the best vehicle for actualizing certain 
universal interests (Bourdieu 2014; 2018, 33-6).  
 To illustrate the historical origins of these three industrialization strategies and their 
socio-political consequences of recasting the rules of competition for power in the state field 
which were central to the post-1978 reform, I delineate the installation of the meta-field of 
the post-revolutionary party-state when the socialist elites took national power in 1949 in 
which centrally planned industrialization would begin in the mid-1950s. Then I analyze the 
becoming of the Third Front (or simply the Front) as the transformative event (from 1964 to 
1978) to illustrate how the differentiated strategic logics of industrialization came into their 
shapes and subsequently conditioned the political dynamics of post-1978 industrial and 
economic reform in different state sectors. The strategic goal of the Third Front is a well-
defined universal interest—rapid development of defense capabilities. Yet, after Mao died in 
1976, elites in the Central Committee abandoned Mao’s agenda and outcompeted the 
supporters of the Third Front strategy (i.e., the mass mobilizers). This move then gave rise to 
the differentiation of state capital. In this sense, this comparative survey serves as a guide 
based on comparative-historical analysis for revealing the historic processes between political 
competition inside the meta-field and policy formation in the ministerial subfields. I argue 
that the Third Front and its sociopolitical outcomes can be explained by the power struggles 
over the state strategy of industrialization.  
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 To understand the relevance of procedural contexts of the power struggles to the 
emergence of the three subtypes of state capital in post-1978 China, I trace the interaction 
among collective strategy (i.e., the strategic goals of industrialization designated by the 
Central Committee of the Party), disalignment (i.e., the constituents’ disagreements over 
political priorities inside the meta-field of power: the Central Committee), political 
articulation (i.e., the vertical bargaining between ministers and dominant actors within the 
Central Committee), and policy formation (as the political consequences).  
 In this conceptual framework, the existential insecurity of the Leninist party-state field 
(i.e., the fear of enemies shared by all political actors) is the independent variable, and policy 
formations in the ministerial subfields are the dependent variables. Insecurity’s encasing 
effects on policy formations are conditioned by the patterns of how insecurity (that permeates 
the entire field of power) transforms into the rules of the games in the ministerial subfields. In 
this sense, political disalignment and political articulation are intervening variables, whose 
relative role in affecting policy formations depends on the types of validations (i.e., the 
transformation of existential insecurity into policy preferences) made6 by constituents (i.e., 
the institutionalized choice made by the members of the Central Committee in the forms of 
directives) inside the meta-field (see Johnson 2001, 255). The temporal scope of the historical 
analysis covers the installation of the meta-field of the party-state in 1949 to the emergence of 
 
6 However, the Bourdieusian approach adopted in this thesis differs from historical institutionalist explanation 
to institutional change in the sense that my conceptualization to institutional choice does not count it as a binary 
variable for changing institution or not; possible choice in the state field is more of a categorical variable 
depends on the procedural contexts of power struggle. This is because the logics of practices cannot be 
separated from choices which are structured by the symbolic parameters of the state. In contrast, the historical 
institutionalist account of choice is a softened utilitarian mode which does not address the symbolic dimension 
of decision-making.     
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the three differentiated strategies of industrial upgrading across manufacturing sectors in the 
early 1980s.  
 Henceforth, to substantiate my theoretical claims, two political processes that mediate 
power dynamics (political competition) and policy outcomes (industrial policy at sectoral 
level) constitute the empirical focus of this thesis: First, depending on the degree, form, and 
path of involvement in the power struggle in the meta-field (i.e., in this case, the stake in the 
struggle is the strategy of industrialization), leaders of centralized agencies (of railroads, 
automobiles, and shipbuilding industries) can forge ties with central planning-oriented elites 
(or simply the central planners) in the Central Committee of the CCP which in turn condition 
the organizational trajectory of these three industrial agencies in post-1978 industrial reform. 
Second, the ties between ministers (i.e., the leaders of centralized agencies) and state 
planning officials in the Central Committee forged in the Third Front are vital for their 
capacities to transform industrial organizations' economic performances into symbolic capital 
in subsequent competitions for power.  
 Acquiring such a competition- and field-specific form of symbolic capital—as their 
credentials to participate in policy formation at national level—expand their autonomy in 
deciding the structural arrangements of economic capital7 at sectoral level. If these ties are 
absent or successfully challenged by Central Committee members who opposed plan-based 
fast-track industrialization, the centralized agencies, as the vehicles of unitary strategy for the 
 
7 This refers to the centralized agency’s capacities to independently design and implement the trajectory of 
institutional change of the industrial sector at national scale. 
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accumulation, circulation, and management of state-controlled economic capital at national 
scale, were more likely to be forced to decentralize in the post-1978 reform.  
 These competitive dynamics among socialist elites divisively shaped and reshaped the 
state strategies of industrialization. Each camp of the divided elite in the party-state 
constructed a distinct institutional logic of national industrialization for obtaining agenda-
setting power in the meta-field. These competitions between elites subsequently condition the 
organizational trajectories of (economic) capital-intensive state-owned enterprises in the post-
1978 reform period. The organizational trajectories of these three agencies under and after 
centrally planned industrialization mentioned above exemplify the lasting impacts of these 
competitive dynamics inside the socialist party-state. These three “structural arrangements” 
of state-controlled economic capital (in the form of the three ministerial agencies) at national 
level became the three dominant modes of operation for state-owned enterprises in all 
manufacturing sectors8 in post-1978 China. 
 In these historic-political processes, policy formation was also influenced by geopolitical 
and economic interests and the dominant party-state actor’s final authority in appointing and 
dismissing ministerial officials. The effects of these additional mechanisms were typically 
mediated by the power struggles among the divided elites inside the meta-field of power—the 
Central Committee of the CCP 
  
 
8 While a complete survey of the politics of industrialization in the People’s Republic will explode the intention 
of this project, this thesis focuses on reconstructing the historical contexts of the three institutional logics of fast-
track industrialization and the oppositions to them in the meta-field. 
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Chapter 2 Existential Insecurity as the Producer of the Militarized Socialist State 
The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there 
only to provide soldiers and feed them. Militarism dominates and is swallowing Europe. But 
this militarism also bears within itself the seed of its own destruction. Competition among the 
individual states forces them, on the one hand, to spend more money each year on the army 
and navy, artillery, etc., thus more and more hastening their financial collapse; and, on the 
other hand, to resort to universal compulsory military service more and more extensively, 
thus in the long run making the whole people familiar with the use of arms, and therefore 
enabling them at a given moment to make their will prevail against the warlords in command. 
And this moment will arrive as soon as the mass of the people—town and country workers 
and peasants—will have a will. At this point the armies of the princes become transformed 
into armies of the people; the machine refuses to work and militarism collapses by the 
dialectics of its own evolution. What the bourgeois democracy of 1848 could not accomplish, 
just because it was bourgeois and not proletarian, namely, to give the labouring masses a will 
whose content would be in accord with their class position—socialism will infallibly secure.  
– Friedrich Engels 1877 (Emphasis in Original) 
A Legacy of Founding Struggles 
 In Anti-Dühring, two threads of arguments intertwined in Engels’ theoretical account of 
the militarization of modern states in the historical context of nineteenth century European 
capitalism. First, the operational mode of war had “gone as far as it can technologically” 
(Joas and Knöbl 2013, 97; emphasis in original). For Engels, the development of armament 
program is “mediated by economic power, highly developed metallurgy, command of skilled 
technicians and highly productive coal-mines” (1877; emphasis in original). In fact, Engels 
“goes so far as to describe the history of war and warfare as fundamentally a history of 
technological innovation, which must itself be understood as dependent on the relations of 
production” (Joas and Knöbl 2013, 97). According to Engels, the wielding of the coercive 
forces in continental Europe was fueled by the fiscal capacities of the capitalist state which 
extracted monopolistic economic capital (with the full cooperation of the bourgeoisie) for 
building the military capabilities of its armed forces. Second, because of the invention of 
universal conscription, evermore workers and peasants would be armed. As a result, Engels 
39 
considered European militarism to be rent “asunder from within” (1877). In this communist 
eschatology (Halfin 2000), once the unconscious subject of history—the working class 
acquired its omnipotent mind from the self-destructive militarism fueled by capitalism, its 
odyssey of class consciousness in the universal time of class warfare would lead to the 
becoming of the end of history (of capitalism). Then, the new emancipatory order without 
violence, exploitation, and antagonism—socialism could be built.     
 A field-theoretic analysis of the socialist state reveals that existential insecurity 
nonetheless was critical to the formation of the socialist state. At the heart of the matter is the 
tension between a totalizing dream of the coming of a non-violent, egalitarian, and 
emancipatory order and an empirical reality which always threatens to annihilate the socialist 
state due to the (imagined) hostilities of counterrevolutionary forces, or if you will, due to the 
state paranoia (Glaeser 2004) of being attacked by the (secret) alliance between domestic 
class enemies and foreign capitalist states. As a result, The Leninist state’s efforts of 
industrialization were geared toward preventive intervention—to build an industrial economy 
for enabling the party-state agents (including the military, the police, and the security 
apparatuses) to identify, deter, and defeat all enemies of the party-state.  
 Thus, the core purpose in this chapter is to establish existential insecurity—the collective 
efforts to deal with credible threats motivated by the collective experience of the large-scale 
taking of life through revolutionary war or counterrevolutionary state-sanctioned mass 
murder—as a sociopolitical force (Evrigenis 2008) which contributed to the formation of 
socialist statecraft in the geopolitical context of the global Cold War. My analysis here builds 
on the “founding struggle” paradigm (see Levitsky and Way 2012; Slater and Smith 2016; 
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Zhou 2019). But it aims to shift out attention from the intensity of revolutioanry violence to 
violent struggles’ distinctive effects on the militarization of post-revolutionary party-states. It 
also transcends path dependence (for example, see Finer and Stanley 2002; Steinmetz 2005, 
145) by considering how a post-revolutionary state’s grand strategy may vary in response to 
geopolitical changes, types of war, and political competitions (Hintze et al. 1975). In 
particular, I illuminate the distinctive order-producing attributes of military merits emerged 
from the violent struggles between the mass-mobilizing Leninist party and elite-protecting 
counterrevolutionary warlords.  
 A comparative-historical analysis of the Russian Revolution (ca. 1917-22) and the 
Chinese Revolution (ca. 1911-49) elaborates the institutional mechanisms through which 
existential insecurity formed in regional insurgencies critically affects the militarization of 
post-revolutioanry state. Building on Luyang Zhou’s study of the party-army dynamics 
(2018), I offer a field-theoretic analysis of the formation of the Leninist field of power. To 
win the revolution, the dominant actors within the Central Committee of the CCP relied on 
institutional mechanisms of non-instrumental compliance to build the revolutionary political 
machine. In particular, political commissars (from party officials and Marxist intellectuals) 
fought side by side with military officers (from radicalized warlord troops and rebellious 
peasants) for wining regional insurgencies. However, this collective strategy of 
bureaucratization resulted in the militarization of Chinese party-state. In particular, military 
merits—the abilities to prepare and win battles—formed in the revolution became a central 
component of socialist statecraft in China. 
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 In contrast, the Bolshevik party elites had to rely on the tsarist officer corps to design and 
implement an army-to-army strategy for winning the Civil War. As a result, a separate pattern 
of party-army dynamics emerged. As a result, Soviet commissars would be outcompeted by 
generals who never replaced statesmen for designing state strategies of industrialization. In 
other words, the Soviet party-army dynamics was embedded in a separated organizational 
frame. Therefore, without specifying the roles of military merits in socialist statecraft, we fail 
to understand the kinds of bureaucratic structure in which competitive dynamics of 
policymaking take place. Inside the post-revolutioanry states, political actors compete for 
creating, converting, and acquiring a field- and competition-specific form of symbolic 
capital—socialist statecraft based on these specific forms of bureaucratic rationalities (see 
Bourdieu 2014) formed in the revolution. This involved exhibiting an alleged expertise of 
designing and implementing the best approach to advance industrialization for defense under 
socialist principles, and a capacity of balancing defense investment and improvement of living 
standards. These competitive dynamics are intrinsic components of the political processes 
within the Leninist state (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 1998; Eyal 
2003; Zhang 2020). 
 Moreover, my theory offers an important correction to Marxist theories of state that 
downplay geopolitics. In contrast to Marx and Engels’ Enlightenment-style expectation in 
which a nonviolent, egalitarian world order would eventually emerge from the proletarian 
revolution, existential insecurity continued to condition the developmental trajectories of 
actually existing socialism. It is in this sense that the socialist victory was fragile. Since we 
cannot properly understand preconceived notions without lived experiences, I attempt to 
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analyze the complex interplay between experiences and assumptions about socialist 
revolution and socioeconomic realties. Thus, my goal is to outline the obstacles to and 
possibilities for a better understanding of the politics of industrialization.     
 In what follows, I identify the collective strategies of the socialist elites which was key to 
their political survival. In the case of Chinese Revolution, the creation of a unified structure 
of command and control of the military allowed the Central Committee of the CCP to firmly 
control its military subfield. Since the military officer and civilian party elites (who served in 
the military as commissars) fought brutal regional insurgencies for more than two decades, 
they shared the values and emotions formed in these infused party-army networks. The 
mechanisms of non-instrumental compliance based on military merits become a critical factor 
of socialist statecraft. This strategy of surviving waves of wars, in turns, shaped the political 
processes of post-revolutionary state formation in which centrally planned industrialization 
began.  
Socialist Industrialization: Geopolitical Turning Points and the Competitive Dynamics of 
Policymaking 
 All socialist states claim that the accumulation of means of production under the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” can be then transcended into better public life (measured by 
higher living standard, more equality, more social rights, etc.) through social redistribution 
guided by socialist principles (though to what extent such social transformation is actualized 
is another subject of debate) (Lenin 1917; Verdery 1996, 20-35; Konrad and Szelényi 1979, 
145-84; Kornai 1992). While industrialization is prioritized by the Leninist state as its main 
task of socialist modernization, the strategic logics of its planning and implementation are not 
driven by the logics of accumulation for accumulation’s sake. “For socialism is merely the 
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next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly. Or, in other words, socialism is merely 
state-capitalist monopoly which is made to serve the interests of the whole people and has to 
that extent ceased to be capitalist monopoly” (Lenin 1917; emphasis in original). In general, 
industrialization is set out by the socialist state for two goals: strengthening national defense 
and improving living standards (Meyskens 2020, 7-23; Mann 2013; Hirata 2020, 876-7).  
 In practice, the state’s interest in defense often dwarfs the quests of economic efficiency 
(this is not limited to the socialist state). Motivated by state actors’ assessment of 
international hostilities and internal threats, one of the central purposes of industrialization 
under state socialism is to strengthen defense capabilities (Naughton, 1988; Mann 2013, 219; 
Meyskens 2015; Meyskens 2020; Hou 2018). As a result, heavy industries such as railways, 
aviation, automobile, and shipbuilding are prioritized for potential military mobilization9. 
More often than not, such political calculations lead to self-contradictory puzzles within the 
Leninist party-state (see Kligman and Verdery 2011). For instance, as Verdery rightly points 
out, the accumulation of means of production seldom translates automatically into higher 
living standards (1996). This self-imposing dilemma originates from the self-understanding 
of socialist state elites: above all, they wanted rapid industrialization.   
 From this messianic viewpoint of socialist theodicy, the emancipatory new social order 
should not be produced by faceless state bureaucrats (Lenin 1917; Stalin [1938] 2013; 
Katsenelinboigen 1980). In particular, the collective intentionality of building such a society 
must be shared by all socialist citizens (Glaeser 2004). This state structured socioeconomic 
 
9 To accumulate scare economic capital for rapid industrialization, collectivization of agriculture is 
implemented. In addition, in the case of the People’s Republic of China, all industrial production was 
nationalized in the mid-1950s. 
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order needs to be produced by the mass under the leadership of the party (Stalin [1938] 2013, 
478-91). The socialist state elites never took the sociopolitical order of state socialism as a 
settled issue; in this view, the party-state is a producer of revolutionary transformation rather 
than a finished product (Hellbeck 2006, 7; Hamrin and Cheek 1986). According to Stalin’s 
constitution, class difference with exploitation no longer existed in state socialism (this logic 
is also coded in the constitution of the People’s Republic); the emancipatory order will be 
produced by a new subject of history—the socialist New Man (Halfin 2003). In the political 
practices of this “nation as a factory” mode of operation of the national economy, this 
sociopolitical balance between military mobilization for nuclear total war and rising living 
standards through expanding production of consumer goods is at the center of the political 
paradox for the socialist state to maintain its political survival and stability (Nee and Stark, 
1989; Walder 1995; Mann 2013, 219). How bureaucratic and centralized planning can 
redistribute resources for the mass for whatever purposes at national level became the subject 
of power struggles in the meta-field of the party-state.  
 In the case of the Soviet state, historians considered the geopolitical conflicts between 
the two nuclear-armed great power made the balance between consumption and military-
industrial production more difficult for the post-war Soviet state elites. In addition, Cold War 
insecurity was mediated by competitive dynamics inside the state field for shaping the state 
strategy of industrial development. According to Priestland, “tensions – between industrial 
and defense investment and consumption, and between technocracy and ideology – had 
dominated Soviet politics since 1928, during the Cold War period they were arguably more 
difficult to resolve than before the war” (2010, 445). The struggle over the “correct” approach 
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to balance consumption and production was the central theme of the competitive dynamics in 
the Central Committee of the Soviet party in the pos-war era. From 1945 to 1953 (i.e., the 
late Stalinist period) “1930s Stalinism was re-established after the war, but in a slightly more 
technocratic form” (Priestland 2010, 445). This can be interpreted as the political 
consequence of Stalin’s dominance in the Leninist meta-field of power.  
 The end of Stalin’s dominance in 1953 induced a new dynamics of power struggle inside 
the Soviet state. During the years immediately after Stalin’s death, “conflicts emerged within 
the leadership and Lavrentii Beriia and Georgii Malenkov were condemned for an 
excessively technocratic and consumerist position” (Priestland 2010, 445). And, of course, 
this happened partly because Beriia was Stalin’s head of secret police who was feared by all 
the other members of the Central Committee. The purges to Beriia and Malenkov’s cliques 
marked the end of this competition inside the Central Committee. Khrushchev’s policy in the 
following years can be interpreted as the attempts to “establish a new equilibrium, combining 
a turn towards consumption with a new emphasis on ideology – one that proved to be highly 
unstable” (Priestland 2010, 445). As a result, new state competitions emerged in the Central 
Committee which ultimately led to the abdication of Khrushchev.     
 In contrast to the Soviet and Eastern European post-Stalinist states’ attempts at balancing 
economic necessities (which were closely linked to concerns to domestic unrests) and 
military buildup (see Dimitrov 2013), one camp from the divided elites in the Chinese party-
state (i.e., the mass mobilizers) articulated the state’s interests in national defense as the most 
important task for industrialization while kept restraining consumption for accumulate 
46 
economic capital (to heavy industry) during the late Mao period (ca. 1959-76)10. This move 
which altered the processes of state formation and political competition in itself was a 
response to changes in geopolitics (Naughton 1988, 353; Yang 2000). In this sense, the 
military-industrial bureaucracy of the Chinese socialist project from 1949 to 1976 is a 
Stalinist system which unconditionally favored military-industrial production over everyday 
consumption. In practice, the big push industrialization was understood collectively by the 
CCP central leadership as to be approached in the form of mass mobilization in combination 
with some degrees of central planning (Naughton, 1988, 352). However, how the laboring 
masses could be integrated into this collective strategy of central planning via state-led 
movements (i.e., mass mobilization in which operational networks of the regimes of 
production are decentralized) was contested; as political competition escalated, central 
planning was itself a contested subject (Mao 1964) in the meta-field.  
 Consequently, since 1964 these industrial programs and their managerial institutions also 
became the targets of intellectual-ideological debates among three camps of elites in the 
meta-field. Within the central planning agencies of the socialist state, technocratic-minded 
state planning commissioners favored central planning as the vehicle to guide the 
development of industrial society. (i.e., “central planners”). The central planners identified 
these industrial programs under central planning as the foundation of socialist modernization. 
When mass-mobilization replaced central planning as the main vehicle to achieve socialist 
modernization, they contested that mass mobilization alone lacked the political leverage for 
the central government to obtain macro-economic management. 
 
10 This certainly does not mean it is the only priority of state interests. 
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 More importantly, according to their viewpoint, the industrial outputs of plan-based 
industrialization symbolized their collective efforts: this industrial modernity guided by 
central planning unified their political endeavors with the spirit of the movement. On the 
other hand, another group of fiscal technocrats inside the socialist state who dealt with the 
stagnation of living standards in rural areas was more inclined to point to the problems of the 
existing developmental approach (i.e., “consumption investors”). For them, the lack of 
economic efficiency, dysfunctional outcomes, and widespread corruption were built-in 
characters of the mass mobilization strategy of industrialization which could not be overcome 
through establishing appropriate socialist consciousness within central planning (The political 
epistemics can be traced to their collective efforts to save China’s national economy from the 
Great Leap Forward in 1962). 
 Moreover, the bureaucratic lines between political mobilization and plan were often 
blurred when the mass mobilizers (i.e., the members of the third camp who favored 
decentralized big push industrialization for rapid military buildup) took control of the 
planning agencies (This repeatedly happened from 1964 to 1978). This engendered self-
contradictory dilemmas between decentralized networks of operation and centralized 
planning. Henceforth, for the mass mobilizers and consumption investors, central planning 
itself was the obstacle to achieve socialist modernization. This tension about how to develop 
an industrial economy was at the core of the political competition between elite groups for 
seizing the agenda-setting power in the central government. These competitive dynamics 
inside the Leninist party-state then gave rise to radical differences in the structural 
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arrangement of state-controlled economic capital (in various forms of state-owned 
enterprises) across manufacturing sectors in post-1978 China. 
 In this sense, a field-theoretic analysis to the socialist state grants the opportunities to 
develop sustained meditations on the historic processes between existential insecurity as 
formed and transformed in geopolitics and the rise and decline of economic institutions 
created and recreated by state actors’ actions with a careful reconsideration to the symbolic 
dimension of state power. For Bourdieu, the state is “the central bank of symbolic capital” 
(2015, 122). The state field is “the site where all the fiduciary currency circulating in the 
social world is produced and guaranteed, as well as all the realities we can designate as 
fetishes, whether an educational qualification, a legitimate culture, the nation, the notion of 
border, or spelling” (Bourdieu 2015, 122). For the state, as the meta-field of power, to 
exercise such functions of granting “power over other species of capital,” including economic 
capital, and “especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the 
relations of force between their respective holders)” (Bourdieu 1999, 57-58; 2015, 345), the 
formation of state field depends on the formation of a unified social space. “The construction 
of the state as a relatively autonomous filed exerting a power of centralization of physical 
force and symbolic force and constituted according as a stake of struggle, is inseparably 
accompanied by the construction of the unified space that is its foundation” (Bourdieu 2015, 
123). Thus, the first step for developing a neo-Bourdieusian state theory to explain the 
political origins of policy formation is to identify the formation of the field- and competition-
specific symbolic capital inside the state field at its moment of foundation.  
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From Imperial Entanglements to Socialist Statecrafts: Non-Instrumental Compliance in the 
Making of Actually Existing Socialism 
 In this section, I disclose a neo-Bourdieusian theory of field, subfield, and symbolic-
political capital at the scale of post-imperial spaces to explain the encasing effects existential 
insecurity has on socialist statecraft. Following the literature on the politics of the armed 
forces (see Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2019; Thies 2005; Swed and Butler 2015; Finer and 
Stanley 2002), militarization means that the military holds key-decision making power over 
policies that are not directly related to the conduct of combat operations. Between 1949 and 
1978, Chinese generals played critical roles in economic policymaking. I argue this 
militarized power structure is the outcome of socialist elites’ collective experience in 
revolutionary warfare before they took national power in 1949. Moreover, their existential 
insecurity was reinforced by geopolitical changes of the global Cold War. Conversely, 
because the Soviet civilian party elites had much less operational experience during the 
Russian Revolution, the bureaucratization of Soviet state was less militarized (for Soviet 
party-army dynamics and security strategies, see Nichols 1993; Nichols 1993; Glantz 2013). 
As a result, subsequent geopolitical changes reinforced the separate pattern of party-army 
dynamics.  
 At the center of the politics of state formation in post-revolutionary China is an infused  
pattern of party-state-army relations. This infusion (see Zhou 2019) can be understood as a 
relational structure of exceeding and distinctive durability results from the revolutionary 
elites’ agreement of resolving the post-imperial social crisis by violently inaugurating a 
Leninist party-state through a particular form of popular revolts—regional insurgencies to 
build an industrial society under socialist principles. In this view of the party-state actors, 
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revolutionary violence was understood as a necessary means to accomplish this goal. “The 
field is sort of a game, one that all of its layers agree is worth playing” (Steinmetz 2014, 2). 
Therefore, the consensus on ending the post-imperial sociopolitical crisis through revolution 
was the illusio (i.e., the basic agreement that underpins all disagreements in a field) of the 
Leninist party field before the CCP took national political power in 1949.  
 From the 1920s to 1930s, this collective strategy of revolutionary change (as the solution 
to sociopolitical crisis in post-imperial China) became increasingly appealing to the junior 
officers who were exposed to Marxism. In contrast to the “separated” pattern in the Soviet 
Union, recurrent military defeats against foreign invaders and multiple intense civil wars 
radicalized the rank and file of the post-imperial armies in China (Zhou 2019). Unlike the 
legendary Soviet officers such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov, and Semen 
Budenny who joined the Red Army only after the Provisional Government had been 
overthrown (Zhou 2019), the Chinese experts in violence within the post-imperial military 
field often joined the Red Army due to ideological conversion when they were junior officers 
of the warlord troops.  
 This radicalization of the junior officers in post-imperial China needs to be thematized in 
the procedural contexts of the imperial state breakdown. The CCP field of power (including 
its military subfield subfield) emerged from a state of disorder—the Chinese Revolution. The 
existence of fields as separate spheres “have to be analyzed as a function of the struggles 
taking place in the spaces between them and of the mechanisms set up in the spaces between 
them” (Eyal 2013, 159). In contrast to the theoretical emphasis of the encasing effects of the 
interstate warfare on the formation of modern European state (Rosenberg 1966; Craig 1968; 
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Hintze et al. 1975; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1992; Dincecco and Onorato 2018), internal rebellions 
and international threats both contributed to the collapse of the Qing imperium. “In Europe, 
political fragmentation was rampant. Thus, conflict tended to be external (i.e., interstate), and 
attack threats were multidirectional. Furthermore, exit ability was high in this context. Elites 
were therefore in a strong bargaining position to demand political representation in return for 
new tax revenue” (Dincecco and Wang 2018, 341). Imperial China, by contrast, structured the 
military as a police force for repressing rebellions. “Here, conflict tended to be internal, 
attack threats were unidirectional, and exit ability was low” (Dincecco and Wang 2018, 341). 
The military consequence of this political centralization accompanied with the limited 
resources extraction capacities was poor combat effectiveness. Rather than defeating foreign 
invasions, the priority of imperial armed forces was to prevent social disintegration.  
 Consequently, the imperial armed forces of Qing Dynasty were in decline since the 
1790s (McCord 1993; Skocpol, 1976; Skocpol 2008). Since then, the Qing state army was 
neither able to fight off foreign invasions nor capable to successfully carry out 
counterinsurgency operations (Khun, 1970). In fact, the Qing imperial state had to relied on 
warlord troops organized by landed gentries to crackdown the Taiping Rebellion (from 1851 
to 1872) which devasted the most economically developed regions of China. As a result, the 
fiscal capacity of the imperial state was ruined. This self-reinforcing dynamic of the structural 
fragmentation of Imperial state’s military, fiscal and ideological power was accompanied with 
military catastrophes in inter-state wars. The Qing Imperial navy suffered humiliating losses 
in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). In fact, since the 1850s, the imperial military 
never won any inter-state wars.  
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 In response to these military disasters, the imperial state tried to reconstruct its military 
subfield by recreating the force structure, armament, and doctrine. A Commission for Army 
Reorganization was established in late 1903 “to centralize military policies and to standardize 
the organization of the New Armies. In 1906 the commission unveiled a ten-year plan setting 
the size of Western-style New Armies in each province, and establishing a goal of thirty-six 
divisions for the entire nation” (McCord 1993, 34). The New Armies is the imperial state’s 
final attempt at strengthening its military might by installing a Prussian style military 
bureaucracy. “By 1911 considerable progress toward this goal had been made. Although few 
New Army units ever reached their full strength, seventeen New Army divisions and twenty 
independent infantry or mixed brigades were established” (McCord 1993, 34). Interestingly, 
The European-trained, professional officer corps of the New Armies was very politicized 
since the New Armies had to intervene domestic unrest.   
 After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, the post-imperial military field was 
plagued by the loss of unified logistic system, poor bureaucratization and decentralized 
authorities. After the death of the founder of New Armies (Yuan Shikai) in 1916, no one 
could exercise the command and control of the fragmented New Armies. Most senior officers 
of the New Armies became warlords who fought against each for access to national power. 
For obtaining national political power, rival warlords launched multiple civil wars from the 
1910s to the late 1920s. “Because the New Armies were the Qing dynasty's best-trained and 
most effective troops, military commanders seeking to survive the civil warfare of the 
Republican period naturally attempted to organize their forces according to this standard” 
(McCord 1993, 44). Nonetheless, the primary restraint to this institutional isomorphism 
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within warlord military subfields was their limited fiscal capacities. “In the context of this 
warfare, warlord commanders often found the implementation of the New Army model no 
easier than it had been for late Qing officials” (McCord 1993, 44). As a result, local warlords 
often relied on informal ties and bribes for exercising command and control authorities and 
recruited cadets from poor peasant family which, in turns, created political opportunities for 
the CCP to exploit. In exchange for funding and territory, the warlord officers aligned with 
militarized gentries to collect protection rent from peasants.  
 Beyond institutional isomorphism, a political change accompanied the fragmentation of 
the post-imperial military field was the radicalization of junior officers. The Marxist 
revolutionary ideology became increasingly attractive to the laboring masses who were 
victimized by civil wars and foreign invasions. The militarization of the Chinese post-
imperial society forced many peasant boys into the warlord troops. Many of them became 
committed Marxists in warlords’ military schools. In the analytical terms of neo-Bourdieusian 
state theory, this can be understood as the precondition of the formation the Leninist field of 
power in China. “The resources vrious actors bring to a given field are rooted in the generic 
species of capital that exist in the social space as a whole, but they are transformed as a result 
of activity within the field” (Steinmetz 2014, 2).  
 As a result of the structural fragmentations of the post-imperial military field, the 
radicalized junior officers of the warlord troops were able to encourage their fellow comrades 
to willingly switch to the CCP side through their personal networks within the post-imperial 
military field. “The hierarchy and value of different generic species of capital in their local 
inflections (symbolic capital) varies by field and over time” (Steinmatz 2014, 2). In other 
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words, without analyzing the fragmentation of the post-imperial military field, we fail to 
understand how and why the class interest of the junior officers metamorphosed into a potent 
force of revolution. For example, the CCP generals often had personal networks originated 
from their time in warlord troops. In a survey over 60 elites from this group, a number of 
these networks with clear centers were revealed, “such as Peng Dehuai’s networks in the 
Hunan Troops, Chen Geng’s network in Huangpu guard regiment, Zhang Yunyi’s network in 
Guangxi warlord troops, He Long’s network in his own guards, and Li Xiangjiu’s network in 
the Shanxi warlord troop” (Zhou 2019, 204). These networks which combined interpersonal 
trusts, political loyalties, and ideological commitments were a critical factor of the 
organization strength of the CCP political-military machine.        
 In this sense, the military subfield of the CCP emerged from the political competition 
between the post-imperial warlords who aligned with landed gentries, urban capitalists, and 
the counterrevolutionary state for resource extraction (Duara 1988). Although revolution 
“was clearly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bureaucratization” (Kiser and 
Baer 2005, 242), it was a necessary condition for militarization of the Chinese socialist state. 
“Most of its 60 generals who had old-army backgrounds were from lower class families, with 
only four exceptions (their fathers were officials and petty gentry)” (Zhou 2019, 204). In fact, 
few officers switched to the CCP side for the sake of personal securities. In stark contrast to 
the Chinese revolution, the Soviet General Staff was filled with (former) Tsarist officers who 
would join the Party in the mid-to late 1930s. In this sense, the relational configurations of 
Chinese post-revolutionary state actors—statesmen, generals and party elites inside the 
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Leninist state field were decisively shaped by their collective efforts to end the organic crisis 
of the Chinese post-imperial society.            
     Another structural arrangement of the CCP originated from waves of wars was the 
interlaces of personal networks and formal institutions in the military-administrative subfields 
(i.e., the administrative bureaucracy of the party). This relational configuration (see Singh 
2016) between the administrative subfield and the military subfield was an outcome of the 
revolutionary warfare as well. Between 1926 and 1928, the civilian party elites were brutally 
murdered by counterrevolutionary warlords, and then with the Guomindang’s repression of 
urban uprisings, by state officials and gangsters. Through these counterrevolutionary state-
sanctioned mass murders, many of the Marxist intellectuals met organized mass death for the 
first time face to face. In this sense, the history of that encounter is crucial to a better 
understanding of the political consequences of that confrontation.    
 The function of shared values within such revolutionary struggles came into sharpest 
focus in the face of organized mass death. The vanquished civilian party elites were forced to 
abandon their existing programs of labor movements (for example, see Perry 1993) and to 
flee the cities in the late 1920. To control the officer corps which originated from warlord 
troops, they installed the commissar system in 1927. In particular, the CCP transferred 
Marxist intellectuals within the Party to the military subfield as commissars. Prominent party 
elites such as Zhou Enlai11, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo, Li Xianian, and Hua 
 
11 Zhou Enlai was the founding director of the CCP’s security service when it was established in 1927; the 
security service (i.e., the Division of Special Operations of the Central Committee of the CCP [zhong guo gong 
chan dang zhong yang Te bie xing dong ke]) was also integrated into the Party. In the early 1930s, Chen Yun 
also briefly served as a prominent intelligence officer who was in charge of the operations of the Division of the 
Special Operations.    
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Guofeng all served as political commissars during this period. (With the exception of the 
“Gang of Four”, I cannot think of anyone within the top echelons of the CCP from 1949 to 
1978 was not in the Red Army during this period).  
 In sum, this operational experience of regional insurgencies decisively reshaped the 
civilian party elites’ detection of threats (for example, see Bates 1981). Moreover, this 
encounter with mass death led to a strengthening of the basic themes of selflessness, sacrifice, 
and salvation inside the Leninist field of power. This structural arrangement then gave birth 
to the personal networks between radical intellectuals and professional military officers 
inside the Leninist field of power. The lived experience of war embedded in the infused 
party-army dynamics conferred a concrete and enveloping socialist identity that reinforced 
the organizational linkages between officers and intellectuals.   
The Missing Links: Socialists’ Encounter with Mass Death 
 I argue that the two institutional mechanisms of non-instrumental compliance developed 
in the course of regional insurgencies constitute the necessary conditions of the militarization 
of the post-revolutioanry state. The dominant actors within the Central Committee of the CCP 
relied on both of the two institutional mechanisms of non-instrumental compliance identified 
by the cultural Weberian theorists (for example, Gorski 1993) to control its military-party 
bureaucracy for winning the revolution: “(1) by recruiting agents who already hold values or 
emotions consistent with the principle; or (2) by creating a situation in which agents acquire 
these values or emotions in training or job performance” (Kiser and Baer 2005, 234). These 
networks within party-state bureaucracy often lasted for decades.  
 In comparison, the Soviet state did not militarize to the extent of its Chinese counterpart 
because the October Revolution did not create the opportunities for the Bolshevik party elites 
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to penetrate and control the Tsarist military bureaucracy. As a result, the organizational 
frames of Soviet party-army dynamics were structured in a separate pattern. “The consistent 
pattern of civil intrusions in military affairs, from the mayhem of Stalin to the political 
struggles of Gorbachev however, nonetheless created an environment of mistrust and 
competition between the Party and the Army that undermined the growth of attitudes 
conductive to objective control” (Nichols 1993, 32). Thus, the interlace of personal networks 
and formal institutions within the Chinese Leninist state field is another precondition to the 
possibilities of state competition. These persistent institutional structures of agency relations 
were the legacies of the regional insurgencies that contributed to militarization.  
 Therefore, the post-revolutionary Leninist state in China can be understood a militarized 
political machine geared to catch up with industrial modernity. In the Leninist meta-field, the 
militarized socialist elites agreed on the necessity of rapid industrialization for putting an end 
to the organic crisis of Chinese society since the 1840s. On March 5, 1949, Mao Zedong 
urged his comrades in his report to the Central Committee to “do our utmost to learn how to 
administer and build the cities” (1949). In so doing he proposed that the Party needed to 
“whole-heartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of the labouring masses, win 
over the intellectuals and win over to our side as many as possible of the national bourgeois 
elements and their representatives who can co-operate with us -- or neutralize them” (1949). 
So that the new party-state “can wage a determined struggle against the imperialists, the 
Kuomintang [Guomindang] and the bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step 
by step” (1949). From the founding moment of the PRC, the collective intentionality to 
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rapidly industrialize the agrarian society devastated by civil wars, political chaos, and foreign 
invasions was shared by the socialist elites within the top echelons of the CCP.  
From Military Merits to Post-Revolutionary Bureaucratization 
 The post-revolutioanry state formation is the focus of this section, for here the encounter 
of large-scale taking of life—through revolutioanry war or counterrevolutionary state-
sanctioned mass murder—took on a new dimension, the political consequences of which 
vitally affected the politics of industrialization. In response to Mao’s orders to develop state-
led industrialization, many communist military officers became the leaders of industrial 
programs. After the CCP successfully overthrew the Guomindang party-state in China’s 
mainland, this collective consensus about the political necessity of industrialization was the 
new illusio of the Leninist field of power. As a result, the administrative subfields of the 
Chinese socialist state were transformed from the revolutionary military-bureaucratic subfield 
which was the institutional pillar of the Party’s power. This conversion of military elites into 
administrative official was ordered by the dominant actors of the state field—members of the 
Central Committee. During the transitional period between 1949 and 1952, the regional 
administrations of the socialist state was delegated to the field commanders who commanded 
the communist troops that had liberated the regions.  
 The entire administrative subfields at the foundational moment of the socialist state were 
directly transformed by the party leadership from the military subfields. In the postwar world 
that succeeded the Revolution, the beginning of this socialist project served to transform 
soldiering into an attainable and much admired merit in the Leninist field of power. “The first 
generation of the ministers in the Peoples’ Republic generally came from the peasant 
backgrounds and had extensive military experience” (Hou 2018, 16). For example, the 
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second minister of oil industry (who would be promoted by Mao to the de facto leader of the 
State Planning Commission in 1964 when the Third Front began)—Lieutenant-General12Yu 
Qiuli joined the Red Army in 1929 as a peasant boy and lost his left arm in battle. In 1970 he 
was formally appointed as the director of the State Planning Commission and remained in 
office till 1980. In 1975, he was promoted to vice prime minister. His ascendence continued 
after Mao died in 1976. In 1982, Yu entered the high command (i.e., the Central Military 
Commission of the CCP) as the deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces (i.e., the 
deputy secretary-general of the Central Military Commission; he also severed as the Director 
of the General Political Department at the same time).  
 As a prominent figure of the central planners, Yu’s carrier exemplified how the infused 
pattern of the party-army relations became an enduring relational structure of the post-
revolutionary party-state. Committed peasant youths fought side by side with Marxist 
intellectuals whose ideals triumphed over their lack of military training, who entrusted the 
military officers with the task of building of the socialist project. This relational structure 
accounts in part for the institutionalization of this infused pattern of party-army dynamics. To 
this day, the armed forces of the People’s Republic are the armed wing of the Party by 
constitution. The Chinese high command was integrated into the institutions of the Party—
the Central Military Commission of the CCP (Fravel 2019) in 1954. The Chinese chief of the 
General Staff directly reports to the Chairman of the Central Military Commission—a 
 
12 Commissioned in 1955. Military rank was first introduced to the People’s Liberation Army in 1955. Before 
this date, the armed forces did not have a rank system. For the sake of consistence, all the military ranks in this 
thesis refer to the military rank of the historical actor in 1955 if the date of commission is not specified.   
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position is always occupied by the head of the Party. Military personnel pledge allegiance not 
to the state but to the party and the socialist fatherland in their oath.  
 In comparison, the Soviet party-state developed a separate pattern of party-army 
dynamics that was reinforced by subsequent geopolitical changes. After the military 
catastrophes in 1941 and 1942, Stalin no longer intervened generals’ planning of strategic 
operation. Since then, the Soviet Stavka (i.e., Staff of the Supreme High Command) could 
autonomously draft plans of strategic operations (see Glantz 2013, 120-123).The Stavka thus 
provided organizational linkages between “political and military leaders and, hence, clear 
political control over the conduct of war” (Glantz 2013, 122). The working organs of the 
Stavka were the General Staff. According to Marshal Sokolovsky, “the General Staff, the 
most important agency of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the main working 
agency of the Supreme High Command, was reorganized” (Sokolovsky and Garthoff 1963, 
362) in 1941.  
 Specifically, the Soviet General Staff was entrusted with planning for “strategic 
operations, their thorough provisioning, control over their fulfillment, the solutions of 
problems of organization of the armed forces, control over the formation and reformation of 
units, organization of operational and strategic transport, and many other problems 
concerning the direct control and coordination of the military activity” (Sokolovsky and 
Garthoff 1963, 362) of every branch of the armed forces on numerous fronts. “The General 
Staff created special groups of officers, known as the General Staff Officer Corps, which 
provided liaison between the General Staff and operating forces. These officers provided a 
constant General Staff presence in front, army, and even corps and division staffs” (Glantz 
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2013, 123). Against the background of Party’s despotic power, the Soviet General Staff—a 
state bureaucracy—became the institutional embodiment of unity of command.   
 Moreover, the soviet arm-to-army strategy of defense created a professional military 
bureaucracy in which political commissars’ interventions to operational planning often 
resulted in conflicts between political commissars and military officers and catastrophes on 
battlefields. “The Stavka, either directly or through its representatives, familiarized 
commanders of directions and fronts with the aim of each operational, provided forces and 
weaponry, designated missions, and organized cooperation between fronts and other large 
units” (Glantz 2013, 122; emphasis in original). Consequently, the Soviet political 
commissars were outcompeted by professional military officers in the Second World War 
since they lack the military expertise for conducing combat-arms operations. In October 
1942, they lost the command-and-control authority and were demoted to be subordinates of 
professional military officers. This relative autonomy of the Soviet military subfield 
continued in the post-war era (see Nichols 1993). The Soviet and Eastern European socialist 
armed forces were all nationalized in the late 1940s. During peacetime, the Soviet armed 
forces was administrated by a state bureaucracy—the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The chief 
of General Staff directly reports to the minister of defense for assisting the minister (i.e., an 
active duty officer) to perform his duty of defending the socialist fatherland. The Soviet state 
planning commission was always led by professional technocrats.  
 Too much fear is paralyzing; and too little fear is suicidal. The right amount of fear, 
however, can become a potent force of social change. This collective insecurity enables the 
socialist elites to sense danger and react to it. Structured by this fear, the competitive 
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dynamics of policymaking emerged in the Leninist field of power. Each camp of the divided 
socialist elites (i.e., the central planners, the consumption builders, and the mass mobilizers) 
within the Central Committee strived to presented their particular agendas as the best means 
to fulfill the universal interests (including socialization, industrialization, and defense). These 
power struggles resulted in pragmatic, ruthless, and ultimately disturbing articulations of the 
unlimited use of state-sanctioned violence for neutralizing perceived threats. These 
competitive dynamics of political articulations shaped and reshaped these self-proclaimed 
guardians’ action-orientations of socialist industrialization. Th competitive dynamics of 
political articulation was at center of the bureaucratization of socialist states. 
 In sum, the differences in party-army dynamics in the Soviet Union and China are shaped 
by their differing trajectories of the founding struggles—the socialist revolutions. 
Consequently, a separate pattern of party-army dynamics emerged in the Soviet Union and an 
infused pattern emerged in China. Then, the power struggles within the Leninist fields of 
power in the subsequent years of state formation reshaped the rationalization of state 
apparatuses in which centrally planned industrialization and national defense (i.e., the 
development of mobile warfare in the form of total wars) were classified as the political 
priority. In the following section, the roles of this relational structure (i.e., the infused pattern 
of part-army dynamics of the CCP) in shaping the formation of state strategies of economic 
development will be analyzed in detail.               
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The Russian Revolution  
(1917-1922) 
The Chinese Revolution 
(1911-1949) 
Repressive Monarchy  Yes Yes  
Repressed Agrarian 
Proletariat   
Yes 
Monarchical state and “Whites” 
Yes 
Guomindang and Warlords   
International Rivalries Yes Yes 
Imperial Military 
Modernization after 
Defeat in Interstate War  
Yes 
Military Reforms of 1905-12. 
   
Yes 








Warlords and Foreign 
Invaders  
No 
Civilian party leaders stayed in 
cities (Moscow and Petrograd) 
for proletarian uprisings; 
Enemies were quickly defeated 
(1917-1922). 
Irregular tactics were an 
auxiliary factor in the Red 
Army’s army-to-army strategy.   
Yes 
Civilian party leaders were 
forced out of cities to stay 
with military officers of the 
Red Army. Bloody regional 
insurgencies lasted 22 years 
(1927-1949). Army-to-army 




of Military Officers  
(Non-Instrumental 
Compliance to Party for 
Dealing with Threats) 
No 
Tsarist officers were 
systemically recruited; Loyalty 
of former Tsarist officers to the 
party leadership were assured 
via threats and disciplines.      
Yes 
Peasant boys, mutinous 
soldiers, and radicalized 
junior officers were the 
backbone of the Red Army 
officer corps.    
Mechanism (2): 
Infused Party-Army 
Networks of Civilian 
Party Elites and 
Military Officers 
(Non-Instrumental 
Compliance to Party for 
Dealing with Threats)  
No 
The commissars never fully 
gained command-and-control 
authority: the civilian party elites 
lacked the military expertise for 
intervention during the Civil 
War; Commissars’ group power 
was further reduced in the 
Second World War to improve 
combat efficiency.    
Yes 
Emotions and values from 
the autonomous operational 
experience of decades-long 
regional insurgencies 
contributed to the 
institutional persistence of 
the infused pattern of party-





No (less militarized ) 
Military bureaucracy was a state 
apparatus; the military  
officers retained high level of 
subfield autonomy. Military 
focused on combat operations; 
industrial bureaucracies were 
run by professional technocrats   
Yes (more militarized) 
Military bureaucracy was 
integrated into the Party; 
symbolic boundaries 
between statesmen and 
officers were blurred; 
generals were transferred to 
industrial bureaucracies   
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The Matrix of Socialist Statecraft: Military Merits, Industrial Modernity, and the Formation 
of Central Planning Subfield 
  The lived experience of large-scale taking of life, as fundamental as they are, cannot be 
properly understood without an appreciation to the larger organizational frames in which they 
are embedded. This is to say that the ways in which the Leninist party in general and the 
military organization in particular treat the military officers on the basis of combat efficiency 
and ideological commitment are as important to the transformation of post-imperial societies 
as the bureaucratization of the revolutionary organizations. After the Revolution, when 
camaraderie had been experienced by so many members of the CCP, the ideals of class 
universalism gathered strength as a fixture of all official account of the revolutionary past 
(Ho 2018), whether it took up the myth of sacrifice (for excellent studies of the symbolic 
structures of death in French and Russian Revolutions, see Mosse 1990; Halfin 2003) or 
emphasized the savagery of counterrevolutionary enemies. Put it differently, the ideals of 
self-sacrifice, of the collective quest for a meaningful life free from exploitation, antagonism, 
and violence, which emerged from these post-imperial crises, represented real needs in a war-
torn society on the threshold of industrialization.  
 To actualize the socialist project, the CCP elites decided to learn how to rapidly 
industrialize from the Soviet Union not only because Stalin’s Soviet state seemed to exercise 
the final authority of Marxism (as a form of ideological-symbolic power) but because the 
Soviet planned economy was viewed as the only viable option for rapidly advancing socialist 
modernization too. After the founding of the People’s Republic, the State Planning 
Commission was established in 1952. The State Planning Commission was tasked to have 
firm control “over the basic factors of the national economy, most importantly, finance, 
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material supplies, and the labor forces and among others” (Hou 2018, 17) and to focus on 
long-term strategic planning and macro-economic management. In theoretical terms, the 
establishment of the State Planning Commission can be interpreted as the installation of a 
new administrative subfield that structures the relations between socioeconomic properties 
(including physical assets) of the socialist political economy. In practice, the state planning 
commission is an autonomous subfield which can only be deconstructed by the dominant 
actors of the main overarching field—the leader of the Central Committee of the Party. 
“Fields come to be defined as relatively autonomous realms in which a particular activity is 
pursued for its own sake” (Steinmetz 2014, 2). As central planning became the vehicle of 
building the socialist industrial society, the subfield autonomy of central planning agencies 
rapidly expanded in the 1950s. 
  This relative autonomy of the central planning subfield was backed by its members’ 
high rankings in the meta-field of the Party. The founders of this administrative establishment 
included “Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai13, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Rao Shushi14, Bo Yibo, Peng 
Zhen, and Li Fuchun, all of whom were core Partly Leaders”15 (Hou 2018, 17). The efficacy 
 
13 Marshal of the People’s Republic, vice prime minster, the minister of defense and deputy commander in Chief 
of the People’s Liberation Army  
14 Rao Shushi (the Director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party) and Gao Gang—and the First Chairman of the State Planning Commission who had 
extensive ties with the Soviet officials were purged in 1954. Zhou Enlai (the prime minister), Chen Yun and 
Deng Xiaoping had conflict with Gao Gang and Rao Shushi over the design and implementation of the First 
Five Year Plan in 1953. On December 24, Mao concluded that Gao and Rao were opposing his leadership. In 
1954, during the same conference in which the Central Committee formally initiated the First Five Year Plan, 
the Central Committee denounced Gap and Rao for trying to form “an independent kingdom” within the party. 
On the height of despair, Gao then committed suicide in 1954. And Rao was arrested in 1955. They were never 
rehabilitated. This conflict was known as Gao-Rao incident.    
15 The other planning commissioners were Xi Zhongxun, Huang Kecheng, Liu Lantao, Zhang Xi, An Zhiwen, 
Ma Hong and Xue Muqiao; Li Fuchun and Deng Tuofu were deputy directors.    
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of this symbolic power is precisely because the membership of the Central Committee, as 
“symbol excreting a symbolic action of reinforcement of the symbol” (Bourdieu 2005, 61), 
allows the agents (i.e., the planning commissioners) to be recognized by the subordinate 
groups (such as generals and provincial leaders who were not in the central committee but 
made crucial contribution to the victory of the Revolution). “This symbolic capital is thus 
inevitably concentrated in his person, which, in and through its recognized existence (as 
delegated representative, president minister, or secretary general), tears the group from the 
non-existence of a mere aggregate, symbolized by the procession of voters isolated in the 
solitude of the pooling booth” (Bourdieu 2005, 61). Put it differently, the membership of 
central committee grants the symbolic leverage to ensure conformity and compliance from 
the postrevolutionary officer-ministers to the planning commissioners.  
 Interestingly, as a part of the central government’s efforts to consolidate its national 
power, most of these people were regional and military leader rather than technical and 
economic experts. In fact, there was only one professional economist (i.e., Xue Muqiao) 
among all 15 planning commissioners. Three of them were professional military elites16 and 
everyone except Xue had extensive operational experience during the Revolution (ca. 1927-
49). The military background of the commissioners further strengthened the autonomy of the 
state planning commission since the Marshals of the People’s Republic are regarded as the 
dominant figures of the military subfield—the backbone of CCP’s political power.  
 
16 Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai were the Marshals of the People’s Republic—there were ten marshals in total; 
Huang Kecheng was General of the Army who worked as Peng Dehuai’s assistant for demobilization. He was 
the deputy minister of defense and later was appointed as the Chief of General Staff in 1958. Peng and Huang 
were purged in 1959 during the Lushan Conference for their opposition to the Great Leap Forward.  
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 A similar collective strategy to consolidate national power by integrating the personal 
networks of regional leaders into the formal structures of central government (Easter 1996; 
Easter 2000) can also be found in the political processes of the formation of the Soviet state 
in the 1920s. Although most (if not all) Soviet regional elites who entered the central 
government were radical intellectuals who had no military background before the October 
Revolution. Partly because the Tsarist armed forces had much stronger and coherent military 
bureaucracy than the imperial military of the Qing state (Zhou 2019); partly because the 
Russian civil war was not as intense and prolonged as the Chinese ones; and partly because 
most of the Bolshevik party intelligentsia were from the periphery of Russian empire who 
were denied by the imperial state to join the administrative subfields for their ethnic 
background (Riga 2008). The majority of Marxist intelligentsias in China who founded the 
Party, by contrast, were Han Chinese. In addition, the symbolic boundaries between the 
intelligentsia and the officer corps were blurred as the New Armies and the military schools 
of the post-imperial warlord troops attracted a great number of intellectuals of the lower 
classes. Henceforth, the militarization of the Chinese party-state field was decisively shaped 
by the structure and intensity of the Chinese Revolution.          
 In 1954, the Central Committee of the CCP formally decided to initiate its First-Five-
Year-Plan during the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. During the 
same year, the State Capital Construction Committee was formed to assist the State Planning 
Commission for managing the construction of national infrastructure. “In 1956, the State 
Economic Commission, under Bo Yibo, was established to ease the burden on the State 
Planning Commission by auditing and examining implementation of the annual state plans, 
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coordinating among industrial sectors, and balancing plans and resources among the central 
ministries” (Hou 2018, 18). As the functions of the three commissions overlapped with each 
other to a certain extent, there was much minor restructuring among the three agencies. These 
three agencies consisted the planning agencies of the central government for design and 
implement the centrally planned industrialization.             
 Though these Chinese socialist elites shared the optimism of historical progress with 
Marx and Engels when they obtained state power in 1949, their dream of building a 
nonviolent, progressive, and emancipatory social order was almost immediately challenged 
by domestic and foreign security threats. Emerged from horrifying revolutionary violence, 
the Chinese party elites soon found themselves had to industrialize for national defense in an 
age of competing and nuclear-armed nation-states. This time, their imaginary enemy could no 
longer be analyzed by class warfare since the lethality, objectives, and intensity of their 
imaginary warfare were completely altered: they prepared to fight against superpowers in 
nuclear total war. Thus, the spirit of the movement was restructured by the fear of enemies.     
 In the next chapter, I argue that the combination of the collective insecurity (embedded in 
the infused party-army dynamics) and the geopolitical changes of the global Cold War results 
in the military logic of the Third Front strategy of industrialization. Tracing the actual 
interactions between the divided socialist elites has produced interesting insights into what 
matters most to them in their stipulations of what and who they are. These perspectives on 
roles played in the formation of state strategy by organizational frames, fantasies, fears, 
spaces, times, capabilities, power, and knowledge lend structure to the next chapter. Taken 
together, they offer a perspective on the roots of the militarized socialist project.     
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Chapter 3 The Becoming of the Third Front: Macro-Structural Change, Reformulated 
Socialist Statecraft, and the Militarized Logic of Big Push Industrialization 
The professional groups’ principal political orientations and attitudes, and their structural 
propositions in the society, also determined the arenas and channels in and through which 
they engaged in political struggles.  
– Eisenstadt 1993, 197 
From Bureaucratization to Militarization: The Third Front as a Turning Point 
 The socialist dream of a non-violent world order ended in 1964. In that year, the political 
turmoil ended the world that the Chinese socialist state had taken for granted and brought 
administrative chaos, mass violence, and military interventions into everyday life. The arche-
images of enemies were radically altered: all socialist states led by the Soviet Union were the 
revisionist enemies at the gates. Moreover, the Chinese revisionists—domestic agents who 
supplied these external enemies with crucial information, traitors who broke their oaths of 
allegiance, and saboteurs who intended to destroy the “correct” approach of socialist 
modernization developed by the CCP—had been infiltrating into the Party in the preceding 
years. Without this state paranoia (Glaeser 2004, 244-5) par excellence, the bureaucratic 
structures of state capital differentiation would fail to occur. As I will explicate below, 
geopolitical change is a necessary, but insufficient, condition. Insecurity, as the cultural 
schema of state competitions, also played a critical role in shaping the state strategy of 
decentralized military buildup, as Mao himself acknowledged in his instructions.   
 In May 1964, the CCP leadership became very concerned with its capabilities to defend 
its sovereignty. After the Sino-Soviet split, the CCP leadership soon realized that China’s 
security environment had drastically deteriorated. “No major attack ever occurred, but the 
CCP clearly had reasons to worry. In the preceding years, Beijing had seen the number of 
Soviet troops on China’s northern border rise to one million” (Meyskens 2015, 238). In 
addition, imperialists could launch attack from a new direction. “Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the 
70 
United States had been increasing its military presence for over a decade, and in late 1964 it 
had leaped closer to China’s southern border with its first air raids on North Vietnam” 
(Meyskens 2015, 238). By this time, the possibilities for prioritizing improvements of living 
standards had looked very different from the recent recovery from the catastrophic Great 
Leap Forward. 
 As the Sino-Soviet relationship continued to deteriorate, the CCP leadership sensed that 
it was possible that China would fight a war against the Soviet Union (and Mongolia). “From 
February to August 1964, China and the Soviet Union negotiated border issues, but failed to 
reach any agreement. In this period, reportedly, the Soviet Union greatly reinforced its 
military presence along the Sino-Soviet border” (Li and Xia 2018, 95). In addition, 
“according to Chinese reconnaissance, the Soviet Union increased the number of troops and 
installations along the western section of the Sino-Soviet border from July. These troops were 
engaged in frequent training and maneuvers, and senior officers increased their visits to 
forward areas” (Li and Xia 2018, 95). The Chinese socialist elites interpreted this as the 
signal of an incoming nuclear armed conflict.  
 The CCP leadership then turned to military solution to this ideological-diplomatic crisis. 
“In February 1964, Mao told the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung that the Soviet Union 
might fight a war with China if it failed to subdue it by all other means” (Li and Xia 2018, 
95). Mao’s assessment was then turned into the operating procedures of China’s national 
economy. At the Central Committee of the CCP working conference “between 15 May and 17 
June, Mao shifted China’s goal of the Third Five-year Plan from resolving the issue of ‘food, 
clothing and daily necessities’ to war preparedness” (Li and Xia 2018, 95). In fact, he 
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suggested to establish defense industry in each province. This proposal marked the beginning 
of Mao’s support to the decentralization of China’s industrialization. To operationalize Mao’s 
new grand strategy, the military establishment had to rewrite its military doctrine since Mao 
rejected the existing strategy (Li and Xia 2018, 95) which placed American amphibious 
assault as the primary threat (see Fravel 2019, 72-7) in June. In addition, the planning 
officials had to figure out how to decentralize national economy while kept investing defense 
industries.   
The Changing Logics of Practices: Fear of Imagined Enemies and Collective Action 
 The CCP leadership sensed that national strivings in this bipolar universe “were subjects 
to the geopolitical intrigue and military posturing that morphed into armed conflicts” 
(Meyskens 2020, 21). Changes in international threats, especially the growing possibilities of 
a Soviet land combat-arms invasion and American air-raids backed amphibious assault, had 
eroded important sources of support to prioritize investments for improving living standards 
(Naughton 1988, 353). According to the political logics of the Chinese party-state elites, the 
People’s Republic not only lost its main security sponsor and all economic, technological, 
and military aids, but it had to then face hostilities from Guomindang (in Taiwan), U.S, India, 
and the Soviet Union as well.  
 At the root of this state paranoia lays a fear of being annihilated, but it also results from a 
military assessment of the changing security environment. According to a report from the 
General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA) in April 1964, most of China’s 
existing industrial bases concentrated in 14 major cities were under grave dangers (General 
Staff Division of Combat Operations [1964] 2014, 55-7) if a nuclear total war broke out in 
the form of Soviet combined-arms ground invasion or American amphibious assault in 
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combination with aerial bombing17. In a potential total war, if strategic bombing or nuclear 
air strikes destroyed these industrial bases, the armed forces would be unable to defeat the 
ground invasion (General Staff Division of Combat Operations [1964] 2014, 55-6). On 9 
May, this report was sent to the Chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing (Army-General Luo was also the 
dominant actor of the defense industry subfield). Army-General Luo immediately sent this 
report to Mao Zedong and his colleagues within the top echelons of the CCP who were in 
charge of China’s defense and economic planning18. This report immediately caught Mao 
Zedong’s attention. Based on these security concerns stated in this report, the CCP leadership 
concluded that the existing defense industry and regular forces were inadequate for defeating 
the possible invasions (Naughton 1988; Mao 1964; Meyskens 2015) in the age of nuclear 
standoff.  
 Paradoxically, conditioned by China’s rugged and vast geographical scale, shortage of 
technical expertise, Cold War insecurity, and lack of economic capital, the CCP leadership 
sought to decentralize the socio-political processes of industrialization (Li and Xia 2018, 95). 
Members of the mass mobilization camp who mostly originated from propaganda and 
ideological indoctrination apparatuses favored this strategy as their weapon in the struggles 
for access to agenda-setting power at national level. On ideological grounds, Soviet-style 
planning was oppositional to their Maoist thinking which stressed proletarian power. In 
 
17 In particular, the report states that about sixty percent of the civilian manufacturing industry, 50 percent of the 
chemical industry, 52 percent of the defense industry are in these fourteen cities. The armed forces lack the air 
defense capabilities to protect these cities and the nearby transportation facilities. Based on this report, Mao later 
suggests that the Chinese planning technocrats should learn from the Soviet Great Patriotic War experience to 
relocate the industrial bases in hinterland.      
18
 In this report, the Division of Combat Operation suggested to establish a task force (zhuan an xiao zu) within 
the State Council to deal with these problems in China’s industrial economy.  
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practice, decentralization of industrial operations (mass mobilization based) seemed to serve 
the state’s interests in defense which required the mobilization of militias and local troops in 
the form of “people’s war” (Chen 2014, 8-10; Fravel 2019) which in turn provided them with 
the opportunity to remove the military and industrial elites who favored building on existing 
industrial bases for expanding urban consumption and agricultural production (Mao). 
 Consequently, when decentralization was supported by Mao Zedong as the guiding 
strategy for industrialization, the mass mobilization camp was privileged within the divided 
elites. The other two camps -- liberalization-oriented “consumption-investors” (mostly 
originated from the State Economic Commission) and hardline “central planners” (mostly 
originated from the State Planning Commission) were marginalized and purged in the 
Cultural Revolution. Between 1963 and 1964 an outline of the Third Five Year Plan was 
jointly drafted by the leading figures of these two camps which concentrated on restoring 
living standards, developing agriculture, and increasing urban consumption by building on 
existing industrial capacities in coastal areas (Chen, 2014 7-12; Meyskens 2020; Li and Xia 
2018, 95). However, Mao intervened in central planning from October 1964 and eventually 
rejected this draft Five-Year Plan in 1965.  
 By this point, Mao—the dominant position and actor in the field of power was haunted 
by his nightmares of a military catastrophe in the near future. His mind was preoccupied by 
Stalin’s failures to relocate Soviet defense industries in 1941. On 20 August 1964, when Mao 
was hearing the director of State Economic Commission Bo Yibo’s briefing about the Plan, 
Mao urged Bo to move “not only industrial and transportation agencies but entire schools, 
research institutes and technological complexes [to the Third Front] as well” (Mao [1964b] 
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2020, 73). In addition, “every province in the coastal areas needs to be stationed with one 
more division. New arsenals [in these regions] should be built in your Plan. Standing army19 
must jointly operate with stationary coastal defense forces [as the only way to fight off Soviet 
and American invasions]. This is not about retreat; this is the preparation for fighting the 
enemy” (Mao [1964b] 2014, 73). On November 26, He urged his fellow comrades in the 
central committee to “learn from Stalin’s mistakes” (Mao [1964a] 2014, 119-20) in 
preparations for nuclear total war. According to Mao, “Stalin’s inactivity for relocating 
factories, accelerating fortifications and reluctance to engaging in guerilla warfare” (Mao 
[1964b] 2014, 73; Mao [1964a] 2014, 119-20) caused the Soviet defeat in 1941.   
 As the response to Mao’s directives, the technocrats in the planning subfield immediately 
began to turn Mao’s visions into industrial realities. On September 18, Bo Yibo submitted a 
detailed report ([1964] 2014, 85-7) for relocating the industrial and transportation enterprises 
to the Third Front to Mao; Bo also sent it to some other members of the Central Committee. 
In essence, this report is a guideline for implementing the relocation of the defense industry. 
The aim of this guideline was to relocate the entire defense industry in concealed and 
decentralized forms to the Front in which all the production facilities were enshrouded by 
caves and mountains. Only facilities that had imported machinery for ongoing production 
which were too important to be interrupted “can be temporarily excluded from immediate 
relocation” (Bo [1964] 2014, 86). In this case, “a new set of machinery should be acquired 
and sent to the Third Front” (Bo [1964] 2014, 86) as substitutions. Bo also attached the initial 
 
19 Here Mao refers to the motorized combined-arms forces. These elite troops were stationed in second line for 
strategic counterstrike. They are better equipped and more mobile and heavily armed in comparison to the front-
line troops in costal aeras.    
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drafts of the relocation plans for the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the First Ministry of 
Machine Building20, Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building, the Ministry of Chemical 
Industry, the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the 
Ministry of Oil Industry, the Ministry of Geology and the Ministry of Construction in this 
report. According to Bo, these drafts would be sent to the State Planning Commission for 
further revision. In sum, the leading consumption investor—Bo Yibo agreed to operationalize 
Mao’s import-substitution industrialization at national scale as the unified collective strategy 
to regulate economic capital for national defense.     
 The Third Five Year Plan was restructured to turn the expectation of rapid growth of 
defense industry into industrial policies as well. For a while, the state planning officials tried 
to modify their original draft to satisfy the new requirements by building the existing 
industrial bases. But this modification was rejected by Mao. Since then, the State Planning 
Commission started to reformulate its Soviet-type plan-based industrialization strategy. Li 
Fuchun (the director of the State Planning Commission) delivered a speech to the planning 
officials from the entire country at the National Planning Conference on September 21 for 
implementing the new strategy which prioritized the decentralized construction of the defense 
industry ([1964] 2014, 88-91). In December, the State Planning Commission and State 
Economic Commission sent orders to provincial authorities and state-owned enterprises for 
relocating industrial enterprises, universities, and research institutes in coastal cities to the 
“rear”.  
 
20 the umbrella agency of civilian manufacturing sectors 
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 The State Capital Construction Commission also ordered to develop China’s West as the 
“rear” in preparation for resisting potential invasions at the same time. This movement was 
dubbed as the “Third Front Construction.” The primary goal of this national project was to 
develop a new industrial economy in China’s inner lands that cannot be easily occupied by 
ground invasion or destroyed by strategic bombing. This political goal soon reconfigured the 
sociopolitical horizons of industrialization in socialist China. In reality, “between 1964 and 
1980, China devoted nearly 40 percent of its capital construction budget to building the Front. 
With these funds, the CCP built more than 1,000 industrial projects. As these numbers 
illustrate, the Front occupied a major place in China’s industrialization for nearly half the 
time that Mao Zedong was in power” (Meyskens 2015, 238-9). In the state field, intense 
competitions among central planners, consumption investors, and mass mobilization camp 
were initiated: each camp articulated an institutional logic for national industrialization as the 
weapon in order to compete for the agenda-setting power to turn their blueprints into 
industrial reality. 
The Becoming of the Third Front: Symbolic Capital, Political Articulation, and Elite 
Competition 
 Mao’s rejection of the drafted plan and removal of the consumption investors from the 
planning agencies decisively reshaped the power dynamics inside the meta-field: At this 
point, the dominant sector of the industrial policy subfield was determined by the dominant 
position and actor—Mao Zedong. Put it differently, Mao insisted on duplicating massive 
military-industrial complexes in China’s hinterland. His intervention drastically reduced the 
relative autonomy of the central planning subfield.  
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 On 23 January 1965, Mao commented on Lieutenant-General Yu Qiuli (the de facto 
leader of the State Planning Commission who replaced Li Fuchun)’s briefing about his new 
proposal of the Third Five Year Plan during a Politburo meeting (zheng zhi ju chang wei kuo 
da hui yi). Mao instructed Yu to include “manufacturing industries, chemical industries, and 
defense industries” (Mao and Yu [1965] 2014, 136) into the planning of the Third Front. Mao 
argues that “if we build steel, defense, machine-building, chemical, oil, and railway industrial 
bases in the Third Front, we won’t be afraid to go to war” (Mao and Yu [1965] 2014, 136). 
This shift in the industrialization strategy undercut the authorities of the central planning 
agencies and the joint efforts from central planners and consumption investors to partially 
reverse radical agricultural collectivization and reduce investment to heavy industries within 
planning as a response to the post-Leap crises. In December 1964, “Mao accused Liu 
Shaoqi21, Deng Xiaoping22, and Li Fuchun23 of sidelining him in the policy-making process” 
(Meyskens 2020, 7). In January 1965, Mao said Liu was a revisionist. From 1965-66, marked 
by the downfalls of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun24, the mass 
mobilization camp’s strategy of decentralization (favored by Mao Zedong) eventually 
outcompeted central planning and agricultural liberalization (i.e., consumption investors’ 
agenda).   
 On 16 June 1965, Mao and his colleagues within the Central Committee organized a 
conference in Hangzhou to discuss the Third Five Year Plan. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Li 
 
21 President of the People’s Republic – leading consumption investors 
22 General Party Secretary – leading consumption investor 
23 the Director of State Planning Commission – leading central planner who developed the rejected draft Five-
Year Plan (1965-1970) 
24 Former Director of State Capital Construction Commission – leading central planner 
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Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi participated in the conference. According to Yu 
Qiuli’s report, the original Planning’s investment strategy had prioritized consumption. Basic 
industries were secondary; and defense industry was the least important sectors. Now the 
state strategy of investment was restructured to the reversed sequence. Yu asked Mao whether 
this decision “violated the principle of treating agriculture as the base” (Mao and Yu [1965] 
2014, 138) of the national economy. Mao replied that “this should be violated. The 
agricultural sector would do better” (Mao and Yu [1965] 2014, 138). Mao then suggested to 
further reduce agricultural investment. However, while Mao insisted on prioritizing the 
defense industry, he decided to control the size of state investment. Yu proposed to set the 
total state investment of the Third Five Year Plan at 108 billion yuan. Mao argued that “108 
billion yuan was too much. Extracting so much [money] from the working masses was not 
good” (Mao and Yu [1965] 2014, 138). In the end, Mao inputted three goals for the Third 
Five Year Plan. “In sum, the most important goal is to [serve] the laboring masses, we cannot 
lose popular support. Military preparation is secondary. Famine prevention is the third factor” 
(Mao and Yu [1965] 2014, 140). This conference marked the formalization of the 
decentralization strategy of industrialization in the national agenda of the Leninist party-state. 
As a result, the decentralization of industrial enterprises was implemented as the 
economic goal to increase the survivability of production facilities in nuclear total war. This 
parallel process of decentralization within the centrally planned political economy then gave 
rise to the rearrangement of the managerial structure of state capital. “The climatic event in 
this process was the decentralization of large enterprises decided on in 1969” (Naughton 
1991, 166). The central government’s state interests altered: its only focus was the military 
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industry at this point. “In 1965, 10533 enterprises, accounting for 47 percent of state-run 
industrial output, had been under central ministerial control. By 1971 only 142 factories, 
accounting for 8 percent of state industrial output remained under central control” (Naughton 
1991, 166). In fact, almost all firms other than defense industries were transferred to local 
governments. This decentralization of administrative structure was accompanied by the 
parallel decentralization of financial structure. “One of the most important results of the 
enterprises' decentralization was the depreciation funds of large enterprises (amounting to 
about 5 billion yuan annually) were remanded to local governments, giving them a reliable, 
large-scale funding source for the first time” (Naughton 1991, 166). The primary goal of state 
investment policies of the decentralized socialist industrial economy was military 
preparation. The investment policy, regardless of the level it was crafted, was concentrated to 
a small set of heavy industries.   
 Decentralization without clear procedures in the sub-fields of the party-state immediately 
led to conflict between state actors who nominally supported the decentralization agenda for 
seizing power and/or protecting their projects. In fact, even the leading member of the mass 
mobilization camp—Marshal Lin was horrified by Mao’s changing strategic thinking which 
recognized the Soviet Union as the primary threat to national security. As a senior officer who 
spent three years in the Soviet Union (from the end of 1938 to 1941), Marshal Lin was 
probably uncertain about his own fate as well. In 1964, after hearing the deputy Chief of the 
General Staff (Yang Chengwu)’s briefing on Mao’s “speeches on strategic defense, Lin was 
very upset when he linked this to Mao’s other talks regarding vigilance against the 
Khrushchev-type people within the CCP” (Li and Xia 2018, 95). Marshal Lin’s anxiety 
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reflected the fact that Mao was the dominant position and actor in the meta-field. The 
Defense Minister (i.e., Lin Biao) worried that he would fail to keep pace with Mao in 
reformulating a new grand strategy.  
 This ambiguity in state interests, which was far-reaching in many bureaucratic subfields 
of the Chinese party-state during the Cultural Revolution, revealed and concealed the 
possibilities of changing the bureaucratic lines between party, state, military economy, and 
society (see Xu 2017). For example, senior officers of the PLA who allied with central 
planners and consumption investors were targeted and purged by their comrades and 
subordinates who aligned with mass mobilization camp in every branch and service. For 
instance, in 1968, the de facto leader of the State Planning Commission—Lieutenant-General 
Yu Qiuli was targeted by the mass mobilization camp as a revisionist. (He was partially 
rehabilitated by Mao and was not dismissed from office.) This loss of subfield autonomy 
mirrored the alteration in the competitive dynamics in the meta-field. 
Corrupted by Design 
 Another consequence of this ambiguity in state interests was the epidemic chaos in 
industrial economy. For example, for fulfilling the reequipment of decentralization, much of 
the industrial planning of the Third Front factories was wasteful and impractical. In Shanxi 
Province, the factory which produced artillery projectiles was built 150 kilometers away from 
the factory which produced shell cases. Consequently, the state had to “overrun the original 
planning with an additional 7.3-million-yuan investment to complete the project. The 
employees of these two factories were one-third more than the original plan. But the 
production capacity was only twenty-five percent of the plan” (Chen 2003, 232). The tank 
factory built in Shanxi province was plagued by similar flaws caused by the decentralization 
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strategy. Its facilities were structured into two zones in four counties which were 120 
kilometers away from each other. For connecting the production line, a railroad of 120 
kilometers and a road of 70 kilometers had to be built (Chen 2003, 232). This kind of 
administrative chaos appeared in all industrial projects of the Third Front during this period.             
 As a result, the Third Front reshaped the possibilities of elite competition in industrial 
bureaucracies: It acted both as an empowering factor for involvers to articulate their interest 
into party-state’s political agenda at the national level for gathering resources and as a 
constraining factor for participants to form a political alliance based on informal ties with 
prominent figures of the CCP’s leadership. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
these competitions at all levels of the party-state were escalated into political-ideological 
conflicts (Xu 2017) which further disrupted the design and implementation of central 
planning.  
 The developmental trajectory of the automobile industry best exemplifies this crisis 
inside the Leninist state. For central planners, the decentralized operational networks of 
automobile production were a nightmare. There were two reasons. First, by the mid-1960s, 
the State Planning Commission had been targeted by Mao Zedong as the headquarter of 
revisionism. The leading opponents to decentralization – Li Fuchun and Chen Yun, the 
directors of the State Planning Commission and State Capital Construction Commission, 
respectively,25 were marginalized; their most capable staff shared much of the same fate: 
 
25 These two agencies were the two primary agencies for designing and carrying out plan-based industrialization 
at national scale 
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most of them were either re-assigned or purged. Li died in 1975 in Beijing26. Consequently, 
from 1965 the central planning agencies were reorganized into a much weaker bureaucracy 
without the capacities to independently oversee and implement planning. In other words, the 
State Planning Commission was no longer capable of coordinating industrial organizations 
for designing and implementing coherent investment policy at the national level. 
 In fact, the State Planning Commission was one of the first agencies that were stormed 
when the Cultural Revolution broke out. On 20 June 1968, a joint report from the reorganized 
State Planning Commission and the Office of Defense Industry of the State Council stated 
that the construction of the Front emerged from “a struggle between the socialists and the 
capitalist roaders, a conflict between two Party lines, and a war between two classes within 
the Party” (State Planning Commission and Office of Defense Industry 1968, 234-5). From 
this teleological viewpoint of power struggles, “Liu [Shaoqi], Deng [Xiaoping], Peng 
[Dehuai], He [Long], Luo [Ruiqing], Bo [Yibo] capitalist roaders and their agents delayed 
and sabotaged the construction of the Third Front” (State Planning Commission and Office of 
Defense Industry 1968, 235). According to the newly appointed reporter of the mass 
mobilization camp, “all delays of the implementation of the Front strategy” (State Planning 
Commission and Office of Defense Industry 1968, 235) were caused by this 
counterrevolutionary group (i.e., the state planning officials who favored central planning). 
The credentials of the state planning officials (both central planners and consumption 
investors included) as worthy beings in the socialist society were destroyed.  
 
26 After being removed from power, Li was unable to stay in Beijing, his health deteriorated drastically in the de 
facto exile to Guangdong in the name of military evacuation in preparation for potential invasion. 
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State planning officials, hailed and respected a few years earlier, were now painted as a 
fifth column. Consequently, the utility of their expertise was denied too. In 1967 and 1968, no 
annual state planning was ever designed or implemented. In 1969, all staff (except for a 
group consisted about 100 officials for basic day-today management) were exiled in the name 
of relocation for wartime relocation (zhan bei shu san). “Moreover, in 1970, the entire 
planning apparatus—including the former Planning and Economic Commissions, Material 
Supply Bureau, and Statistical Bureau—was amalgamated into a single ‘revolutionary 
committee’ with only 610 employees, 12 percent of the former personnel” (Naughton 1991, 
166). By the end of 1968, the Cultural Revolution deconstructed the other planning 
agencies—the State Capital Construction as well. The entire planning subfield was killed off 
by the external forces unleashed by the mass mobilizers. Its agenda-setting power for setting 
production quotas, maintaining supply chain, and enforcement of fiscal discipline was taken 
over by military officers and provincial revolutionary committees controlled by the members 
of the mass mobilization camp.  
 Second, the mass mobilizers originated from military-propaganda apparatuses. They 
possessed limited technical knowledge for managing industrial production. During the 
Cultural Revolution, their local allies often came from similar backgrounds or were directly 
promoted from rank-and-file workers and peasants who received little technical training. The 
members of the mass mobilization camp in the provincial government started to have the 
control over labor, materials, and money to stimulate the growth of local industrial system 
since they could use the newly acquired economic capitals for carrying out their own 
investment policies. Consequently, this change in the competitive induced political conflicts 
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at workplaces. It is in this sense that “the Cultural Revolution played a significant role too, 
since administrators and skilled workers27 came under attack for supposedly stabbing Maoist 
China in the back and supporting Soviet revisionism and a capitalist road for the country” 
(Meyskens 2020, 29).  
 In the period of 1966-69, these localized conflicts between the divided socialist elites 
culminated in bloodshed. “Nationwide fights against perceived internal threats collided with 
the Third Front in 1966 and almost completely supplanted its construction with internecine 
clashes in 1967 and 1969” (Meyskens 2020, 29). Since the mass mobilization camp 
possessed significant influences on the industrial planning of the decentralized operations 
networks in the hinterland, many of these facilities are often built solely for military-
ideological purposes which failed to be productive: since these projects were developed for 
military purposes, their geographic remoteness made them economically inefficient. To 
increase the survivability of these facilities in nuclear air raids, all of them were purposefully 
built on rugged terrains which were far from existing cities. These decisions increased the 
difficulty of construction. “Some projects were also impetuously built, and their construction 
dragged on for years. This is partially attributable to security pressures speeding up 
construction” (Meyskens 2020, 29). Consequently, they could not be easily integrated into 
inter-regional trade networks and national market without the completion of large-scale 
(economic) capital intensive investment into transport infrastructure (which was beyond 
CCP’s structural capacities at that time) 
 
27 They are perceived as the local allies of the central planners and consumption investors.  
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 The fate of the hinterland industrial bases immediately became a subject of contestation 
between central planners and consumption investors after Mao died in 1976. For central 
planners in Beijing who tried to save these industrial complexes through recentralization via 
means of finance and personnel, they soon realized that these decentralized, geographically 
remote networks of operations were very difficult to be integrated into the national economy 
due to remoteness and lack of economic scales. In addition, these factories often competed 
against each other for funding, production quota, technical assistance, and administrative 
ranks which are controlled by the central government.  
 To make the situation more hopeless, the harsh conditions of these factories led many 
technicians and engineers who were mobilized from pre-existing industrial bases at coastal 
cities in these facilities to petition for improving their welfares. On 26 January 1984, the 
Office of Third Front Adjustment and Reform (san xian jian she tiao zheng gai zao gui hua 
ban gong shi) of the State Council made a detailed guideline ([1984] 2014, 299-303) to 
address these issues. Within six months, its proposal was turned into policies. The State 
Council and the Central Military Commission issued a joint order ([1984] 2014, 304) to 
improve the living conditions the Third Front enterprises’ employees and their dependents.   
 Finally, perhaps most importantly, the cause for developing these industrial complexes 
was lost. Deng Xiaoping, as the supreme leader, no longer considered a nuclear total war 
would break out soon28 ([1981] 2014, 284; [1984] 2014, 309-10; [1985] 2014, 314-315). 
 
28 In July 1977, Deng Xiaoping was formally rehabilitated by the CCP leadership. He was appointed as the Vice 
Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the 
Vice Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA at the same time. This meant he had access to 
veto power in the decision-making processes in party, state and military affairs. His appointment of the Chief of 
the General Staff ended in November 1979. From 1981 to 1989, Deng was the Chairman of the Central Military 
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Since the Sino-US relationship had been greatly improved since the early 1970s, he also 
expected the United States would play a more supportive role if a Sino-Soviet war broke out. 
Because of the improvement of Sino-US relationship and the gradual abandonment of 
supporting third world revolution, Deng Xiaoping—the leader of the survived state planning 
officials who favored investing consumption and agriculture (i.e., the consumption investors) 
decided to shift the focus of industrialization from defense industry to agriculture and basic 
industries (for consumptive goods). Deng’s decision marked an important change of the 
meta-field—the socialist state no longer considered military preparation for nuclear total war 
as the priority of its national agenda. As a result, the investment policy of the central 
government was opened to debate, competition, and revision.   
The Articulated State Interests: Defense, Industrialization, and Decentralization 
 Given that the primary (if not sole) purpose of the Front was to develop a war-time 
industrial economy for a potential nuclear total war, the military and industrial bureaucracies 
of the central government were both heavily involved. When the Front was officially 
abandoned in 1985, it had reconfigured the structural features of the heavy industries in 
China. “From 1964 through mid-1971, 380 large-scale factories were moved to Third Front 
regions (about one-fifth of the total number of large plants in the Third Front)” (Naughton 
1991, 160). In fact, “the program was so huge that it can fairly be said that, with the 
exception of petroleum development, the central government’s industrialization policy from 
1965 through 1971 was the Third Front” (Naughton 1991, 158; emphasis in original). The 
Front was central to socialist industrialization in the late Mao era.  
 
Commission. In the command-and-control structure of the PLA, this meant he was the supreme leader of the 
armed forces who had final authority to military decisions.        
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 All capital-intensive industrial sectors were involved in the Third Front to various extent. 
For example, “during the Front, the CCP further expanded railroads in China’s West with an 
additional 8,000 kilometers of tracks, which accounted for 55 percent of rail built in China 
between 1965 and 1980. In this same period, western China’s percentage of national rail also 
jumped from 19 percent to 35 percent” (Meyskens 2015, 241). As these numbers illustrate, 
the mass mobilization camp’s collective strategy of the Third front occupied a major place in 
China’s industrialization for almost half the time that Mao Zedong (i.e., the dominant actor 
and position of the state field who favored the mass mobilization camp’s agenda) was the 
supreme leader.  
Table 3.1: Third Front Investment as a Proportion of National Investment 
Region 1953-1964 1965-1971 1972-1980 1981-1987 
Southwest29 10% 23% 11% 8% 
Northwest30 10 12 9 7 
Second Phase31 13 15 15 11 
Third Front Total 32 50 35 26 
(Source of Data: Naughton 1991, 161) 
 The Front was especially prominent during much of the late Maoist period (ca. 1959-76). 
Henceforth, these strategic choices also profoundly restructured the administrative subfields 
of the Leninist party-state. Large scale organizations were formed and reconfigured to 
oversee railroad construction; and existing institutions were rearranged for directing factory 
construction and facility relocation. Depending on the path, pattern, and degree of 
 
29 Southwest: Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan 
30 Northwest: Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai 
31 Second Phase: Hubei, Hunan, Henan.  
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involvement in the Third Front, the political consequences of the Front were differentiated for 
industrial sectors. 
Martyred for the Socialist Cause: Dreaming about the Emancipatory Futures in the Violent 
Past 
 The distinguishing mark of the socialist state field is the extraordinarily high cost of 
contestation inside the meta-field of power. The political field is “the relatively autonomous 
world within which struggle about the social world is conducted only with political weapons” 
(Bourdieu 2015, 335). This conceptualization of the political field captures how the power 
dynamics inside the Central Committee of the Party “transcends” into economic-industrial 
realities. The power struggles for acquiring the symbolic capital—the “correct” approach to 
build a socialist industrial society at the scale of nation-state often led to the annihilation of 
its participants and the deconstruction of the administrative subfields led by them.  
 It is in this sense that Lenin’s democratic centralism was never actualized by the socialist 
elites in the politics of industrialization. The mode of operation was neither democratic (i.e., 
every participant can willingly express and articulate their voice and turn their voice into 
actions) nor centralized (i.e., the collective strategy adopted by the party commission cannot 
be overwritten by the subsequent closed-door confrontations within the state bureaucracy) 
This competitive dynamics of annihilation and reconstruction was at the center of the politics 
of socialist industrialization.  
 Dubbed the “golden boy” of the October Revolution by Lenin himself, Nikolai Bukharin 
nonetheless was removed from the meta-field of the Soviet party-state for his objection to 
Stalin’s dreams of rapid industrialization which resulted in disastrous forced collectivization. 
Shortly before Bukhrain’s execution by his former comrades he wrote to his wife, “urging her 
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to ‘remember that the great deed called the Soviet Union lives; only this is really important. 
Our personal fates are transient and pitiful’” (Halfin 2003, 282). From the beginning of the 
politics of socialist industrialization, the cost of contestation was extraordinarily high.    
 In the case of socialist China, this stake of contestation over the “correct” means to 
perform the “self-fulfilling revolutionary prophecy” (Glaeser 2011) of creating a communist 
society is equally high. Marshal Peng Dehuai and Army-General Huang Kecheng, 
respectively, the minister of defense and the chief of the general staff were purged in 1959 for 
trying to save the national economy from the catastrophic Great Leap Forward. Their 
opposition was classified by Mao as a plot of coup d'etat.  
 Peng’s successor was Marshal Lin Biao who never dared to challenge Mao’s strategy of 
industrialization. Lin was appointed as the minister of defense and deputy secretary-general 
of the Central Military Commission of the CCP shortly after the purge to Marsha Peng and 
his generals in 1959. Within a few years, Li Fuchun and Liu Shaoqi, respectively, the director 
of the State Planning Commission and the Chairman of the People’s Republic, paid with their 
lives for opposing Mao’s agenda to prioritize national defense. They were classified by Mao 
as the revisionists who tried to sabotage the socialist development as the hidden enemies 
inside the Party. 
 These violent dynamics of competition were by no means limited to the meta-field. 
During the first three years of the Cultural Revolution, rank-and-file of the Third Front 
workers were slaughtered as well. In 1967, a group of the 17000 workers from Shangdong 
and Henan provinces who had been tasked to construct the Third Front roads for military 
preparation (zhan bei gong lu)—the Eighth Regiment of Workers became involved in the 
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violent conflicts between rival grassroot organizations backed by mass mobilization camp 
and the administrative establishment. By 16 January 1967, 104 people were killed in street 
fights. The members of the mass mobilization camp backed faction who attacked the workers 
reported to the Kunming Military District that the members of the Eighth Regiment of 
Workers became a “armed column of bandits” which had been “robbing arsenals, storming 
towns and killing military personnel” (Chen 2003, 187). The Kunming Military District then 
reported to the Central Committee for permission to conduct counter-insurgency operations. 
After obtained the permission from the Central Committee, commanding officers of the 
Kunming Military District ordered its troops to encircle the Eighth Regiment of Workers in a 
coal mine. The troops then opened fire on the workers. 243 civilians were killed as insurgents 
and all the rest were arrested by the troops (Chen 2003, 187).  
 On 13 February, Jiang Qing—Mao’s wife and the leading figure of the mass mobilization 
in the central government camp phrased this bloody event as a “necessary counter-insurgency 
operation” when she met with the leaders of these grassroot organizations from Yunnan 
province (Chen 2003, 187). The other prominent member of the mass mobilization camp 
Kang Sheng—the head of the secret police supported Jiang’s evaluation: “if [the workers who 
supported the administrative establishment] went to the oppositional side [of the party line 
issued by the mass mobilization camp], then they are counterrevolutionary bandits” (Chen 
2003,187). As the mass mobilization camp now started to exercise the political power of 
classification at national level, they could deploy institutional degradation to any voice which 
opposed their agenda.  
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 Similar incidents happened in almost every town in China. These conflicts were vicious, 
murderous, and bloody regardless of administrative level (see Su 2011; Wu 2014). In the case 
of Shanghai, many workers and engineers who were mobilized for the Third Front took this 
chance to escape their factories and returned to their hometown. Once they returned to 
Shanghai, “they started to hold struggle rallies against their superiors who had mobilized 
them for the Third Front” (Chen 2003, 188). By early 1967, the 20000 personnel of the 26000 
workers mobilized by three industrial bureaus of the Shanghai municipal government had 
returned to Shanghai. In one Third Front factory in Xian which had 1500 employees 
mobilized from Shanghai, only the firm manager and the party secretary refused to desert 
(Chen 2003, 188). As a result, the Front was halted. “In 1967 and 1968, the completed state 
capital construction projects only equaled 66.9 percent and 50 percent of the one of 1966” 
(Chen 2003, 188). The state bureaucracies, the industrial subfields included, were first sent 
into chaos, and then paralyzed. 
 As a result, the Central Committee was forced to devise unconventional policies to 
restore social order and industrial production. The authorities of the party-state officials in 
provincial government were relinquished. And the military was instructed to replace the party 
committees at all levels of the administrative subfields for exercising state authorities. The 
power of the military subfield mushroomed to an unprecedented level. 
 In fact, the experts in violence were in charge of socialist development. On 16 February 
1967, a new separate troops branch of the PLA—the Corps of Engineers for Capital 
Construction (ji ben jian she gong cheng bing) was established to be the backbone of the 
construction of the Third Front. In the joint order issued by the State Council and Central 
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Military Commission titled “The Decree to Carry Out the Cultural Revolution in the Corps of 
Engineers for Capital Construction” (guan yu ji ben jian she gong cheng bing bu dui jin xing 
“wen hua da ge ming” de tong gao), the Corps was tasked to “construct the most important 
projects of industrialization and national defense industry”. The party-state depicted the 
Corps as an elite unit for realizing socialist development in the highly dynamic time of the 
socialist theodicy: “this is a big event about speeding up the race against time for out-
competing the imperialists and revisionists” (Chen 2003, 189). This decision militarized all 
construction team and civil engineers employed by the central government. Mao personally 
endorsed this policy. The officer corps of the Corps was transferred from other branches of 
the PLA and the Corps was explicitly instructed to be not involved in the factional struggles.                        
 Certainly, worrying about the fate of the socialism is not something new under the sun. 
Fears of the possible end of the historical progression of class universalism have been 
recurrent in the political thinking inside the Leninist states across the globe and have sparked 
intense debates among socialist state elites as to the reality of the coming of the emancipation 
under central planning, or whether such claims were merely a wishful thinking of the self-
deluded nomenklatura for justifying its own existence (Djilas 1983). Contestation about the 
“correct” approach to fulfill the final completion of socialist modernization in the universal 
time of emancipation, usually articulated only in very general way, can be found in every 
socialist state from East Germany to China. Despite accusing each other being revisionist 
traitors (Mao 1964), the attempt at linking the time of industrialization campaigns to the 
universal time of the coming of true communism can be found in the official narratives of all 
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socialist states. It is in this sense that the search for the correct vehicle of industrialization is 
at the center of the power struggles inside the socialist state fields. 
 Since the core argument of this chapter revolves around socialist elites’ attempt to secure 
the CCP’s political survival, chapter 4 provides a comparative historical analysis of the 
political consequences of that attempt. 
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(Source: Meyskens 2020,5) 
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Table 3.2: Political Articulation and Elite Preferences in the Meta-Field (1964-1976) 
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32 These elites were not publicly advocating tearing down central planning during this period. In fact, before 
1978 few elites thought market economy can be a vehicle of building the socialist project. However, their 
skepticism to mass mobilization and central planning began to emerge during this period. Many of them tried to 
convince Mao that expanding consumption and developing agriculture for urban population within the central 
planning should be prioritized for remedying the post-Leap crisis. Mao’s rejection to their proposals, endless 
power struggles and the stagnation of consumption made them became increasingly doubtful to the feasibility of 
command economy as the vehicle for building a new emancipatory social order. This painful experience 
decisively shaped the contours of their economic thinking of market liberalization in the post-1978 period. They 
started to search for possibilities to incorporate market economy into the national system of political economy 
after Mao died in 1976. Therefore, I name them as consumption investors.         
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Chapter 4 The Beginning of State Capital Differentiation: Power Struggles, Subfield 
Autonomy, and Delegation of Political Will 
But the lessons of historical experience, particularly that of the Soviet states, and the 
teachings of social analysis does not incline those who would seek a mode of formation of 
opinions that is as egalitarian as possible – that is, capable of giving everyone an equal 
chance of producing and imposing opinions corresponding to their interests — to rely 
unconditionally rely on the other mode of production and expression of opinions, this one 
collective that is based on delegation to institutions especially designed to produce and 
express collective claims, aspirations, or protests (such as associations, unions, or parties), 
and charged, at least officially, with the collective defense of the individual interests of their 
members.  
– Bourdieu 2005, 59 (emphasis in original)  
Mao’s Endkampf 
 The purges to the generals and statesmen who opposed the decentralization strategy of 
industrialization was the first stage of the political competition of the Cultural Revolution. 
These purges marked the start of the reign of terror against members of the intellectual, 
administrative, and military establishments who favored to prioritize agriculture and 
consumption. The purges to these state planning officials and generals silenced all voices 
against military buildup in the Leninist field of power.  
 According to State Planning Commission’s annual plan of 1966, “the state capital 
construction budget [of this year] is 15.57 billion yuan. This is 0.61 billion yuan more than 
the 14.96-billion-yuan investment of the 1965 annual plan. The Third Front [projects] and 
military mobilization programs and defense industry in the First and Second Front will 
receive 7.8 billion yuan—half of the total investment” ([1965] 2014, 194). In total, 846 mid- 
to large scale industrial projects were planned in the annual planning. And “408 projects were 
in the Third Front, 203 projects were in the Second Front; 227 projects were in the First 
Front; 8 projects such as telecommunication facilities were interprovincial ones” (State 
Planning Commission [1965] 2014, 198). Most planned production facilities, power stations, 
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and transport facilities were for the full-scale production of conventional weapons in 
preparation for the imminent nuclear total war.           
 As the central planning subfield was killed off by Mao, a power vacuum inside the 
socialist state field emerged. To fill this vacuum, the members of the mass mobilization camp 
soon played a key role in supervising the construction of the Front. Interestingly, the high 
command—the Central Military Commission of the CCP took over the role of designing and 
implementing the industrialization strategy; the high command became a kind of war cabinet 
which sidelined the State Council. By 1965, “the PLA numbered more than 6 million troops” 
(Li 2007, 236). To restore social order, under Marshal Lin’s command, “the Chinese military 
replaced civilian governments at the provincial, district, county, and city levels through 
military administrative committees from 1967 to 1972“ (Li 2007, 236). In fact, civil power 
was in the hands of the divisional commanders.  
 Therefore, between 1967 and 1972, the Chinese socialist state was militarized to an 
unprecedented level. By indirect militarization, this means “a civilian leads the executive and 
the military wields political power from the background, for instance through a national 
security council ‘advising’ the government” (Eibl, Hertog, and Slater 2019, 3). While the 
Chinese military did not develop a logic of practice in which they pursued the military 
interests for their own sake, the military was the backbone of state institutions. The PLA used 
its officers as administrators for schools, factories, companies, villages, and farms. More than 
2.8 million officers and soldiers participated in the tasks” (Li 2007, 236). In fact, one could 
argue that the entire state field was under the command of military officers who remained 
loyal to the supreme leader—Mao Zedong. By February, “the military administration took 
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control of nearly seven thousand enterprises of mass media, defense, law enforcement, 
foreign affairs, transportation, finance, and other pivotal activities” (Li 2007, 236). By the 
end of 1967, PLA administrative teams had taken over all universities, colleges, high schools, 
and elementary schools across the country” (Li 2007, 236). All key ministerial portfolios 
were occupied by active-duty officers. The military became the most powerful subfield of the 
socialist state field.  
 In provinces where the Third Front projects concentrated, civil power was almost entirely 
in the hands of the men on horseback. “By September 1968, each province had established a 
provincial revolutionary committee to replace the governor’s office, a provincial congress, 
and a provincial court (Li 2007, 236). Inside these “omnipotent” revolutionary committees, 
“the majority of the provincial committee members were from the military: about 98 percent 
in Hubei, 97 percent in Yunnan, 95 percent in Shanxi, 84 percent in Liaoning, 81 percent in 
Guangdong, and 78 percent in Beijing” (Li 2007, 236). The first five years of the Cultural 
Revolution was the only period of the People’s Republic in which the armed forces replaced 
party-state bureaucracies for basic administrations.  
Nuclear Nightmare 
 These militarized structures of state power were also partly caused by changes in 
geopolitics: the Warsaw Pact’s combined-arms invasion to Czechoslovak in 1968 was a 
particularly alarming event to the Chinese socialist elites. From the viewpoint of the Chinese 
socialist elites, the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was the formalization of the Soviet state’s denial to 
other socialist states’ sovereignties. “Late in 1968 the situation along the Sino-Soviet border 
deteriorated sharply in the wake of Soviet troops’ invasion of Czechoslovakia and the CCP 
Central Committee’s 12 Plenary Session” (Yang 2000, 25). Soon, the process of escalation 
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itself went head over heels. In March, a major armed clash erupted between Soviet border 
guards and PLA troops on Zhenbao (Damanskii) island. “The situation at the border quickly 
got out of hand and created, for Beijing, a perceived danger of war that Mao never intended” 
(Yang 2000, 22). As a result, Beijing had to prepare for a nuclear total war between the Soviet 
Union and China33.    
 Therefore, Marshal Lin’s military buildup was also nominally supported by the 
remaining central planners such as the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. Although the Prime 
Minister considered a full-scale nuclear war to be avoidable (Yang 2000) and tried to control 
the scale of military production, he could not object Marshal Lin’s military buildup as the 
priority of the central government. After all, Marshal Lin was one of the most talented 
military officers whose skills of mastering combined-arms operations at strategic level were 
widely acknowledged by the CCP leadership. In addition, Mao concluded that the economic 
liberalization which prioritized agriculture and urban consumption by building-up existing 
industrial bases, as a response to the catastrophic Great Leap Forward, was inappropriate and 
insisted that a national agenda that prioritized heavy industries was obsoletely necessary. 
 In response to the imminent threat of nuclear total war with the Soviet Union, the CCP 
threw the Third Front construction into high gear in 1969. Mao had to consider the possibility 
of the border conflict of being the precursor of a full scale Soviet combined-arms invasion. 
On 28 April 1969, Mao delivered a speech to the Central Committee of the CCP for urging 
 
33 Zhou Enlai’s assessment of the possibility of full scale invasion differed from Mao’ analysis. Zhou thought 
that it would be unlikely for the border conflict to escalate into total war. But this border conflict did create a 
armed standoff between China and the Soviet Union. This standoff forced the Chinese party-state to regard the 
Soviet Union as its primary security threat.      
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the party-state leadership to mobilize the Chinese people for mentally and materially prepare 
for the incoming war (Mao [1969] 2014, 244). In the same speech, Mao also reemphasized 
his support to the decentralization strategy of industrialization. According to Mao, the 
provincial authorities should not “request materials from the central government for weapons 
such as hand grenades. Hand grenades can be built in every province. Small arms should be 
produced in every province too” (Chen 2014, 244). Indeed, “the Chairman even claimed that 
China should be ready to ‘fight a great war, an early war, and even a nuclear war’. He also 
mentioned that in fighting a war against the Soviet revisionists, China should be prepared to 
lure the Soviet enemy deep into Chinese territory” (Yang 2000, 31). As a response to Mao’s 
speech, the mass mobilizers led by Marshal Lin and his generals inside the high command 
was tasked to supervise the growing defense industry by implementing the decentralization 
strategy. To address these security concerns, the central government continued to let military 
necessities dictate industrialization.    
 In terms of state security, the military appeared to be the final assurance for the central 
leadership of the CCP. Generals were needed to hold the country together. As the most 
cohesive organization which (re)controlled the arms, the PLA was the dominant political 
force to restore social order and to end the factional violence unleashed by Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution at the grassroot level. These self-reinforcing dynamics drastically increased the 
power of the military subfield in the state field for shaping and reshaping policy outcomes. 
Marshal Lin became the only Vice Chairman of the Party. Consequently, Marshal Lin and his 
generals started to hold agenda-setting power and veto power to industrial policy at national 
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level since they became the de facto successors of the purged central planners and 
consumption investors within the party-state field. 
  Known as the “Lin Biao clique”, this group consisted Lin’s wife Ye Qun, the chief of 
General Staff Huang Yongsheng (a Colonel General), deputy chief of the General Staff Wu 
Faxian (a Lieutenant General who also served as the commander of the Air Force), 
Lieutenant General Li Zuopeng (deputy chief of the General Staff and Political Commissar of 
the People’s Navy) and Lieutenant General Qiu Huizuo (the chief of the General Department 
of Logistics)34. From 1965 to 1971, this group of the mass mobilization firmly controlled the 
formation of military doctrine, the management of economic recourses (inside the military 
field) and the design of industrial policy for the defense industry.  
 The action orientation of the mass mobilizers marked the assimilation of war within the 
mechanisms of state power. Ordered by these generals of the mass mobilization camp, the 
military establishment switched China’s industrial economy to a total-war track. Marshal Lin 
stated that “fighting war is about the ratio [of turning national strength into military power]. 
We should reserve all existing fiscal capacities and cutting expenditure of all businesses for 
concentrating fiscal capacities to this affair” (i.e., military buildup) (Chen 2003). According 
to the Minister of Finance Wang Bingqian’s report on the National Planning Conference in 
1972 (shortly after Marshal Lin’s death on 13 September 1971), the socialist state’s military 
expenditure had jumped from 16.5 percent of the state budget of the Second Five Year Plan 
 
34 While Lin Biao hold a tremendous of power as Mao’s handpicked successor, he was not the dominant 
position and actor in the meta-field. Mao continued to be the dominant position and actor in the military, party 
and state field. In fact, Lin’s position was very unstable. After Lin Biao’s violent death in 1971, the Lin Biao 
clique was denounced and arrested.  
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(37.5 billion yuan) to 28.5 percent of the state budget of the Third Five Year Plan (70.7 
billion yuan). In 1969, the state spent 15.8 billion on defense (30.2 percent of the annual state 
budget); in 1970 this number was 23.7 billion (33.6 percent of the annual budget). To execute 
Marshal Lin’s industrialization strategy, the socialist state devoted 40 percent of its budget to 
defense in the Third Five Year Plan (Chen 2003, 235). In comparison, between 1950 and 
1953, the central government’s military expenditures amounted to 41 percent, 43 percent, 33 
percent and 34 percent of total state budget35(Li 2007, 112). In other words, Marshal Lin 
spent as much state funding as the one of the Korean War. “In an atmosphere where the threat 
of imminent war was dominant” (Yang 2000, 22), military buildup became the only goal of 
the socialist state in 1969.” 
The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger: Competition and Crisis 
 Comparing to the Central Military Commission’s active roles of supervising and 
constructing the Third Front, the state bureaucracy played a much more limited role of 
coordinating the development of defense industry from 1966 to 1969. While the Central 
Military Commission directly designated the locality, type and technical requirement of the 
production facilities, the State Council could influence the path, scale, and budget of these 
industrial projects. The state field was led by the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai36. Under the 
leadership of the Prime Minister, a small group of experienced state officials was able to 
 
35 “In all, about 73 percent of the Chinese infantry troops were rotated into Korea (25 of 34 armies, or 79 of 109 
infantry divisions). More than 52 percent of the Chinese air force divisions, 55 percent of the tank units, 67 
percent of the artillery divisions, and 100 percent of the railroad engineering divisions were sent to Korea” (X. 
Li 2007, 106). 
36 In contrast to Mao’s preference of radical decentralization for rapid growth; Zhou Enlai’s strategy was much 
moderate. Zhou Enlai protected many central planners who were attacked by the mass mobilization camp during 
the Cultural Revolution.  
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retain their authorities and issue state orders. This administrative establishment included Li 
Xiannian, Gu Mu, Yu Qiuli, Su Yu, Yuan Baohua (Chen 2003, 191) and some other officials. 
They functioned as the backbone of the surviving central planners in the state field. In fact, 
these fiscal-planning officials led by Zhou Enlai were the core of the central planners 
(Meyskens 2020, 77) during the Cultural Revolution. The members of the administrative 
establishment were organized into the Administrative Group of the State Council (guo wu 
yuan ye wu zu) which was established by the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1967.  
 Before Mao Zedong died in 1976, the central planners worked under the protection of the 
Prime Minister Zhou in the Administrative Group of the State Council as indispensable 
experts for technical management within the collective strategy of decentralization. This 
organization continued to exist till 1975 when a power struggle in the meta-field began. Lin’s 
death in 1971 changed this distribution of power between the military subfield and the state 
subfield to some extent. This event was proved to be an opportunity for the surviving state 
planning officials. After Lin’s violent death, Mao allowed planning officials to regain their 
authorities to oversee the military industry to some extent.  
 However, before Mao’s death, central planners were unable to regain access to agenda-
setting power at national level. The Cultural Revolution was a violent nightmare for the state 
officials who favored the collective strategy of central planning. On 5 January 1968, the 
primary agency of policy implementation—the Office of the Third Front Construction 
Committee of the Southwest Bureau of the CCP (Zhong gong xi nan ju san xian jian she wei 
yuan hui ban gong shi) reported to the State Capital Construction Commission that “the 
Cultural Revolution had paralyzed the Southwest Bureau” and the Office “was no longer able 
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to perform its duty of constructing the Front” (Chen 2003, 192). And at this point, the State 
Capital Construction Commission itself was on the edge of destruction. On 6 February 1968, 
the authorities of the planning officials of the State Capital Construction Commission were 
relinquished. On 26 August, they were exiled to Jiangxi province (Chen 2003, 192). 
Consequently, the entire central planning subfield (i.e., the State Planning Commission, the 
State Economic Commission, and the State Capital Construction Commission; the officials of 
the other two agencies had been purged and exiled in the previous two years) ceased to exist. 
The authority of constructing the Third Front was transferred to the military. In fact, all 
industrial sectors which were considered to be important to national defense were all 
transferred to the military in 1969. This institutional arrangement would constitute to function 
till Marshal Lin lost his power and life in 1971.           
 While Lin’s generals were purged in 1971, the mass mobilization camp within the 
administrative field managed to expand their power by exploiting this power vacuum. Led by 
Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, this group who originated from the propaganda apparatuses would be 
known as the Gang of Four. In terms of collective strategy, they agreed on the necessity of 
industrialization with other state elites but disagreed on almost every other issue from 
military doctrine to foreign policy. Between 1972 and 1976, no coherent state strategy of 
industrialization was issued by the central government: the investment to the Third Front 
reduced since the border conflict deescalated and a nuclear total war between the Soviet 
Union and China no longer seemed to be the most imminent threat. But the Front was still 
considered to be the primary goal (at least in the official statements). The final showdown 
between the mass mobilizers and the alliance between central planners and consumption 
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investors would only happen shortly after Mao died in 1976 in which this alliance decisively 
won by purging all the members of the mass mobilization camp (Baum 1994). The Guard 
Regiment (zhong yang jing wei tuan) arrested the leading figures of the mass mobilization 
camp (i.e., the Gang of Four) that marked the end of the Cultural Revolution.  
The Fate of Ministries: Railway, Automobile, and Shipbuilding Industries 
 To illustrate the causal effects of the strategic choices on the political consequences (on 
institutional change), I decide to focus on the three national agencies which all involved in 
the Third Front construction to various extent: The Ministry of Railways, the Sixth Ministry 
of Machine Building (Or simply the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry), and the Chief 
Directorate of Automobile Industry. Given that the three agencies took differentiated roles in 
facilitating the construction process, the technocratic-minded ministers’ abilities to articulate 
their organizational interests during the Cultural Revolution were weakened; in the 
subsequent post-1978 economic reform period, their capacities to articulate their interests for 
influencing industrial policy were conditioned by their engagement in the Third Front. 
 These changes at sectoral levels were decisively shaped by the competitive dynamics in 
the meta-field. In the meta-field (i.e., the Central Committee of the CCP), before the Front 
was put to an end in the early 1980s, consumption investors and central planners’ capacities 
of articulating industrial policy (i.e., the State Capital Construction Commission and State 
Planning Commission’s capacities to directly control and oversee industrial production at 
national scale) were weakened since the Maoist mass mobilization camp led by the Gang of 
Four was not outcompeted in the power struggles inside the Central Committee. Between 
1971 and 1976, a temporal stalemate (Naughton 1991) emerged between the divided socialist 
elites. 
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Table 4.1: The Differentiated Institutional Outcomes of the Third Front 
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 After Mao died in 1976, however, the decentralization strategy was collectively 
understood by survived consumption investors and central planners as economically 
inefficient and dysfunctional. Furthermore, the violent conflict among these three camps led 
to a strategic alliance between central planners and consumption investors to remove the 
mass mobilizers from positions of power: After the arrest and trial of the Gang of Four 
 
37 Its internal conflict was moderate in comparison to the other two ministerial agencies.  
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(which is the official designation to the four leading figures from the mass mobilization camp 
who played active roles in escalating the Cultural Revolution), decentralization strategy was 
halted in 1977; and its supporters in the party-state bureaucracy were marginalized.  
 Once the Maoist decentralization camp was outcompeted, to put an end to the 
dysfunctional outcomes of the decentralized industries, these two groups of elites (the 
consumption investors and central planners) started to compete over the agenda-setting power 
in the meta-field. On the one hand, survived central planners favored to simultaneously 
strengthen large state-owned enterprises and central planning. On the other hand, 
rehabilitated consumption investors opposed recentralization and favored market-building 
and de-collectivization (for example, see Gewirtz 2017). In the industrial subfields of the 
socialist state, ministers of industrial sectors soon realized that they had to align themselves 
with one of the two remaining groups to expand their autonomy in policy formation which in 
turn led to the differentiated paths of reform in the state sectors.  
 The variations in patterns of involvements in the Front decisively shaped the differences 
in the developmental trajectories of the three ministries in the post-1978 reform. In this 
chapter, how and why the Ministry of Railways, the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building and 
Chief Directorate of Automobile Industry opted for import-substitution, export-oriented 
industrialization and decentralization (for inflow of foreign direct investment and joint 
ventures with foreign firms), respectively, in the post-1978 reform for market-building will be 
discussed in detail. The ministerial actors’ abilities to autonomously design and implement 
the developmental trajectory of their organization were decisively shaped by the ways they 
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were channeled to the constituencies inside the main overarching field—the state planning 
commissioners in the Central Committee of the CCP. 
Dismember Me If You Can: Sectoral Coherence of the Railways Industry, Dynamics of 
Policy Alignment, and the Formation of Import-substitution Industrialization Strategy 
 For the Ministry of Railways, its involvement in the Front engendered two sets of 
institutional arrangements which then conditioned its political trajectory in the post-1978 
reform. First, due to its extensive involvement in railroad construction, its administrative 
power, personnel, and assets had grown to an unprecedented level. “In total, the Front added 
over 8000 kilometers of tracks between 1964 and 1980. In this same period, regional 
railroads rose from roughly one-fifth of the national stock to over one-third, and trackage 
increased in all provinces, except Gansu. During the Front, western China’s annual freightage 
also increased” (Meyskens 2015, 246). As a result, the Third Front Railways became an 
indispensable component of China’s national transportation infrastructure. “By 1980, it had 
quadrupled and come to comprise one-third of the national total. In terms of personnel, China 
mobilized roughly 5.5 million people, of whom over 80 percent came from rural militias 
(4.45 million)” (Meyskens 2015, 246). As these numbers indicate, the Ministry of Railways’ 
involvement in the Front transformed itself into a “superagency” with vast resources and 
power. Put it differently, the Ministry of Railways was the vehicle of transforming China’s 
West to a unified social space for the construction of national economy.  
 From the beginning of the Front, the ministerial officials realized that they would be 
central to the construction of the Third Front since they would be in charge of building inter-
provincial railroads. From mid-August to September 1964, the acting minister of railways Lu 
Zhengcao submitted reports to the dominant actors in the military, state and party subfields 
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(i.e., State Council, the Central Military Commission, the State Planning Commission and the 
State Economic Commission) for building four railway lines of the Third Front (collectively 
designated as the Southwest Railways). In Lu’s August 11 report, he explicitly stated that the 
task of complete these four lines was “the most difficult and the biggest railway project in the 
history of China” ([1964] 2014, 58). In order to complete these four main lines, his 
apparatchiks had to “build 795 tunnels of a total length of 339 kilometers; This equal the 
length of all existing tunnels in our country; 784 large and mid-scale bridges of a total length 
of 90 kilometers [also needed to be built]; And 2248 kilometers tracks [to be constructed]. 
This required a 2.45-billion-yuan investment” (Lu [1964] 2014, 58). To complete such a 
megaproject in very limited time, Lu also had to deal with labor shortage. “Now there are 
20000 soldiers of the Railway Corps and 22000 workers from the Southwest Railway 
Construction Bureau [of the Ministry of Railways] at the construction sites of these lines. 
Most of them are skilled workers and officials. [We] need 200000 to 240000 workers for full-
scale construction” (Lu [1964] 2014, 58). Lu thought it would be impossible to train so many 
peasants with the required technical skills. “Mobilizing so many peasants and then 
demobilizing them after the completion of the project will be a huge burden for the villages” 
(Lu [1964] 2014, 58). Consequently, Lu turned to the armed forces for completing this mega-
project.     
 For turning this ambitious program into industrial reality, Lu’s solution was to create an 
army of 240000 soldiers. “After careful consideration, we think the Southwest railways 
should be constructed by the armed forces. In doing so, 80000 soldiers of the 5 divisions and 
22 regiments of the Railway corps should be assigned to the construction” (Lu [1964a] 2014 
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59). A detailed plan to expand these existing troops into the army Lu wanted was also 
included in this report. Lu suggested to name this army as the Southwest Railway 
Construction Troop. “The Southwest Railway Construction Troop will be subordinated to the 
Central Military Commission; the command-and-control authorities should be exercised by 
the Railway Corps and the Ministry of Railway. During the construction, the Ministry of 
Railways should be the primary leading agency of the Troop”. Lu also made a name-list for 
the military officers, state planning technocrats, and provincial leaders and their proposed 
positions within the command post of the Troop.  
 Lu’s reports were sent to Mao Zedong (the Chairman of the Party), Zhou Enlai (the 
Prime Minister) and Deng Xiaoping38 (the Secretary-General of the Central Secretariat) for 
approval. In these reports, Lu also made an estimate of labor demands, funding and the 
schedule of construction. He proposed to rely on 180000 military personnel from the Railway 
Corps (80000 soldiers in active service would be deployed and 100000 new soldiers would be 
recruited to meet this goal) with 50000 workers from the Ministry of Railways, 6000 workers 
from the Ministry of Coal Industry and 1000 workers from the Ministry of Metallurgical 
Industry (Lu [1964b] 2014, 79-80). In addition, he also requested 0.32 billion yuan for 
funding the construction (Lu [1964b] 2014, 79-80). Lu’s reports received instant approvals 
from the directors of the planning agencies (i.e., Li Fuchun—director of the State Planning 
Commission and Bo Yibo—the State Economic Commission) and the dominant actors of the 
party-state (i.e., Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping) (Chen 2014, 78). On 11 
September, the Central Committee issued a directive ([1964] 2014, 81) to formalize this 
 
38 Between September 1956 and March 1967, Deng severed as the Secretary-General of the Central Secretariat. 
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decision by establishing the Southwest Railways Construction Command. Lu obtained 
everything he wanted.   
 Within two months, the Ministry of Railways then started to marshal resources into its 
Third Front projects. On 6 November, the Ministry of Railways issued a ministerial guideline 
as the countermeasure to potential surprise attacks. Titled “The Ministry of Railways’ 
Countermeasures to Surprise Attacks and the Plan for National Railways Adjustment”, this 
document included a summary to the weakness of the existing railway networks, a design of 
four Third Front railway hubs and a detailed plan for building new strategic railway lines. 
According to the analysis of the ministerial officials, the major problem of the existing 
railroads was over-centralization (Ministry of Railways [1964] 2014, 99-101). The existing 
railway hubs at the industrial heartland could be destroyed in one full-scale strategic air strike 
which in turn would paralyze the entire national railway transports.  
 Furthermore, the existing railways failed to facilitate the formation of a true national 
economy. In this document, the ministerial officials state that “there is only one railroad 
linking the areas outside Shanhaiguan39; and there are only two and half main lines inside 
Shanhaiguan” (Ministry of Railways [1964] 2014, 100). In terms of the construction of the 
Front, they concluded that “all the four Third Front railway hubs must be built within the 
Third Five Year Plan [1965-1970] and this required 0.2-billion-yuan investment” (Ministry of 
Railways [1964] 2014, 100) In addition to the railway hubs new railway lines were planned 
as well. “For the sake of national defense and national economic development, several 
 
39 Shanhaiguan was the historical borderline of the Dynastic State. The regions outside Shanhaiguan were (and 
still is) considered to be the inhabitable hinterland in mountains. The regions within Shanghaiguan were the 
most populous and developed area of China.     
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strategic railway lines must be built as soon as possible” (Ministry of Railways [1964] 2014, 
100). Specifically, the ministerial leaders listed 12 strategic railways lines which need to be 
built from scratch in this ministerial guideline. They plan to complete this megaproject of 
7195 kilometers of railways on rugged terrains in seven to eight years.       
 This quick response of the Ministry of Railways to Mao’s call for wartime mobilization 
can be partially explained by its institutional origins. From the foundation the Ministry of 
Railways in 1949, the CCP central leadership structured the Ministry of Railways as a 
militarized organization which would play a key role in the war-time industrial economy. Put 
it differently, the dominant actors in the meta-field of power actively converted talented 
military officers (who acquired their credentials from their military education and battlefield 
victories) into ministerial agents in the railway subfield for designing and implementing 
socialist industrialization. For instance, the acting minister Lu Zhengcao was a former 
professional military officer who had worked as the head of CCP’s railway bureaucracy since 
1946. In 1955 he was commissioned as a Colonel General who acted as the commanding 
officer of the General Staff’s Division of Military Transportation and the deputy commanding 
officer of the Railway Corps simultaneously. In comparison, the minister of oil industry (and 
the future leader of the State Planning Commission) Yu Qiuli was commissioned as a 
Lieutenant General in 1955 (i.e., one rank lower than Lu, the Army General was a four-star 
general; the Colonel General was a three-star general and the Lieutenant General was a two-
star general; Army General was the second highest rank in the 1955 military ranking system 
in which Marshal was the highest rank). In 1958 Lu was transferred to the Ministry of 
Railways as the acting minister. Meanwhile he worked as the First Political Commissar of the 
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Railway Corps. Lu’s exemplary execution of the militarized socialist industrialization cannot 
be explained without taking his merits in the military field into account.        
 Consequently, the Ministry of Railways emerged as one of the most powerful ministerial 
subfields of the socialist state. According to the proposed 1966 Annual Planning Guideline 
(1966 nian guo min jing ji ji hua gang yao) issued by the State Planning Commission on 17 
November 1965, the Ministry of Railway alone would receive 1.863 billion yuan from the 
Annual Plan for constructing 19 new railway lines (656 kilometers in total) (State Planning 
Commission [1965] 2014, 197). In other words, the Ministry of Railway would enjoy 12 
percent of the total state budget40of industrialization (i.e., state capital construction budget: ji 
ben jian she) of that year. In addition to the construction of railway lines, the Ministry of 
Railways also utilized its funding for industrial upgrading. Before the Front, the Ministry of 
Railways mostly relied on imported Soviet locomotives. The acting minister of railways Lu 
Zhengcao ordered to build indigenous locomotives in 1964 when the Front began. In 1965, 
48 locomotives were built in total and the acting minister ordered to start experimenting with 
electric locomotives. Prototypes of electric locomotives were successfully built in 1969 
(Chen 2003, 270-71). This strategy of import-substitution industrialization for industrial 
upgrading was then crystalized as the dominant mode of operation in the railway subfield 
which continued to operate in 2021.         
 Obtaining a tremendous number of resources and power engendered political 
consequences. First, the Ministry of Railways’ informal ties with military elites and 
 
40 This number is calculated from the document of State Planning Commission’s proposal of annual planning 
guideline issued on 17 November 1965. Here the state budget excludes the projects that would be built by 
provincial authorities. In other words, this is the budget of the central government.    
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administrative staffs in the central government was strengthened. Historically, the ministry 
had developed close ties to the military establishment. From its foundation in 1949 to 1985 
(when the Front was formally ended by the Central Committee), all the ministers of railways 
had military backgrounds. Such ties were further strengthened by the construction process of 
the Third Front. “To engage in more capital-intensive work, the CCP also sent in personnel 
from the People Liberation Army’s Railway Corps (tielu ju; 660,000) and regional railroad 
offices (tielu sheji yanjiu yuan; 480,000)” (Meyskens 2015, 240). These staff from the 
Ministry of Railways often worked closely with the troops of the Railway Corps at the 
construction sites. For example, for constructing the Xinyang-Chongqing railway (895 
kilometers in total) which connected the major industrial bases of the Front, 9 divisions of the 
Railway Corps (Chen 2003, 276) were assigned for construction and three research institutes 
of the Ministry of Railways were tasked to design the railway lines. In addition, 800000 
workers (Chen 2003, 276) were mobilized from militias to assist the construction.     
 In fact, all major railway lines designed and completed from 1964 to 1978 were arranged 
in this organizational pattern as parts of the Third Front industrialization. As the Central 
Committee was instructed by Mao to be fully prepared for a Soviet combined-arms ground 
invasion in 1970, the military started to become even more involved in railway construction. 
On 25 August 1970, a joint order from the State Council and the Central Military 
Commission issued to the Railways Corps and the Ministry of Railways stated that the 
railway construction personnel should “lower the cost of construction as much as possible; 
the materials, machineries and investment will be prepared by the agencies of the State 
Council. The Hunan-Guizhou railway and Zhicheng -Liuzhou Railway Construction 
116 
Command will be led by the Guangzhou Military District” (State Council and Central 
Military Commission [1970] 2014, 258). Inside the Construction Command, the commanding 
officer was a senior military officer from the Guangzhou Military District (Chen Haihan), the 
deputy commanders included officials from Kunming Military District (Xu qixiao), the 
Ministry of Transportation41 (Sujie), the State Planning Commission (Liu Binghua), and the 
Ministry of Commerce (Jia yimin) (State Capital Construction Commission, Ministry of 
Transportation [1970] 2014, 259). In total, the Construction Command built 1639 kilometers 
of new tracks (about 20 percent of the total Front Railways) by mobilizing 1.85 million local 
workers. These two railway lines were built for linking the military industrial bases in the 
hinterland. This was a typical arrangement which reflected the industrial policy inside the 
railway subfield of this period: while the project was centrally funded, the military 
coordinated with ministerial officials to mobilize local workers for completing the project.      
 Eventually, the entire Railway Corps would be absorbed by the Ministry of Railways in 
the mid-1980s when the CCP changed its military doctrine and streamlined the PLA. These 
formal relations and informal ties with the military would be pivotal for the Ministry of 
Railways’ capabilities to articulate its role in national security and economic development in 
post-1978 reform to retain its autonomous status. By incorporating the Railway Corps and 
participating in the Front, the Ministry of Railways gained its symbolic leverage to represent 
 
41 From 1970 to 1975, the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication were briefly 
incorporated into the Ministry of Transportation. But this arrangement was ended in 1975 when Deng Xiaoping 
was tasked to resolve the administrative chaos in the railway system caused by the Cultural Revolution. 
Consequently, the Ministry of Railways became an independent entity again in that year.   
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itself as a successful agency to manage and accumulate state-owned economic capital at 
national scale by carrying out import-substitution industrialization.           
 The other institutional arrangement, perhaps the more important one, is the participation 
in the Front created a long-term coalition between the Ministers of Railways and central 
planners in the Central Committee of the CCP who could jointly take political credentials 
from the fast-track industrialization. For instance, when central planners tried to claim the 
importance of socialist modernization through planning, their involvement in the recent 
development of railway networks were utilized as evidence of their contribution which 
cannot be achieved through market-oriented liberalization alone. For the central planners, the 
industrial development in hinterland is the cornerstone of a national economy: “With this 
additional railroad infrastructure, the CCP aimed to lessen transport bottlenecks between 
eastern and western China and facilitate interregional trade” (Meyskens 2015, p.244).  
 As Vice Premier and Minister of Finance Li Xiannian (1909–1992) explained in his 
comments on the Hunan-Guizhou Railroad, “the Southwest was rich in resources but its 
development required products from other regions. Due to a dearth of interregional transport, 
resources could not easily circulate, especially since mountains surrounded the Southwest and 
made up much of its terrain” (Meyskens 2015, p.244). As the efforts to overcome 
developmental problems, “the Hunan-Guizhou Railroad would aid in resolving this problem 
since it would enable materials to flow to and from the rest of the country” (Meyskens 2015, 
p.244). It is in this sense that the central planners considered their collective efforts of 
building plan-guided industrialization as the foundation of a national society in which 
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emancipatory state-structured order could then be gradually constructed as the metanarrative 
of historical progress in socialist theodicy.  
 The technocrats of the Ministry of Railways then claimed that such railway networks 
were developed as an integrated system and put it under the administration of a highly 
centralized agency was the best option (if not the only one) to fulfill the state’s interests in 
national security (for wartime mobilization) and economic development (for inter-regional 
trade). In other words, after the Front ceased to exist in the early-1980s, the participation in 
the Third Front still brought political credentials for the Ministry of Railways. By presenting 
the historical participation in the Front as their contribution to the socialist modernization, the 
Ministry of Railroads was able to keep the fingers of ministerial power down to each track in 
the post-1978 reform.   
 Consequently, the institutional structures of the Ministry of Railways, backed by a long-
term political coalition, granted the opportunities for it to pursue import-substitution 
industrialization even in the post-1978 reform. This coherent investment policy was 
articulated by the Ministry of Railways as an effective instrument to satisfy state interests in 
national development and defense. For consumption investors who prioritized the 
improvement of economic efficiency in the state sectors via trade, material incentives, and 
rationalization of managerial procedures, this viewpoint was proved to be exceptionally 
difficult to be challenged. In practice, changing such institutional structure and its investment 
policy means that these politicians must prove their proposal to be effective not only in the 
economic sense, but also in the lens of political, military, and ideological sense. For example, 
one of the repeated arguments from the Ministry of Railways to fight off decentralization 
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which allowed the regional railway networks to retain profits was that such changes in 
investment policy would lead to the disintegration of the interregional railroads which would 
undermine the capabilities to mobilize and deploy troops.  
 This voice often found sympathetic ears in the armed forces and the State Planning 
Commission in the reform era. For example, the military and revolutionary veteran leaders 
such as Li Xiannian who controlled the veto power in the economic decision-making process 
always support the Ministry of Railways’s proposal to maintain centralization since these 
elites had personally involved in the affairs of central planning and regarded the construction 
of this national railway network as their achievements in promoting socialist modernization. 
On practical grounds, streamlining the PLA means the CCP leadership had to found ways to 
assure the loyalty and combat effectiveness of the PLA while drastically reduce defense 
expenditure. From this perspective, rewarding the retired personnel of the Railway Corps 
with positions in the Ministry of Railways was critical for the CCP’s structural capacities to 
control its coercive means. If industrial reform to the Ministry of Railways meant 
destabilizing the morale and loyalty of retired officers of the Railway Corps who possessed 
substantive ties with active-duty officers who might share the same fate, this tradeoff between 
economic efficiency and insecurity became a dangerous game which few elites in the Central 
Committee were willing to play.  
 In sum, the Ministry of Railways’ engagement in the Front leads to the formation of a 
long-term coalition between central planners and ministerial technocrats (with the active 
involvement of the Railway Corps) in this subfield. The emergence of this coalition was the 
political consequence of state interest in defense and security. In this case, the necessity to 
120 
have a centralized agency for overseeing and coordinating the construction of interregional 
railway networks overdetermines the mass mobilization camp’s articulation to overhaul the 
structure of ministry and its industry. Central planners continued their domination in the 
Ministry of Railways since they were indispensable for the completion of national railroad 
networks. They welcomed the organizational techniques of mass mobilization as a 
supplementary means to deal with the shortage of economic capital. Mass mobilization camp 
failed to provide any viable options without the assistance of technocrats among central 
planners in this subfield.    
 Also, the dominance of central planners’ allies in the subfield of the Ministry of Railways 
led to the stabilization of import-substitution industrialization as the mode of operation to 
arrange state-controlled economic capital in the railway system. While the majority of the 
consumption investors were started to be weakened and purged in the mid-1960s, a few 
surviving central planners were able to participate in the construction of railroads as 
indispensable experts42 who held relative autotomy in the ministerial subfield. In the post-
1978 reform, moreover, the consumption investors found themselves were neither able to 
discredit the central planners’ active roles in railway construction nor to separate the 
 
42 In the railway system, central planner-backed technocrats accepted some mass mobilization camp’s 
organizational techniques as auxiliary means for compensating their shortage of economic capital during the 
Cultural Revolution. For example, personnel and materials for construction projects were mobilized locally 
during the Front via militias controlled by local party authorities. This measure was accepted by the central 
planners for two reasons. First, this lowered the costs of construction since it reduced the amount of economic 
capital that needed to be mobilized by the central government. Second, since Mao favored decentralization, 
adopting these measures as auxiliary means for plan-oriented construction gave the central planners the final 
authority to railway development and the superficial cooperation with decentralization. After the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1976, these techniques were almost immediately abandoned since mass mobilization 
camp in the meta-field were outcompeted by the alliance between consumption investors and central planners. 
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economic utility of railway networks from their usefulness in fulfilling defense and security 
purposes. Consequently, central planners were able to maintain the validity of the argument 




(Meyskens 2015, 242) 
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No Mercy for Failure: Structural Fragmentations of Automobile Industry, Competitive 
Dynamics of Reform, and the End of Coherent Industrial Policy under Central Planning 
 For the automobile industry subfield, the involvement in the Third Front led to a series of 
institutional changes. “Everything about a field, including its very existence, is open to 
revision on the basis of struggles and changes inside and outside the field” (Steinmetz, 2014, 
2). The fragmentation of the automobile subfield was an outcome of intense competitions 
which existed both in the meta-field and the sectoral subfield. First, new production networks 
were developed in decentralized forms in China’s West. For example, a new mega-plant was 
built in Hubei province. Named Second Automobile Works, it was developed as part of the 
Third Front strategy. This was the largest single project in the manufacturing sectors during 
the Cultural Revolution (Naughton 1991, 160). In 1964, the Central Committee of the CCP 
formally approved the construction of Second Auto Works as part of the Front. As a result of 
the institutional logics for national defense, the Second Auto Work’s operation was highly 
decentralized.  
 Before 1964, the First Auto Works was the only automobile production facility. It was 
developed under Soviet technical assistance as one of the national priorities of the First Five 
Year Plan. In 1953, the construction of the First Automobile Works began in Changchun. 
After its completion, there were intense debates inside the Central government about whether 
to develop another automobile facility. Before the beginning of the Front, this plan 
(articulated by Mao personally) to develop the Second Automobile Works was discussed for 
multiple times. Each time it was struck down by the central planners. The planning officials 
argued that there was insufficient economic capital for building another Fordist mega-plant. 
Rather, they favored to build on the First Automobile Works.       
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 The Third Front strategists (i.e., Mao and mass mobilizers) rejected central planners’ 
centrally planned strategy and approved the construction of the Second Auto Works as the 
second production facility of the automobile industry. Given that this new automobile factory 
became a separate entity from the already established one, the political consequences of the 
Front were very different in comparison to the ones of the railway system. For the Chief 
Directorate of the Automobile Industry, the immediate results for the automobile industry 
were that the networks of production with their supply chains were further decentralized at 
national scale. Such decentralization unintentionally intensified the competition between 
factories (i.e., the First Automobile Works and Second Automobile Works) for funding, 
administrative rank, and other institutional privileges. In addition, because of the purges of 
technocrats in the automobile industry who were deemed as potential or actual members of 
the other two rival camps (i.e., the central planners and consumption investors), the 
production networks were often poorly designed and constructed (Meyskens 2020). 
 The competitive dynamics at the firm level during the Cultural Revolution also 
contributed to the fragmentation of the automobile industry. For the industrial subfields 
(including the automobile industry) in which central planners were unable to outcompete the 
members of the mass mobilization camp, “the old cadres were increasingly disturbed by the 
disruptive political movements led by the radicals, and the radicals were convinced that the 
old cadres were taking China down the capitalist road.” (Andreas 2019, 164) Comparing to 
the railway and shipbuilding sectors, because the mass mobilization camp gained the upper 
hand in the guiding agency of the automobile industry, but skilled workers and engineers 
were indispensable to the industrial development inside the factories, fragmentation of the 
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industry were reinforced by pressures from the competitive dynamics at both top and 
grassroots levels.  
 As the political competition between these two groups at the grassroots level escalated 
into armed conflicts in 1967 to 1968, the industrial bureaucracies were first stormed by armed 
red guards supported by the local allies of the mass mobilization camp and then paralyzed by 
the violent confrontations between armed groups. For example, in September 1968, the 
managers, engineers, and party officials who were mobilized from the First Auto Works to 
construct the Second Auto Works were captured by their former subordinates of the First 
Auto Works. These technocrats were sent to the struggle rallies at the First Auto Work (Wu 
2009). Most construction projects and industrial productions were halted during this period.  
Consequently, the construction of the Second Auto Works did not begin until 1969. In 
1969, Mao personally ordered to deescalate violent conflicts between the local armed groups 
organized by the local allies of the mass mobilization camp and central planners, construction 
of the Third Front restarted. “Led by Rao Bin, the former director of First Auto Works, the 
workers (many of whom had also been transferred from Changchun) scattered production 
facilities across different valleys, often utilizing the many caves of the region.” (Thum 2005, 
186) The development of the Second Auto Works reflected the typical institutional 
arrangements of the Front as well: “Construction costs were financed by the central 
government, and in that initially it would be manufacturing military vehicles, it also had close 
ties with the military command.” (Thum 2005, 186) Specifically, military officers of the mass 
mobilization camp extensively intervened the design and construction of the Second Auto 
Works.  
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Marshal Lin — the dominant actor of the military subfield and Mao’s handpicked 
successor at the time (he was appointed as the only vice-chairman of the Party) from the mass 
mobilization camp (before his “defection”43 to the Soviet Union and sudden death in 1973) 
continued to act as the patron of the Second Auto Works. Since Marshal Lin was the leading 
figure of the mass mobilization camp who was able to articulate military interests in the 
national political agenda, his support, in turn, alienated the firm managers of the Second Auto 
Works from the central planners and consumption investors. In the report from the First 
Ministry of Building Ministry (i.e., the umbrella agency of the Chief Directorate of 
Automobile Industry) to the State Council (sent to the State Council on 30 July 1969) for 
accelerating the construction of the Second Auto Works, the ministerial officials stated that 
“the Second Auto Works is the defense project personally approved by the Vice Chairman Lin 
[Biao]. The task of the Second Auto Works is designated by the General Staff. The location of 
the factory was personally approved by the Prime Minister [Zhou Enlai]” (First Ministry of 
Machine Building [1969] 2014, 249).  
In addition, the design of the construction project needed to comply with Marshal Lin’s 
military doctrine which required the decentralization of industrial production facilities. “The 
general arrangement of the Second Auto Works is guided by Vice Chairman Lin’s instruction 
to [build factories] ‘near mountains, with camouflages and in caves’. The layout of its 24 
specialized production facilities is divided into four zones” in an area of “200 square 
 
43 Lin Biao died in an air crash in which he and his family was heading to the Soviet Union. Most party-
commissioned historians in China suggested that Lin Biao had been plotting a coup. The plan was exposed and 
defeated by troops loyal to Mao. Consequently, Lin attempted to flee to the Soviet Union. Most governmental 
files on Lin Biao’s death remain classified.    
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kilometers in which there are 19 ravines” (Military Administration Committee of the First 
Ministry of Machine Building [1969] 2014, 249). Each zone “is divided by a mountain” (First 
Ministry of Machine Building [1969] 2014, 249). By building the Second Auto Works, the 
socialist state only “possessed an automobile production bases in the hinterland” but also “is 
able to meet the demand of the armed forces for mid-size off-road vehicles” as week 
(Military Administration Committee of First Ministry of Machine Building [1969] 2014, 
249). In addition, “the automobile industry of the socialist fatherland will master the 
technology of industrial automation. Thus, the industry will be able to improve its efficiency” 
(Military Administration Committee of the First Ministry of Machine Building [1969], 2014, 
249). In sum, the ministerial officials articulated a collective strategy of import-substitution to 
expand production, facilities industrial upgrading and satisfy military requirements. This 
collective strategy of the automobile subfield can be understood as an operational subtype of 
the decentralization strategy at national scale.              
In terms of production capabilities, the Second Auto Works was instructed to be fully 
integrated into the wartime economy. According to the ministerial report to the State Council, 
the Second Auto Works “should focus on producing two military vehicles (2.5-ton and 3.5-
ton military tracks) at the amount of 45000 vehicles per year to meet the requirement of the 
General Staff” (Military Administration Committee of the First Ministry of Machine Building 
[1969] 2014, 249). For putting the production line to better use, the factory should also 
organize production of civilian trucks (5-ton) based on the same prototype [of the two 
military vehicles] at the amount of 55000 trucks per year. In sum, the annual production 
capabilities of the factory should be 100000 vehicles” (Military Administration Committee of 
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the First Ministry of Machine Building [1969] 2014, 249). The report was formally approved 
by the State Council and then turned into a directive (State Council [1969] 2014, 249) for the 
acceleration of the construction on 28 October 1969. This directive marked the beginning of 
the construction of the Second Auto Works.         
Despite the fact that the workers’ contributions to the completion of the Second Auto 
Works was widely recognized by the central government as an extraordinary 
accomplishment,44 the actors in this industrial-administrative subfield missed the opportunity 
to be fully entrusted by central planners as political allies. After all, the Second Auto Works’ 
patrons were Marshal Lin and his generals who purged the state planning officials. 
Consequently, the central planes had to outcompete the Gang of Four—the remaining 
members of the mass mobilization camp—before they could design industrial policy for the 
Second Auto Works.  
This power struggle between the central planners and Gang of Four between 1971 and 
1976 disadvantaged the Second Auto Works in its competition with the First Auto Works. The 
plan to import equipment from West Germany which was essential to mass production was 
classified by the Gang of Four as “traitorous actions”. Moreover, the Gang of Four threated to 
purge the leading central planner—Li Xiannian who supported this plan. Li could not 
approve this plan until the Gang of Four was outcompeted. For the Second Auto Works, this 
meant that they could not obtain equipment for mass production. Consequently, the planning 
 
44 Rao Bin’s contribution to the construction of the Second Auto Works was recognized by the rehabilitated 
central planners and consumption investors in the Central Committee. Consequently, after the completion of the 
Second Auto Works he was then appointed as the Minister of Fist Machine Building (the First Ministry of 
Machine Building is the umbrella agency for civilian heavy industries in the manufacturing sectors); in 1982 he 
was appointed as the president of the Chinese State Automobile Corporation.     
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agencies often set higher production quotas for the First Auto Works which in turn expand 
First Auto Works’ revenue and increase Second Auto Works’ deficit. In 1976, the Second 
Auto Works had a deficit of 50.66 million yuan. In 1978, the State Planning Commission set 
a production quota of 2000 vehicles for the Second Auto Works which led to a deficit of 32 
million yuan (Chen 1996, 237-8). Meanwhile, other facilities of the First Ministry of Machine 
Building continued to trouble (rehabilitated) central planners in the post-1978 reform.  
After Mao died in 1976, the strategic alliance between consumption investors and 
central planners in the meta-field immediately arranged systemic purges to the mass 
mobilization camp—the Gang of Four and their local allies. And this alliance soon found the 
institutional legacy of the decentralization movement – dysfunctional industrial bases in the 
hinterland was a black hole for state funding. Many of them still failed to initiate any 
meaningful mass production. The production quality was often unbelievably poor. Even in 
the most successful one of all these facilities—the Second Auto Works, mass production had 
just begun: “regular production of the 2.5-ton military truck did not begin until 1975, the 
same year that a rail line to Shiyan was finally completed” (Thum 2005, 186). As a result, the 
managers of the Second Auto Works soon realized they must abandon the original wartime 
design of the facilities to achieve economic efficiency. In the 1980s, as the Second Auto 
Works continued its program of reform and development, “its remote location became a 
severe handicap. The sedan joint venture in Wuhan was not only an opportunity to acquire the 
technology necessary to build a modern car, but also a chance to move from Shiyan to 
Wuhan” (Thum 2005, 186). Viewed both horizontally and vertically, then, the Chief 
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Directorate of Automobile Industry was troubled by the structural fragmentations of its 
production facilities.    
 Consequently, in the post-1978 industrial reform, such structural fragmentations in the 
automobile industry subfield made it easy for consumption investors to mobilize opposition 
to centralization, which forced policy innovators among central planners to rely on short-term 
coalitions and to pursue innovation through existing channels rather than recast the 
institutions themselves. “If the field is space of objective positions, this does not mean that 
the array of positions is static” (Steinmetz, 2014, 2). In the state field, the agents actively 
sought to recreate the relational configurations of power and capitals. For example, in 1978, 
the party committee of the Second Auto Works decided to end the deficit by producing 
civilian 5-ton trucks.  
 To sale these trucks, they not only fixed 64 defects but also mobilized their ties to the 
provincial officials. In August 1978, the provincial party secretary of Hubei—Chen Pixian 
paid a visit to the Second Auto Works (i.e., one of the leading auto factories at the national 
level developed during the Third Front). During this visit, the firm managers seized this 
opportunity to complain to Chen that the Second Auto Works was not able to get enough 
orders from the five-year-plan which had led to years of deficits. Chen immediately ordered 
to purchase 2000-3000 civilian trucks (a modified version of the military truck which used 
the same production line) on behave of the provincial government to expand revenues for the 
Second Auto Works. This move allowed the Second Auto Works to produce 5000 trucks in 
1978: the central government purchased 2000 trucks; the provincial government bought 2000 
ones; and the military bought 1000 trucks (Chen 1996, 238). This expansion of production 
131 
ended its deficit and turned over its profit to the central government for the first time in 
history. In 1978, the Second Auto Works turned 2.79-million-yuan revenue to the central 
government (Wu 2009). Consequently, the State Planning Commission expanded the 
production quota for the Second Auto Work in the following year which enabled it to achieve 
a balance of payment. In 1980, the State Council issued an order to continue the Construction 
of the Second Auto Works. 
 All these problems made the Chief Directorate of Automobile Industry (and its 
successor: Chinese State Automobile Corporation) an easy target for firm managers in the 
automobile industry and consumption investors in the Central Committee to collectively 
criticize its inefficacy and failures as a centralized agency. While the Second Auto Works’ 
output jumped from 125,400 vehicles (1.2 percent of the total production of motor vehicles at 
national level) in 1977 to 222,300 vehicles (14.2 percent of the total production of motor 
vehicles) in 1980 (Byrd 1992, 374), the state planning officials had to deal with the economic 
and administrative problems of the automobile industry with “a legacy of small45, backward, 
overly integrated and high-cost producers” (Byrd 1992, 375). Then, the central planners and 
consumption investors would start to compete for devising the most effective policy to 
rationalize, reform, and modernize the automobile industry in the 1980s.   
In this case, neither the State Planning Commission nor the Chief Directorate of 
Automobile Industry was able to take credentials from the industrial-economic outputs of the 
automobile industry as their achievement. This can be understood as the failure of the central 
planning strategy in the automobile subfield. “Individual and collective strategies may create 
 
45 Except for the First Auto Works 
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or eliminate entre positions or transform the overall balance within a field – say, a shift from 
dominance by autonomous positions to the less autonomous pole” (Steinmetz, 2014, 2). In 
fact, the autonomy of dominant actors of the automobile subfield would be killed off by the 
internal and external forces of power struggles: an alliance between consumption investors46 
in the Central Committee, provincial governments and firm managers emerged. Under 
pressure from this vertical alliance of market-building, industrial policies designed by central 
planners were constantly under revision, and no coherent policy was pursued at the national 
level.  
The central planner’s inability to design coherent policy was also caused by fiscal 
restraints: in 1979, the planning agencies had to reduce its investment to capital construction 
(Chen 1996, 239-40) because of the lack of hard currency. This provided possibilities for 
consumption investors to devise policies to outcompete central planners. One of the most 
effective weapons crafted and deployed by consumption investors for achieving this goal is to 
strip the monopolistic status of the CSAC (i.e., the successor organization to the Chief 
Directorate of Automobile Industry). The justifying frame used for these policies was to point 
to the endemic failures of centralized agencies in solving inefficiency and conflicts: Market-
building is the only way out. This criticism was proved to be very difficult for central 
planners to counteract.  
 In stark contrasts to the disalignment of policy preferences in the meta-field, the 
managers of the Second Auto Works formed a contingent alliance with officials of Hubei 
 
46 Chen Pixian is one of them who maintains close ties to Deng Xiaoping. His appointment as the provincial 
party secretary was engineered by Deng.   
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provincial government in 1978. This alliance became the backbone of regional market-
building. In fact, this alliance functioned as an investment fund. In 1981, the central 
government decide to reduce the scale of its investment to industrialization which in turn 
reduce the demand for automobiles. To deal with this situation, the provincial officials led by 
Chen Pixian not only decided to buy 3000 trucks for providing the Second Auto Works with 
the funding for industrial upgrading, but these officials also lobbied the central bank to 
provide the loans to resolve the financial difficulties of the Second Auto Works. On the 
supply side, to achieve economies of scale, the Second Auto Works implemented a vertical 
integration strategy which put 9 factories from 8 provinces into its syndicate. On the demand 
side, Chen decided to scrap the old trucks and buy new ones from this syndicate to replace 
the old on. According to the analysis of the provincial bureaucrats, this investment decision 
would become profitable in two years (Chen 1996, 243). Chen sent a report to the State 
Council which presented this “trade-in” strategy as an effective tool of socialist 
modernization. 
 Moreover, the party committee of the Hubei provincial government also participated in 
lobbying the planning agencies. The Second Auto Works managers required to use the 
depreciation funds for capital construction. According to the formal regulations, this move 
cannot be approved. But the director of the Second Auto Works—Huang Zhengxia sought to 
get Chen Pixian’s support to make his case as an exception. In Feburary1980, Huang paid his 
third visit to Chen for obtaining this permission. According to Huang, all he need was “a 
policy” to use the depreciation funds for continuing the construction of the Second Auto 
Works. Once he obtained the permission from the party committee of the provincial 
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government, he would need no additional investment from the central government. Chen said 
to Huang that “this is a smart move which is much better than petition for more funding” 
(Chen 1996, 240). The party committee of the Hubei provincial government then approved 
Huang’s plan and sent it as a report to the central government on February 4. 
 The response of the constituents within the central government to the subfield 
bureaucrats’ industrial policies validifies the encasing effects of political alignment in the 
meta-field on policy formation. In this case, the utilitarian logics of socialist ethics (Glaeser 
2011, 107-9) shared by the divided elites in the Central Committee underpinned the 
integration of policy preferences. Although the central planners competed with the 
consumption investors, both camps were consequentialists who were interested in actualizing 
socialist modernization. This utilitarian logic was the illusio of the meta-field. On March 15, 
the State Council planning officials led by the leading central planner—Li Xiannian held a 
meeting to review the Second Auto Works’ proposal (Chen 1996, 240-1). If Li’s primary 
interests were to hold his agenda-setting power for his own sake, he could reject the proposal 
since it breached the regulations of central planning. But Li approved the proposal since he 
was also interested in actualizing socialist industrialization with whatever means which were 
necessary. “Values can provide a strong basis for integration of policy making and 
implementation” (Lieberthal 1992, 6).  
 Put it differently, the illusio of the meta-field structures the competitive dynamics 
between divided elites which structures the state-structured economic order. “Shared values, 
in short, can substantially affect the operations of a political system. Value consensus can 
basically reduce the need of the political leadership to develop additional resources to assure 
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fidelity to their priorities and compliance with their policies” (Lieberthal 1992, 7). In the 
language of analytical political economy, these shared values incentivize the members of the 
Central Committee to overcome collective action problem.  In this case, the Second Auto 
Works’ initiatives were symbolically valid for achieving the goals which the consumption 
investors and central planners in the Central Committee agreed to be important. On March 
22, the State Council issued an order that formally approved the Second Auto Works’ 
initiatives as an industrial policy.     
 Soon, the consumption investors in the meta-field enthusiastically supported these 
industrial policies designed and implemented by the alliance between the Second Auto Works 
and the Hubei provincial government. On July 22, Deng Xiaoping—the leading consumption 
investor visited the Second Auto Works, he phrased the decision of producing civilian trucks 
as “a great one”. In addition, he notified Chen and firm managers that he had read the State 
Council’s order which approved their proposal to use depreciation funds for investment. 
Deng also expressed his interests in recommending their investment policy to other industrial 
enterprises (Chen 1996, 242). When Bo Yibo (at this point, he was a vice prime minister) —
another leading consumption investor in the central committee paid a visit to the Second Auto 
Works in 1981, he openly endorsed the “trade-in” policy (i.e., the provisional government’s 
decision to scrap its old trucks for buying new ones from the Second Auto Works) as well. 
According to Bo, “there should be a plan to gradually upgrade the machineries. It is 
impossible to produce good products if the equipment is technologically backward. Old 
products should be scrapped. The vehicles which had traveled 0.5 million kilometers can be 
scrapped. This policy is great; it must be an effective one” (Chen 243). Chen then seized this 
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chance to lobby the President of the People’s Bank of China and Bo Yibo to provide loans for 
the Second Auto Works.  
 This alliance between firm managers, provincial officials, and consumption investors, or 
if you will, a faction within the state field became a potent force of market-building. The 
People’s Bank of China then provided the Second Auto Works with a 160-million-yuan loan. 
By the end of 1981, the demand of the Second Auto Works’ trucks exceeded the supply. 
Between 1978 and 1981, the annual production at the Second Auto Works jumped from 5000 
vehicles to 40000 ones; every year, the average cost per vehicle reduced 9.6 percent. By the 
end of 1981, the Second Auto Works had turned over 250-million-yuan revenues with 100-
million-yuan taxes to the central government. The financial difficulties created by the lack of 
investment from central government was effectively resolved by this alliance between firm 
managers and provincial officials.  
 Eventually, the alliance between consumption investors and firm managers outcompeted 
the coalition between central planners and head of the centralized agency (the CSAC): the 
central government would abandon its role in directly crafting investment policy and left such 
roles to provincial state authorities in the late 1980s. The alliances of firm managers and 
provincial government replaced the centralized agency for market-building. From the late 
1980s to today, the central government’s main leverage for altering the national agenda for 
automobile development would be its ability to control the access of forging direct 
investment via manipulation of the desires of foreign firms to obtain access to China’s 
domestic market.  
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The Birth of the Developmental State: Central Planners, Shipbuilding Industry Subfield, and 
the Historical Origins of the Export-Oriented Industrialization Strategy 
 In contrast to the automobile and railway industry’s extensive involvement in the Third 
Front, the lack of engagement of the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building (or simply the 
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry) created a new set of constraints and opportunities when it 
faced state-led economic liberalization. The lack of engagement in the Front generated three 
structural conditions47. First, unlike the automobile and railways industries, the shipbuilding 
industry did not obtain much funding from the Third Front. Given that the shipbuilding 
industry cannot be entirely developed in mountains, most of its production facilities remained 
in coastal areas. The decentralization of networks of operation was limited both in scale and 
depth.  
 More importantly, since the dominant actors of the military subfield decided to combine 
mass mobilization of militias and to expand its still ill-equipped ground force as its strategic 
force to fight off a potential Soviet invasion or American amphibious assault, the 
development of naval armament programs was constrained (Fravel 2019). This collective 
strategy in the military subfield which favored preparations for convention total war to deter 
the two nuclear great powers was endorsed by Mao Zedong as the only practical response to 
external threats to the CCP. The high command found itself technologically cannot rely on 
thermonuclear weapons to resolve existential insecurity.  
 
47 The Front did not include seaports; in 1973 Prime Minister Zhou Enlai ordered to renovate and develop 
seaports as a separate project. This project excluded the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry since its duty 
primarily focused on manufacturing vessels. Rather, the project was nominally supervised by the State Planning 
Commission, funded by the State Capital Construction Commission and carried out by the Ministry of Transport 
and Telecommunication; the PLA Navy was instructed to provide technical assistance to the Ministry of 
Transport. 
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  Although the PLA successfully conducted the first thermonuclear test on 17 June 1967, 
the armed forces still lacked the capabilities of mutual assured destruction since the PLA did 
not have strategic bombers or Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in service. The PLA 
acquired limited nuclear retaliation capabilities in 1971 when the DF-3 missile system was 
pressed into service (and the DF-3 missile system, which was an intermediate-range ballistic 
missile with a range fewer than 3000 kilometers, was not able to reach Moscow). In fact, the 
newly acquired nuclear retaliatory capabilities was far from assured. The only “reliable” 
operational method to conduct nuclear strike was to use the obsolete H-6A bomber (i.e., a 
license-built version of the Soviet Tu-16 bomber) which was pressed into service in 1969 to 
conduct suicidal one-way air raid. The PLA never successfully acquired ICBMs that were 
able to reach the United States before the Front was abandoned in 1980 (Lewis and Di 1992). 
In total, fewer than ten DF4 missiles (the missile which could carry a megaton warhead to a 
maximum range of 4800 kilometers) were produced in total before 1980. Some of these DF-4 
missiles entered initial service in 1971 (Lewis and Xue 1991, 213). “In 1984, the probability 
of successful Chinese nuclear retaliation against the European part of the Soviet Union (i.e., 
Soviet territory west of the Urals) was 38 percent for day-to-day alert status; if Chinese 
nuclear forces were on full alert, the probability would increase to 64 percent” (Riqiang 2020, 
86). In the case of deterring the United States, the PLA nuclear forces appeared to be even 
weaker: “In 2000, however, the only type of Chinese weapon that could reach the continental 
United States was the vulnerable, silo-based, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)” 
(Riqiang 2020, 86)48. Consequently, the high command (i.e., the Central Military 
 
48 This refers to the DF-4 missile mentioned above.  
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Commission) was forced to prioritize the Third Front as the primary industrial bases of its 
military doctrine which heavily relied on its massive conventional troops since its 
thermonuclear weapons alone were inadequate for resolving existential insecurity before the 
nuclear rocket force finally came online in the mid-1980s.               
 Since military-industrial preparations for conventional total war were central to the 
military doctrine, the PLA Navy received limited funding for its surface fleet. On several 
occasions, the navy ordered new frigates to replace its aging gunboats built in the World War 
Two when the leading central planner—Prime Minister Zhou Enlai approved this request, but 
this funding alone was insufficient for the entire industry to upgrade its obsolete technologies. 
The only exception in naval armament programs was the development of the nuclear 
submarine force which was personally supported by Mao Zedong. From the viewpoint of 
securing political survival, the nuclear submarine force was key to the PLA’s second-strike 
capabilities in the long term since only the nuclear submarines were unlikely to be destroyed 
in the first strike. Consequently, the PLA Navy, the main client of the shipbuilding Industry, 
remained as a coastal defense force. The primary role of the surface fleet was to conduct 
counter-amphibious operations and secure the territorial waters. In addition, most funding for 
the nuclear submarine programs went into research facilities which were unavailable for the 
majority of the production facilities to the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building. The only 
major investment of the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building was its new industrial 
complexes for producing torpedo boats and diesel-powered submarines in the Third Front. 
There facilities were never intended to be built as the replacement of the most advanced and 
productive facilities (such as shipyards) in the First Front.      
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 In 1969, when Li Zuopeng (the Political Commissar of the People’s Navy; the Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff)—the senior naval officer of the Lin Biao clique (i.e., the main 
implementers of the decentralization strategy in the military-industrial subfields) was 
appointed as the director of the Leading Group of the Shipbuilding Industry of the Central 
Military Commission, Li decided to expand the Third Front industrial bases of shipbuilding 
industry as a part of the rapidly growing defense industry. However, this directive was 
overturned in 1972 when the central planners regained some agenda-setting power at national 
scale. Partly because the downfall of the Lin Biao clique in 1971 had led to the removal of Li 
Zuopeng from power; partly because the scale of industrial development had overreached the 
fiscal capacities of the central government; and partly because the central planners within the 
State Council considered the ambitious program of rebuilding an entire shipbuilding industry 
in mountains to be unpractical and thus wasteful and unnecessary. In addition, unlike other 
capital-intensive transport industries such as automobile, railways and aviation, the fixed cost 
of running shipbuilding factories in caves that were thousands of kilometers away from sea 
was ridiculously high. For testing the products, these factories had to send the disassembled 
ships to seaports and then reassembled them for testing. Eventually, the Minister decided to 
sell/transfer most of these facilities to provincial authorities in the post-1978 reform era.            
 Without much military funding, the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building had to seek 
alternative approaches to gather economic capital. The limited funding from the People’s 
Navy was further reduced in the early 1980s when the CCP’s central leadership decided to 
cut the defense budget. In fact, the naval armament programs would not regain importance in 
the agenda of the Central Committee until the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. As a result of this 
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reevaluation to the military strategy in the main overarching field, the political influences of 
the high command to policies inside the industrial subfields were weakened in the post-1978 
period (Although this certainly does not suggest that the pursuit of national security becomes 
irrelevant to the members of the Central Committee).  
 When the Front was halted in 1980, most Front industrial bases administered by the Sith 
Ministry of Machine Building faced severe economic difficulties the existing facilities in the 
coastal areas could produce the same product at much lower fixed costs. Consequently, these 
military-industrial bases which had been tasked to produce torpedo boats and diesel-powered 
submarines soon were forced to produce civilian products such as automobile engines, 
bicycles, and refrigerators (Chen 2003, 321-25). In the post-1978 reform, Chai decided to 
focus on investing its costal facilities for industrial upgrading (Chai [1982b] 2000, 74-7), 
while he continued to provide some orders to the Front facilities by “outsourcing” tasks from 
coastal industrial bases. Based on these decisions, the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building 
gradually transferred/sold the rest of its Third Front factories to the provincial governments.  
 The minister of shipbuilding industry — Chai Shufan49did not have the fortune of his 
comrades in the automobile and railways industry to shield himself from vicious factional 
struggles initiated by the mass mobilization camp both from top and below during the 
Cultural Revolution by pointing to his “usefulness” in the Third Front. However, he was 
indispensable to the administration of the socialist economy for a different reason: the 
management, use and accumulation of hard currency. Trained as a custom officer before he 
 
49 Chai was commissioned in 1977 as the minister of shipbuilding industry; by this point the mass mobilization 
camp had been weakened since the leading figures of this camp in the meta-field were arrested in 1976 shortly 
after Mao died.  
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joined the Revolution, Chai was one of the few technocrats in the state field who had the 
economic expertise which were essential to the import-substitution strategy. In fact, the 
divided socialist state elites all realized that they had to import foreign technologies for 
achieving their common goal—building a socialist industrial society at national scale. 
 Furthermore, Chia’s informal ties with central planners which originated from the early 
1940s would be essential for the formulation of export-oriented industrialization of the 
shipbuilding industry in the post-1978 reform era. This relational configuration between the 
shipbuilding subfield and the planning subfield was weaponized by the central planners in the 
early to mid-1980s for fortifying their positions in the state field for exercising their veto 
power to changes in industrial policies.  
 Before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Chai Shufan was himself a top central 
planner who was responsible for the formation, design, and implementation of the Five-Year 
Plans: Chai’s career in the party-state began as a fiscal technocrat in the early 1940s. From 
the very beginning of his political career, he worked as a subordinate to Chen Yun in the 
Yan’an Marxist-Leninist Institute (i.e., the most important apparatus in the theoretical-
ideological subfield of the Party). In 1949 and 1952, he served as Prime Minister Zhou 
Enlai’s assistant during their two visits to the Soviet Union for economic, military, and 
technological aids (Gu 2000, 3-18). From 1952 he worked as the deputy director of the newly 
established State Planning Commission and then he was commissioned as the deputy director 
of State Capital Construction Commission in 195850(Gu, 19-20). After the purges to the 
members of the three central planning agencies (i.e., the two mentioned above and the State 
 
50 Chen Yun was the director. 
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Capital Construction Commission) in the mid-1960s, Chai was reassigned as the deputy 
minister of foreign trade in 1972. At this point, he worked as Li Xiannian51’s assistant for 
designing and implementing China’s import-substitution plans for industrial upgrading too 
(Song 2000, 3; Gu 2000, 21-4). Chai’s skills and ties with other central planners ultimately 
provided new opportunities for him to participate in the state-led institutional changes in the 
post-Mao reform. 
 Such a personal network among the central planners was one of the critical antecedents 
for the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building to maintain autonomous status for recasting its 
institutional structure for investment policy in the subsequent years of post-1978 reform. 
These inter-organizational networks in turn left an imprint on the form it assumed and 
channeled subsequent policy debates along particular paths. These network facilities the 
creation and accumulation of informational capital among central planners. For example, 
when Chai Shufan demanded to restructure the ministry into an “economic entity”—the 
Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation, he sent personal letters and formal reports to the 
central planners in the Central Committee who had been his colleagues and superiors from 
his days in the State Planning Commission, the State Capital Construction Commission and 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. As early as in April 1979, Chai started to utilize his ties with 
central planners in the meta-field to pursue his goals. In his letter sent to vice prime minister 
Wang Zhen, Chai urged Wang to instruct the State Planning Commission to design a plan for 
“three to five years” to “coordinate the demand of ships” ([1979] 2000, 54). Moreover, if 
 
51Li was vice prime minister in the 1970s who supervised the Front, international trade and import of foreign 
technologies; he was a leading central planner who survived the Cultural Revolution and remained in power.  
He became the head of the state (Chairman of the People’s Republic) in the early 1980s.  
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domestic industrial enterprises needed to import foreign vessels, Chai wanted the State 
Planning Commission to intervene by contacting the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building to 
arrange domestic production.  
 In this case, the minister successfully exhibited his alleged expertise of socialist 
modernization for turning this field- and competitive symbolic capital into changes in 
investment policy. Chai skillfully presented his demand as a critical factor which can 
potentially contribute to the central planners’ state strategy of industrialization. To gain 
support from the domain central planners in the mate-field, Chai pointed out that his proposal 
was a necessary step to actualize these central planners’ dream of plan-based 
industrialization. “We consider the design of a long-term developmental plan of shipbuilding 
industry as an urgent task which should be done as soon as possible” (Chai [1979] 2000, 54). 
In addition, Chai articulated his sectoral industrialization strategy as the vehicle of actualizing 
central planners' orders. “The Vice Chairman Li Xiannian’s recent instructions for developing 
a long-term developmental guideline for the shipbuilding industry is absolute necessary. 
These instructions meet the [economic] reality of the industry” ([1979] 2000, 54). In other 
words, Chai skillfully demanded to restructure the central government’s investment policy to 
provide him with the opportunities to obtain material, technologies, and money for carrying 
out industrial upgrading. His proposal received instant approvals from not only these central 
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planners but direct support from the consumption investors too: Deng Xiaoping52, Chen 
Yun53, and vice prime ministers54all endorsed his plan.  
 Put it differently, the lack of involvement—in comparison to the degree and form of the 
Ministry of Railways and Chief Directorate of Automobile Industry—in the Third Front 
indirectly pushed the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building to seek export-oriented 
industrialization (Chai [1978] 2000, 41-53) as the alternative strategy for raising funding and 
vertical integration as the industrial policy to improve economic efficiency. To actualize this 
strategy, Chai’s ties to central planners and his expertise in industrial planning and 
international trade were the two necessary conditions. This strategy was then transformed 
into the political-symbolic capital for both central planners and consumption investors to 
obtain agenda-setting power for directing national economy in contrasting but coherent 
forms. For central planners, the success of a centralized agency in generating revenues and 
industrial upgrading can be transformed into their agenda for creating more similar agencies 
under planning.  
 The restructured Sixth Ministry of Machine Building represented the birth of a new kind 
of massive industrial complex which was more economically efficient and technologically 
advanced. For marker builders, the success of Chai’s shipbuilding industry could be 
articulated as a new path for national development: the integration of Chinese manufacturers 
into the international market for attracting foreign investment and technologies. As a result, 
 
52 The leader of consumption investors 
53 The leader of central planners 
54 They are senior technocrats of the State Council who had veto powers to the operationalization of 
institutional reform and changes in fiscal discipline and monitored the design and implementation of industrial 
policies at ministerial level. Most of them were members of the Central Committee of the CCP at the same time. 
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both camps thought this move could be useful for their contrasting agendas.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
stment policy was shaped by the combination of ffective bureaucratic coordination and 
entrance into the international market. In this case, contingent events also opened new 
possibilities for re-orienting institutional choices. While funding from the armed forces 
dwindled in the late 1970s, the international market of maritime technologies shrunk due to 
the oil crisis. At the same time, Chai Shufan was troubled by obsolete technologies and 
inadequate funding to restore mass production. Surprisingly, the lack of demand in the 
international market was an unprecedented opportunity for him: it lowered the cost of 
importing foreign technologies.  
 Indeed, the minister seized this opportunity to get orders from Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
and subsequently imported foreign technologies and introduced new industrial standards 
which met the requirements of western clients (Gu 2000, 24-8). According to Chai, “now 
Europe and America have exited the international market of shipbuilding. Japanese 
shipbuilding industry are focusing on technologically advanced equipment and special 
vessels. From the viewpoint of gaining hard currency for the socialist fatherland, the most 
promising commodity is export ships” (Chai [1982a] 2000, 64). Therefore “we must 
implement coherent policy, unified planning, and centralized strategy to deal with foreign 
[competitors]. We can have some domestic competition, but we should not let the outcome of 
such competitions to benefit the foreign [competitors]” (Chai [1982a] 2000, 64). In a few 
years, these “foreign” investments from Hongkong entrepreneurs and state funding from the 
Ministry of Transport transformed the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building into a competitive 
manufacturer in the global market.  
147 
 In the mid-1980s, the Chinese State Shipbuilding Cooperation55 was able to obtain 4% 
market shares in the global market of the civilian shipbuilding industry. This success would 
be phrased by central planners in the central committee as the exemplary success of the 
creative application of state-managed economic capital in advancing socialist modernization 
under central planning. 
  
 
55 It was the successor of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry from 1982; Chai was appointed as the founding 
president of the company.  
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Conclusion State Strategies and Zeitgeist 
But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed—for there must always be 
something opposed to the good56. 
— Socrates 1990, 304 
Political Competition, Subfield Autonomy, and Policy Formation 
 When viewed side by side, the episodes of political competition examined earlier 
constitute a history of socialist industrialization that is striking on two counts. First, because it 
consists of waves of actions and reactions: those exemplified by the Tsarist officers’ reaction 
to Bolshevik leaders, Mao’s reaction to the contingent alliance between consumption 
investors and central planners for the post-leap recovery (ca. 1961-64), and this alliance’s 
reaction to mass mobilizers (ca. 1976-78), respectively. Although in some ways each wave is 
different from the ones follow, they are also very similar. Each wave is marked by a 
pragmatic, ruthless, and ultimately disturbing articulation of the appropriate solution to 
existential insecurity. These political articulations resulted in the reclassifications of priorities 
of the socialist party-state. Consequently, the fear of enemies shaped and reshaped the logic 
of practices: Leninist elites’ action-orientation is geared toward preventive intervention—that 
is, a self-defeating project in which the self-proclaimed defenders of the spirit of the 
movement can characterize their repression as preemptive measures. We may not know the 
good (i.e., the correct approach to actualize the promised emancipation), but we do know the 
bad (i.e., the absolute necessity to crush the counterrevolutionaries). 
 Second, the history of socialist industrialization is striking because despite the fact that it 
consists of a series of actions and reactions, it displays a remarkable degree of continuity. 
This continuity can be seen on two levels. The first of these concerns the events that gave rise 
 
56 See (Burnyeat, Levett, and Plato 1990, 304) 
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to each wave of action. In particular, the tension between a totalizing dream of the coming of 
a non-violent, egalitarian, and emancipatory order and an empirical reality which always 
threatens to annihilate the socialist project resulted in the state terror against (imagined) 
enemies. The second level, however, is even more surprising because it concerns the reaction. 
What is unexpected is the degree to which those who react to each wave are also forced to 
make room for the undeniable roles of the consequentialist logic of practices. This priority of 
transforming agrarian societies into industrial one is the illusio of the mate-field of power. 
 To substantiate this theory, I combine theoretical assumptions and empirical analysis to 
get a detailed picture of what and how historical actors thought and acted. Because values 
vary across time and space, I think this is the best method for explaining the agency relations 
that are central to the closed-door state competition. The personal idiosyncrasies of socialist 
state elites in positions of power—the Central Committee of the Party—have important 
impacts on socioeconomic order at the macro level. In particular, the collective experiences 
of insecurity formed in bloody regional insurgencies between 1927 and 1949 critically 
affected the CCP elites’ threat perceptions and opportunities in the global Cold War. Their 
misconceptions, fears, and fantasies (Fligstein, Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 2017) played 
important roles in the politics of industrialization. This existential insecurity resulted in the 
militarization of the post-revolutionary party-state.  
 The military merits formed in the founding struggles between mass-mobilizing CCP and 
elite-protecting counterrevolutionary warlords were central to the militarization of the 
Chinese socialist state. The Chinese generals were extensively involved in the making of state 
strategies of industrialization. Conversely, because the Russian Marxist intellectuals shared 
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little operational experience with the former Tsarist officers who commanded the Red Army 
during the Russian Civil War, the bureaucratization of the Soviet state was much less 
militarized. As a result, Soviet generals were much less involved in economic policymaking 
which took place in the Central Committee of the Party.       
 This neo-Bourdieusian theory of socialist statecraft enables us to explain the historical 
origins of state capital differentiation in post-1978 China. In this sense, then, it was the 
classification struggles in the political sphere led the Chinese socialist elites to restructure the 
economic sphere by reclassifying “a definite social relation of production pertaining to a 
particular historical social formation, which simply takes the form of a thing and gives this 
thing a specific social character” (Marx and Mandel 1991, 953). Thus, it is because the 
competitive dynamics within the Chinese Leninist state gave rise to capital differentiation 
which allowed social labor to be commodified in forms that were incompatible with Soviet-
type socialism, the economic institutions in post-1978 became more “adaptive” than the ones 
of the post-Soviet transition in which organized violence (for example, see Volkov 2002) was 
used for primitive accumulation (see Fraser and Jaeggi 2018). The post-1978 economic 
sphere (see Desan 2013) was shaped by these political forces (see Wright 1993, 219-25) 
structured by the symbolic parameters of the Leninist state. 
 In particular, the agency relations among the dominant actors conditioned the divergent 
trajectories of industrial reform designed by the actors in the ministerial subfields. Because 
the contingent alliance between consumption investors (led by Deng Xiaoping) and central 
planners (led by Chen Yun) outcompeted the mass mobilization camp (led by Marshal Lin 
and the Gang of Four) in 1976, the military logic of decentralized big push industrialization 
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for preparing nuclear total war was abandoned. Consequently, policymakers in the ministerial 
subfields were able to articulate alternative policies that gave rise to state capital 
differentiation. On the one hand, industrial policy is the subject of political competition that 
needs to be articulated by competitors as the vehicle to fulfill universal interests. On the other 
hand, it is also weaponized by competitors to hold power (Bourdieu 2014) as their particular 
interests. The relative autonomy of the subfields (for example, see McDonnell 2020, 141) can 
be successfully defended by the subfield actors if their collective strategy can symbolically 
transform their performance into the justification of the existence of the subfield.  
 If the illusio of the subfield collapsed or the collective strategy of the subfield actors 
failed to transform their resources into field- and competitive-specific symbolic capital which 
can be recognized by the dominant actors, subfieldness can be killed off by the actors of the 
meta-field—the loss autonomy. This theoretical approach can explain the conversion, 
creation, and circulation of symbolic, economic, and informational capital in the central 
government, and how the three economic-industrial subfields (i.e., the three ministries) are 
created and recreated by the competitive dynamics over the collective strategy of 
industrialization inside the meta-field of the Leninist state. In this sense, the institutional 
variations of administrative states (McDonnell 2020) are shaped and reshaped by political 
competitions that need to be thematized in the procedural context of power struggles.    
State Capital in the Global Spaces of Neoliberalism 
 Without wishing to present the reader with an all-inclusive “master interpretation”, a few 
possible theoretical implications can perhaps be presented here. In this thesis, I explored the 
historical origins of differentiated state capital in post-1978 China. The theoretical arguments 
offered here are rooted in the geopolitical context of the global Cold War in which the 
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possibilities of a nuclear holocaust were central to the Chinese socialist elites’ collective 
strategy of national development. Between 1949 and 1976, the prioritized universal interest 
of the Chinese socialist project is the development of defense capabilities.  
 Indeed, many of the inferences in this thesis such as my theoretic claim that the 
messianic self-understanding of socialist state elites that considers the Leninist state as the 
producer of a new emancipatory order challenges the conventional theoretical assumptions to 
authoritarian politics which impute state officials as self-interested actors who prioritize 
holding power for its own sake (which in turn implies that state-structured social order is a 
given product), serve as starting point for future research. The point is not that the currently 
prevalent economic and political accounts are altogether wrong. Rather, I argue there is a 
symbolic dimension of power struggles that has so far not been properly addressed. Any 
future work on state capital beyond my own focus of socialist China during the Cold War era 
would almost certainly amend, refine, or challenge the arguments offered here.  
 I would also welcome a literature exploring the varieties of state capital. Different state 
strategies of industrialization existed in other national systems of political economies outside 
this global Cold War space as well. In the case of post-soviet state formation, for example, 
state control of strategic sectors was and still is a hallmark and a defining feature of the 
Russian leviathan in the time of Putin. In the developing world, state-owned enterprises play 
important roles in national economies as well. The strategic sectors in India, for example, are 
owned by the state. In recent years, the military establishments of the Leninist party-states in 
North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam have been working on national economies behind the scenes 
as well. I suspect each of these subtypes of state capital might have different pathways to 
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their emergence, alternative sources of crystallization, and diverse mechanisms of 
differentiation from the ministries in socialist China I discuss here.    
 Differentiation of state capital can also be treated as an independent variable for 
outcomes other than authoritarian resilience and economic development. For example, the 
Polanyian effects (1985) state capitals have on the domestic responses to global neoliberal 
capitalism (Chen 2018) or the redistribution of social services are natural areas for 
consideration. In this sense, state capital is of importance because the fate of the developing 
world is interconnected to the rise and expansion of market fundamentalism.  
 Moreover, the reach of state capital can go beyond the territorial boundaries of nation-
states. However, their modes of operation differ from the ones of private capital to a great 
extent. After all, Ching Kwan Lee’s sociological analysis to Chinese state capital in Africa 
reveals that it can “adapt to local conditions in its attempt to realize its encompassing and 
multidimensional agenda, more so than global private capital, whose single-minded profit 
motive makes it more mobile” (159). In this sense, a comparative study of state capital in the 
global spaces of neoliberal economic order would contribute to our understanding of state-
society coalitions in the global periphery (for example, see Kohli 2020) from a new analytical 
angle. My hope is that such analyses would clarify the causal mechanisms that produced 
these socioeconomic orders, especially the role of economic sovereignty, or the lack thereof.   
 A final fruitful path for research would be to systematically explore the actual political 
processes which mediate elite politics and the (re)configuration of state capital. Such an 
inquiry is important not only because of the potential implications to social justice but also 
because of the intellectual consequences. After all, state always makes claims of economic 
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capital. Without economic capital, the state cannot exercise its coercive force. That is to say, 
we might regard the differentiation of state capital in the global spaces of neoliberal 
capitalism as a consequence of “a new historical intensification of the contradiction between 
the forces and relations of production in an age of increased scientific and technical 
complexity” (Joas 2003, 106) and where informational capital is increasingly central to post-
Fordist methods of decentralized production. In this regard, striving to understand the means 
by which a more inclusive mode of policy formation might lead to more equitable futures has 
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